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The Dynamics of International Trade
Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on
Officially Supported Export Credits
Janet Koven Levit*
I. INTRODUCTION
We are living through a defining moment in international law. The pace
of globalization makes cooperation through international law and institu-
tions vital. The recent SARS scare, exponentially magnified by the ease of
international travel, poignantly illuminates the proactive, standard-setting
role that international rules, such as World Health Organization regulations,
can and should play.' Yet public impatience with international law is
mounting.2 Paradoxically, this unease may be the product of international
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1. See, e.g., Editorial, Fighting a Mystery Illness, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at A16 (arguing that the
SARS epidemic shows the need "for international cooperation and collaboration"); Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of State, Lawmakers Say SARS Crisis Shows Need to Have Taiwan in WHO, May 19, 2003 (members
of Congress arguing that, despite political difficulties, Taiwan should become a member of the WHO
because of the strong need for "international coordination").
2. See, e.g., Bruce Nussbaum, Building a New Multilateral World, Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 2003, at 42 (ar-
guing that the Iraqi conflict further demonstrates the inability of multilateral institutions to solve global
problems). See also Richard S. Dunham et al., Where Do the Neocons Go From Here?, Bus. WK., May 12,
2003, at 73 (discussing neoconservative "impatience with ... international institutions such as the U.N.
that rein in U.S. power. Many in the movement would like to jettison institutions they see as managing
the status quo rather than spreading democracy."); Michael Ignatieff, The American Empire: The Burden,
Harvard International LawJournal / Vol. 45
law's maturity and success. For the first time since World War II, states have
consistently embraced international institutions to assist in the management
of prominent international issues. From the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia to the World Trade Organization ("WTO") to the
U.S. engagement of the United Nations Security Council prior to the Iraqi
conflict, states have turned to, or at least paused to reflect upon, interna-
tional law, catapulting it prominently into public view. Admittedly, interna-
tional law's record in these cases is mixed at best. But precisely because of
widespread reliance on international law in these high-profile roles, its fail-
ures have become a focal point for public skepticism and criticism.
This public unease may also be a product of the type of international law
that gains media and high-level policymaker attention, namely formal trea-
ties and security agreements marked by choreographed signing ceremonies
and diplomatic photo opportunities. Yet these headline treaties and agree-
ments mask a universe of international rules that does not technically fall
into the International Law 101 categories of formal international treaty or
customary international law3 but nevertheless performs its job and engen-
ders sustained compliance. This Article will examine one example, an in-
formal "Gentlemen's Agreement" named the Arrangement on Guidelines for
Officially Supported Export Credits (the "Arrangement") 4 as a window into
this important, but under-appreciated world of international legal regulation.
The Arrangement is a highly technical international agreement that effec-
tively regulates export credit agencies ("ECAs"), such as the Export-Import
Bank of the United States ("Ex-Im Bank"). ECAs are officially supported
governmental institutions that provide financing in support of nationals'
exports. In the 19 6 0s and 1970s, many ECAs offered subsidized financing at
below-market interest rates. In an unregulated world, the natural tendency
is for ECAs to offer increasingly higher subsidies to promote nationals' ex-
ports, triggering a costly, market-distorting war in export subsidies.
Beginning in the 1970s, and gaining great momentum with the creation
of the Arrangement in 1978, ECAs in the industrialized world voluntarily
came together to regulate themselves. The Arrangement sets specific pa-
rameters on the type of financing packages that ECAs may offer, with the
goal of eliminating all competition among ECAs. The Arrangement has
evolved significantly over its twenty-five-year history, beginning as a modest
effort to avert an export credit war and evolving into a comprehensive regu-
N.Y TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 22 (suggesting that unilateral action on the part of the
United States may be the last hope for democracy and stability given the inability of multilateral institu-
tions to enforce their proposed solutions).
3. See infra notes 232-235 and accompanying text for a technical treatment of fbrmal international law.
4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Arrangement on Guidelines
for Officially Supported Export Credits: Introduction, 8, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/3/
2763846.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (on file with the Harvard International Law Journal) [hereinafter
the Arrangement].
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latory scheme affecting most export credit activities. The attached empirical
data reveals that ECAs consistently comply with the Arrangement.
Yet the Arrangement is not a formal treaty-there are no signature, ratifica-
tion, or amendment procedures, and the parties are not technically bound by
it. Many would argue that the Arrangement is not law at all, 5 or is at best
"soft law."'6 In contrast with other international agreements that are the
culmination of heralded, institutionalized drafting conferences and ambi-
tious programmatic goals, 7 the Arrangement developed over years in a slow,
modest, almost ad hoc fashion, with no fanfare and very little publicity.
While the Arrangement manages U.S. $50 billion annually in international
trade,8 it rarely receives mention in the press. 9 Nor has the Arrangement
been the focus of any legal scholarship. 10 Yet the Arrangement achieves what
5. See, e.g., Timothy E Geithner, The Economic Policy Benefits of International Cooperation, in THE EXPORT
CREDIT ARRANGEMENT: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES, 1978-1998, 87, 87 (OECD 1998) (argu-
ing that the Arrangement does not carry the "force of law") [hereinafter THE EXPORT CREDIT AR-
RANGEMENT]. See also Lawrence H. Summers, Continuing the Fight Against International Trade Finance
Subsidies, in THE Ex-IM BANK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 258 (Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Rita M. Rodriguez
eds., 2001) (arguing that the Arrangement is not legally binding).
6. See infra notes 241-244 and accompanying text for description of soft law. See also Jacques de Laju-
gie, Soft Law, Hard Results, in THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5, at 107, 107 ("[Flew
people are aware of the actual status of the Arrangement which in itself is somewhat of a legal curiosity.
The Arrangement is one of the very few lasting and effective examples of 'soft law."').
7. See, e.g., Press Brief, WTO, Golden Jubilee of the Multilateral Trading System (Feb. 5, 1998) (providing
a detailed chronology of the lengthy, high-profile development of the GATT and WTO trading systems);
Joanna Depledge, Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article-by-Article Textual History, UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, FCCC/TP/2000/2 (Nov. 15, 2000) (providing a lengthy history of
the evolution of and high-level meetings leading up to the Kyoto Protocol). See also Allison Marston
Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the Independent
Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1633, 1642-43 (2003) (offering a succinct background on the International
Criminal Court).
8. See Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank), REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON
EXPORT CREDIT COMPETITION AND THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PERIOD
JANUARY 1, 2002 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2002, at 13, available at http://www.exim.gov/ bout/reports/
compet/compet2002.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (on file with the Harvard International Law Journal).
9. From 1989 to present, the New York Times mentioned the Arrangement only one time in conjunc-
tion with the setting of Commerical Interest Reference Rates (CIRRs). See infra notes 71-73 and accom-
panying text for description of CIRRs. A search of the Washington Post from 1977 to present yielded three
hits: two mentions were in passing and a third announced the tied aid package. See John D. Macomber,
Editorial, Aids to Trade, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1992, at A17. A search of the Wall Street Journal from
1984 to present yielded one article on tied aid. See Gary Hufbauer, Editorial, The Vicious Circle of Export
Subsidies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1985, at A30.
10. The Arrangement has been the subject of a few relatively outdated political science pieces. See, e.g.,
Daniel F. Kohler & Peter H. Reuter, Honor Among Nations: Enforcing the 'Gentlemen's Agreement' on Export
Credits, A RAND Note (Dec. 1986) (reviewing the Arrangement and making suggestions for its progres-
sive development). See also JOHN RAY, MANAGING OFFICIAL EXPORT CREDITS: THE QUEST FOR A
GLOBAL REGIME 52 (Inst. for Int'l Econ. 1995); Andrew M. Moravcsik, Disciplining Trade Finance: The
OECD Export Credit Arrangement, 43 INT'L ORG. 173 (1989) (examining the Arrangement's development
from 1975 to 1985 from the perspective of international relations theory of international cooperation).
But see Katherine P. Rosefsky, Tied Aid Credits and the New OECD Arrangement, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L.
437 (1993) (analyzing the Helsinki Package for tied aid that Participants incorporated into the Ar-
rangement in 1992).
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much formal international law has not: deep, sustained compliance-even obe-
dience1 '-among its constituents. For that reason, it warrants legal attention.
The Article unfolds by documenting compliance and then offering expla-
nations for such compliance. In substantiating compliance, this Article first
describes the rules with which states may-or may not-comply. Given the
highly technical nature of official trade finance regulation, Part II of this
Article explores the world of trade finance and ECAs as context for Part III's
in-depth discussion of the Arrangement's rules. Part IV, coupled with Table
2: Participant Compliance with the Arrangement's Export Credit Provisions
("Table 2: Participant Compliance"), Table 3: Non-Participant Compliance
with the Arrangement's Export Credit Provisions ("Table 3: Non-Participant
Compliance"), and Table 4: G-7 Compliance with the Arrangement's Export
Credit Provisions (1982-2003) ("Table 4: Historical Compliance") presents
this Article's empirical core. Through in-depth scrutiny of ECA export
finance programs throughout the world, the Article presents a picture of
thorough, deep, and sustained compliance with the Arrangement's technical
rules and processes. These data uniquely contribute to the world of trade
finance by providing a look at industrialized states' disparate approaches to
official trade finance and to compliance literature generally by quantifying
compliance on an ECA-by-ECA basis. 2
Having established ECA compliance with the Arrangement, the Article
then explores why the Arrangement breeds compliance. Part V revolves
around three categories of compliance factors: state interests (ECAs will
comply with the Arrangement when it is in their interest to do so); the Ar-
rangement's architecture (its historical evolution, constituents, architecture,
legal form, and processes); and international systemic linkages (the Ar-
rangement's relationship with other international institutions and legal sys-
tems). While all factors are undoubtedly part of the Arrangement's compli-
ance puzzle, the Arrangement itself emerges as the integral piece. The Ar-
rangement is elastic (its soft form permits experimentation and revision),
pragmatic (its processes redefine compliance in a way that accommodates ECA
practice within the Arrangement's rubric), measured (it embraces consensus
decision-making without diluting its rules with generalities and platitudes),
and the Arrangement is dialogic (the camaraderie of the Participants group
and the Arrangement's unique processes assure that the Arrangement re-
mains a vibrant and progressive discussion). In the end, Part V concludes that
11. This reference to obedience, as opposed to mere compliance, is an ode to Professor Harold Koh,
who argues that obedience to international law is much deeper and more "sticky" than compliance and
thus should be the end goal of policymakers and lawyers alike. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599, 2603 (1997).
12. While many scholars have explored compliance, few have attempted to quantify compliance. There are
two notable exceptions. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L.J. 1935 (2002) (quantifying worldwide compliance with human rights treaties and arguing that ratifica-tion
of human rights treaties may not improve a country's human rights record); Beth A. Simmons, Money and
the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323 (2000) (quanti-
fying compliance with the IMF rules regarding domestic restrictions on currency convertibility).
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the Arrangement itself must be considered at a detailed and technical level
to explain documented ECA compliance. In short, the Arrangement's rules
"matter" significantly with respect to ECA compliance decisions.
The conclusion that "law matters" conflicts with both public perceptions
of international law fueled by high-profile events and the dominant scholarly
bent. When the United States engages Iraq without explicit U.N. Security
Council approval, the public, in the United States and abroad, understands
international law and institutions to buckle easily under the weight of U.S.
power and interests in its security. Likewise, the course of international legal
scholarship, beginning with the Cold War realists, has been decisively cen-
tered on state interests, with the content, rules, and dynamics of interna-
tional law often receding into the crevices of compliance scholarship. Part VI
forays briefly beyond the Arrangement case study to explore how this Arti-
cle's fundamental conclusion-that the Arrangement's rules are integral to
the compliance puzzle-bears on some extant theories of compliance. While
the Arrangement, as a single data point in a complex web of international
regulation, cannot alone provide the foundation for a new theory of compli-
ance, the conclusions herein illuminate some strengths and weaknesses of
current scholarship.
This historic moment, with international law on the cusp of both promi-
nence and notoriety, demands a foil. The Arrangement serves that role. In its
ability to generate widespread compliance, the Arrangement provides useful
insight into the effective building of international legal frameworks and institu-
tions, which are valuable lessons given that international institution build-
ing will increase in significance during the next decade. In its pragmaticism,
the elasticity of its soft form, consensus-backed incrementalism, and dia-
logue-enhancing prodedures, the Arrangement is an international regulatory
framework that effectively beckons compliance, thereby deserving attention
and emulation. The Arrangement's dynamics and dynamism are the keys to
understanding why ECAs overwhelmingly comply with its strictures.
II. OFFICIALLY SUPPORTED INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE
A. Export Finance and Official Export Credits
Consider the following hypothetical transaction. A U.S. company, for ex-
ample General Electric ("GE"), attempts to sell a gas turbine for U.S. $10 mil-
lion to a power project in Brazil. The Brazilian company entertains bids from
GE's foreign competitors, such as Siemens of Germany or Mitsubishi of Ja-
pan. Then, the Brazilian buyer compares turbines in terms of price and quality
indicators such as reliability, energy efficiency, and energy output. Because
the Brazilian buyer likely does not want to expend cash by paying for the
turbine in full immediately, it will request proposals from each of the bid-
ders that include financing terms, such as extended terms of payment and
favorable interest rates. The Brazilian buyer now chooses a turbine on the
basis of price, quality, and the attractiveness of the financing package.
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At this point, GE has several choices, including: (1) offer no financing
package and (assuming that the foreign competition offered packages) likely
lose the sale; (2) provide and carry "debt" to the Brazilian company on its
own balance sheet; (3) borrow money from a commercial bank to "pay" for
the cost of financing; or (4) contact Ex-Im Bank, the local ECA, to provide
official support for the financing package. In this transaction, the first two
options are usually unattractive. 13 GE could engage a commercial bank and
ask it to participate in the financing transaction, either by having the bank
issue a buyer credit 14 or a supplier credit. 15 This option may not be available
or could be very expensive (and thus unattractive), depending on the com-
mercial bank's current appetite for Brazilian risk. The fourth option, en-
gaging the U.S. ECA to provide official export credit support for the trans-
action, becomes GE's most attractive option.
As the previous example illustrates, officially supported export credits are
an important lubricant of international trade and, not surprisingly, support a
giant market, exceeding U.S. $50 billion in 2000.16 Official export credit
support may involve a below-market interest rate. It may involve an ex-
tended repayment term at a reduced fee. An official export credit package
may merely offer liquidity in the face of private sector intransigence. Or it
may involve some combination of the foregoing. Whatever its shape or
form, officially supported export finance is a type of export subsidy,'7 carry-
ing all of a subsidy's costs and benefits, advantages, and disadvantages.
13. To offer no financing package is to lose the sale. The second option, to finance offofGE's own bal-
ance sheet, is a possibility, but is neither attractive nor desirable. GE would likely do better conserving cash for
making investments, paying dividends, and bolstering of the balance sheet to improve investor confidence.
14. In a buyer credit, a bank (creditor) loans money to the Brazilian buyer (debtor) to pay GE imme-
diately and have the bank carry debt to the buyer.
15. In a supplier credit, the bank (creditor) loans money to GE (debtor) to cover the "cost" of
financing (i.e., pay GE for the turbine up front), and GE repays the bank from proceeds received from the
Brazilian buyer; if the buyer does not pay GE at any point over the financing relationship, GE still must
repay the loan from its own cash reserves.
16. Export-Import Bank of the United States, supra note 8, at 13.
17. Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 177 ("A modest implicit subsidy is contained in most export credits,
since the national credit agency is a nonprofit organization with access to capital at government rates.").
For an economic description of export subsidies, tariffs, and quotas, see generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL &
ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 738-42 (3d ed. 1985). While admittedly the
Arrangement has actually squeezed most of the interest rate and repayment terms subsidies from official
trade finance, see infra notes 149-157 for discussion of the evolution of Arrangement rules on interest
rates and repayment terms and see infra notes 63-64 for discussion of standardization of repayment
terms, a small subsidy still exists by virtue of ECAs raising funds to onlend at rates extended to govern-
ment agencies. In addition, by offering financing in the face of private sector reluctance, governments
grease nationals' exports by creating financing opportunities where none would otherwise exist or by
creating "cheaper" financing opportunities than the private sector would offer.
Because Ex-Im Bank, the U.S. agency that delivers official trade finance support, provides some type of
export "subsidy," it has come under attack from some liberals (who see big businesses as unworthy recipi-
ents of "corporate welfare") and conservatives (who believe that the government should not intervene in
private markets) for doling out corporate welfare. See Paul Blustein, White House Wants to Curb Ex-Im
Lending, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2001, at E3; Paul Blustein, 'Corporate Welfare' Fight Heats Up: White House
Braces for Battle to Keep Export Assistance Agencies, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1997, at D3.
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States offer official export credits as a means to "grease" international
trade'8 and promote domestic exports. 19 In the previous example, it is possi-
ble that GE's transaction would not go forward without some type of official
export support. Additionally, official export support may be necessary to
"level the playing field"; if Seimens or Mitsubishi receives government sup-
port, then U.S. support is necessary to ensure that GE's bid is not at a com-
petitive financing disadvantage.2 0
Official export credit carries some international economic benefits as well.
Admittedly, official export credit initially appears as a "zero-sum" game be-
cause either the United States, Germany, or Japan will earn the sale at the
cost of the others; the Brazilian company will buy only one turbine. How-
ever, the sale might be a net positive to the international economy if it would
not have occurred at all but for some official support and might, depending
on the destination, have a positive developmental impact.2 '
18. Hidehiro Konno, From Simple to Sophisticated, in THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra note
5, at 95, 95 ("If trade is the engine that drives the increasingly integrated global economy, export credit
is the fuel that powers it."); Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 176 (noting that "[e]xport credits are the
financial lubricant that keeps the international trade system going").
19. For a discussion of why exports are important, see J. David Richardson, Exports Matter ... And So
Does Trade Finance, in THE Ex-IM BANK IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 5, at 58-65 (providing twelve
economic reasons why exports are important for any country). See also Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 173
("Higher exports are viewed almost universally as a vital national objective. Governments mount export
drives, mobilizing vast public and private financial resources to expand sales abroad."). But see RAY, supra
note 10, at 14 (arguing that the macroeconomic effect of export credits on balance of payments may be
nominal, depending on the size of the economy). Export promotion is sometimes considered an impor-
tant macroeconomic policy to counteract unwanted trade deficits. In our example, the connection be-
tween official support for the export of a U.S. $10 million turbine and trade deficit reduction may be
tenuous, but when the export is a fleet of Boeing airplanes or an entire oil refinery, the impact may be
profound and discernable. For example, in Fiscal Year ("FY") 2002, Ex-Im Bank guaranteed the export of
over U.S. $3.5 billion in Boeing aircraft. See EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL
REPORT FY 2002, 23-33 (list of transactions approved, and amount of such transactions, for FY 2002).
Others argue that trade promotion leads to economic growth and job creation. See Richardson, supra at 59
(arguing that job creation is an important, but not unique, benefit to export promotion).
One governmental means to promote trade is government intervention in foreign exchange markets (a
devaluation of local currency makes foreigners "perceive" goods as less expensive). See BAUMOL &
BLINDER, supra note 17, at 766-67 (discussing devaluation and effects on balance of payments accounts).
Another governmental means of promoting trade is utilizing different forms of industrial policy (direct
subsidies to the industries manufacturing or producing the exportable goods or services, as opposed to
subsidizing the finance piece). See Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 178 (citing Rita Rodriguez discussing
export subsidies as a form of industrial policy). See also BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 17, at 793-94
(discussion of industrial policy).
20. For example, in the Export-Import Bank Act, Congress explicitly requires Ex-Im Bank to be "fully
competitive with the government-supported rates and terms and other conditions available for the finan-
cing of exports from the principal countries whose exporters compete with United States exporters." 12
U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2003). Congress also requires that Ex-Im Bank submit a competi-
tiveness report on an annual basis. Id See also EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 8.
21. For example, if our Brazilian power project is able to purchase a state-of-the-art, environmentally
friendly turbine due to the provision of officially supported trade finance where it would not be affordable
in the absence of Ex-Im Bank or other ECA support, then such financing positively contributes to the
provision of cheap, clean energy to traditionally under-served parts of the globe. See Hiroo Fukui, Export
Credit Agencies and the World Bank: A Partnership, in THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5,
at 123, 123 ("ECAs are an essential component in the financing strategies of most developing countries:
ECA credits provide them with financing in circumstances and on terms that would not otherwise be
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Yet official export credit subsidies pose economic risks, as well as benefits. A
competitive spiral in official export subsidies, with states vying for precious
exports with increasingly aggressive subsidies, is costly for governments
22
and increasingly distortive of free trade. By shifting demand for any one
country's exports independent of the economic fundamentals of price (re-
lated to the cost of materials and labor) and quality, economists argue that
export subsidies contribute to inefficient global allocation of resources and,
concomitantly, costly market distortions.2
3
B. Ex-Im Bank and Export Credit Agencies
ECAs are government-owned and government-operated bank-like institu-
tions that deliver official export credit support. Most industrialized countries
have active ECAs. 24 Ex-Im Bank, the U.S. ECA, has been financing U.S.
exports for over sixty-five years. Ex-Im Bank is an independent administra-
tive agency governed by a bipartisan Board of Directors. 25 Ex-Im Bank sup-
ports U.S. exports through loans,26 guarantees,2 7 and insurance 28 backed by
available.").
22. See infra notes 45-50 for discussion of the export credit wars in the 1970s and 1980s that essen-
tially gave birth to the Arrangement.
23. See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 17, at 392-96, 751-53 (discussing the effects of tariffs, quo-
tas, and subsidies on efficient allocation of economic resources and comparative advantage). An interna-
tional desire to guard against some of these market distortions clearly animated the creation of the Ar-
rangement, as evidenced in its preamble: "The Arrangement seeks to encourage competition among
exporters from the OECD-exporting countries based on quality and price of goods and services exported
rather than on the most favourable officially supported terms." The Arrangement, supra note 4, Introduc-
tion, at 7. While demonstrations from Seattle to Genoa to Doha reveal some public skepticism about the
magnitude of the benefits of free trade, especially when compared to the costs, see, e.g., Manny Fernandez,
Varied Paths, One Goal: Taming Global Capitalism, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2001, at BI, a debate about the
merits of free trade is certainly beyond the scope of this project and a resolution of the "free trade" issue is
irrelevant to the conclusions herein.
24. See, e.g., Harvard Business School, Export Credit Agencies, available at http://www.hbs.edu/
projfinportal/ecas.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (providing links to ECAs around the world). See also
OECD, EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS: IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES AND NON-MEMBER
ECONOMIES (6th ed. 2001).
25. Ex-Im Bank is a sunset agency, meaning that Congress must renew its operating charter every few
years. Ex-Im Bank's reauthorization historically coincided with the presidential election cycle. However,
during Ex-Im Bank's last reauthorization, Congress decided to "delink" the timing of the process from
the frenetic atmosphere that frequently accompanies the first year of a new administration. Ex-Im Bank is
currently scheduled to be reauthorized in September 2006. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(f) (West Supp. 2003).
26. Ex-Im Bank's direct loan program provides fixed-rate loans at CIRRs to credit-worthy public and
private sector buyers. The program is not as large or as active as Ex-Im Bank's guarantee and insurance
program. See http://www.exim.gov/products/directloan.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
27. Ex-Im Bank's loan guarantee program provides unconditional guarantees to commercial banks
that have signed a Master Guarantee Agreement with Ex-Im Bank. The applicant (exporter or bank)
must apply to Ex-Im Bank for the guarantee and arrange for a commercial bank lender. The guarantee
program is divided into two segments: the medium-term program covers transactions up to U.S.
$10 million with repayment terms of less than 5 (sometimes 7) years; the long-term program covers
transactions of any amount with repayment terms longer than 5 (sometimes 7) years. See http://www.
exim.gov/products/loan guar.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
28. Ex-Im Bank's insurance program provides a conditional guarantee of payment to an exporter or
lender in case of default caused by commercial or political circumstances. It is conditional in that prior to
payment of any claim, the insured party must file a claim (in the same way that one files a claim on a car
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the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. As a child of the Depres-
sion, Ex-Im Bank's mission is "U.S. jobs through exports."2 9
The Bank operates in a manner similar to a commercial bank; it borrows
money from the U.S. Treasury at government rates and charges fees for its
services that cover most of the Bank's operating expenses. 30 Ex-Im Bank is
not an aid agency, and all loans, guarantees, and other forms of official export
credit support must offer Ex-Im Bank a "reasonable assurance of repay-
ment."31 While most of Ex-Im Bank's support is in the form of insurance or
guarantees, which only require Ex-Im Bank to outlay funds in the case of a
default and subsequent claim, Ex-Im Bank still bears transaction-by-transaction
costs in the form of "charges" against its program budget, 32 much in the way
that commercial banks must meet minimum capital and loan loss reserve
requirements. 33
Nonetheless, as a government agency, Ex-Im Bank is prohibited from
competing with the private sector,34 making financing available only where
commercial banks will not lend (because their lines to a particular country
are tapped or because they deem a particular market too risky to lend) or
where the risk premium (as reflected in the interest rate) is so high that the
transaction is no longer commercially viable. Ex-Im Bank thus operates in a
narrow band, creating additional exports that are not attractive financing
insurance policy), and Ex-Im Bank will not pay out unless certain conditions are met. Some insurance
products involve an element of co-insurance, meaning that Ex-Im Bank will pay out at a rate of 90% or
95% on the dollar for the insured amount. Insurance programs cover both short- and medium-term
transactions. Short-term transactions generally have repayment terms of 180 days or less; medium-term
transactions are defined as in the loan guarantee program. See supra note 27. Short-term transactions are
outside the scope of the Arrangement. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 2, at 9 (The Arrangement
applies only where the repayment term is 2 or more years.). Ex-Im Bank's insurance program offers a
wide array of products. Any description here is beyond this Article's scope. For more information, see
http://www.exim.gov/products/insurance/index.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
29. See Ex-Im Bank, Mission Statement, available at http://www.exim.gov/about/mission.html (pro-
claiming that Ex-Im Bank's reason for being is "to maintain and create U.S. jobs and contribute to a
stronger national economy") (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(a)(1) (West Supp.
2003) ("The Bank's objective in authorizing loans, guarantees, insurance, and credits shall be to contrib-
ute to maintaining or increasing employment of U.S. workers.").
30. Ex-Im Bank income and cash flow statements suggest that the fees and reserves for losses clearly
cover operating expenses and losses from bad debts. See Ex-Im Bank, supra note 19. However, if claims,
losses, and direct loans exceed reserves and income, then Ex-Im Bank borrows from the U.S. Treasury at
rates extended to U.S. government agencies. See id. at 35.
31. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(bXl)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
32. The program budget works like a commercial bank's capital reserve. For each authorized non-
insurance transaction, Ex-Im Bank must "charge" its program budget a percentage of the transaction,
with the "charge" rate related to the transaction's risk, which in turn is linked to a variety of factors, most
notably the obligor's country (based on a U.S. government risk rating system called the Inter-Agency
Country Risk Assessment System ("ICRAS")), whether the obligor is a public or private entity, and the
duration of the loan/guarantee/insurance policy.
33. Bank rules on capital adequacy requirements, which involve a risk-based capital ratio system, are
found at 12 C.FR. §§ 208 (Regulation H), 225 (Jan. 1, 2003).
34. See § 635(b)(1)(B) ("It is also the policy of the United States that the Bank in the exercise of its
functions should supplement and encourage, and not compete with, private capital.").
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candidates in the private sector but nonetheless offer the U.S. government a
"reasonable assurance of repayment." 35
Even within this band, Ex-Im Bank may not support exports unless
(1) they are truly U.S. exports (and satisfy highly technical U.S. content
rules); 36 (2) their destination is "permissible"; 37 (3) they will be used "le-
gitimately";38 (4) neither the exporter nor importer is on any U.S. govern-
ment "blacklist"; 39 and (5) they will not have an adverse impact in terms of
moving U.S. jobs overseas. 40 Furthermore, as an engine of domestic eco-
nomic growth and job creation (or preservation), Ex-Im Bank may only sup-
port exports that pass an "additionality" test, whereby exporters must prove
that their exports are indeed "incremental"-would not have happened but
for Ex-Im Bank financing-and that Ex-Im Bank financing is not sought as
a substitute for readily available private sources of financing. 41
In the hypothetical GE transaction, financing likely would be in the form
of an Ex-Im Bank guarantee to a commercial bank buyer credit, as diagrammed
in Figure 1. The Bank's Board of Directors must approve the guarantee prior
to committing resources. 42 In the GE example, if the Brazilian buyer de-
35. See id.
36. Because Ex-Im Bank sees itself as preserving U.S. jobs, a key part of its mission depends on ex-
ports actually being U.S. exports and not a mere re-export of foreign goods and/or services (possibly
packaged or assembled in the United States). In the latter case, most of the "jobs" associated with the
exports are abroad. The foreign content rules are rather technical but, in short: (1) goods or services must
be shipped from the United States; (2) the goods and/or services must be produced in the United States;
and (3) the contents of the goods and services (e.g., subcomponents) must be of U.S. origin. In the case of
a piece of equipment like the GE turbine, the exporter would be responsible for "guesstimating" (with a
high degree of precision) the percentage of the turbine that is U.S. content, and Ex-Im Bank engineers
would corroborate. Ex-Im Bank will only finance the U.S. content part of the transaction. For additional
information, see EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, Foreign Content Policy for Medium- and
Long-Term Exports, available at http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/foreign-content.html (last visited
Dec. 2, 2003).
37. The Ex-Im Bank Country Limitation Schedule does not permit support to: (1) any Marxist-
Leninist country; (2) any country in which the United States is engaged in armed conflict; or (3) any
country that, due to economic conditions, could not host a transaction with a reasonable assurance of
repayment. See http://www.exim.gov/tools/country/country-limits.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
38. For example, Ex-Im Bank may not support the export of "defense articles" or "defense services"
unless such articles or services are being used for "anti-narcotics" purposes or any other use that the President
determines is in the national self-interest. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(6XA)-(B) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
39. One example is the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control list of 7,000
names of individuals and organizations. This "master list" can be viewed and downloaded. See U.S.
TREASURY, Office of Foreign Assets Control: Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/t 1lsdn.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
40. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(e) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
41. For a discussion of the additionality requirement, see Rita Rodriguez, Ex-Im Bank: Overview,
Challenges, and Policy Options, in THE Ex-Im BANK IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 5, at 4. In satisfac-
tion of this requirement, Ex-Im Bank requires all applicants for Ex-Im Bank support to prove that they
face "foreign competition" or that private financing is unavailable. See Ex-Im Bank, Preliminary Com-
mitment & Final Commitment Application, available at http://www.exim.gov/pub/pdf/95-10ap.pdf (last
visted Dec. 2, 2003).
42. The internal process is as follows: an Ex-Im Bank case or credit officer will prepare the file on be-
half of the applicant (which may be either Citibank or GE) and will argue the case before the Board. The
case officer must assure the Board that the transaction passes certain jurisdictional thresholds, and in
reality, absent an extremely compelling reason, a case officer will not present the Board with a case unless
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faulted on its loan with Citibank, Ex-Im Bank would repay the loan to Citi-
bank, assume the remaining debt, and attempt to recover against the Bra-
zilian buyer. Ex-Im Bank involvement in this transaction is a "win/win"
situation for both Citibank and GE. Citibank's risk is the risk that Ex-Im
Bank (U.S. government) reneges on its obligations, and GE is able to offer
the Brazilian buyer a financing package without placing any pressure on its
balance sheet. Ex-Im Bank assumes the risk that the Brazilian buyer will
default, and, in the case of a claim, U.S. taxpayers may bear the ultimate cost.
FIGURE 1
Diga f E-Xrn jGuarantee Trasaction
III. THE ARRANGEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR OFFICIALLY SUPPORTED
EXPORT CREDITS
A. The Cooperative Moment: The Arrangement's Birth
ECAs deliver official export credits, which bring benefits but also carry
some economic risks. With the specter of a competitive spiral in official ex-
port subsidies looms the potential for skyrocketing government costs and
increasing market distortions. The industrialized ECAs poignantly con-
fronted these risks in the 1970s and thereby began coordinating efforts to
curtail export subsidies.
Prior to the 1970s, disparities in official export financing mechanisms, 43
coupled with relatively low interest rates (which correspond to relatively low
it meets these thresholds. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
Most of the Board's deliberations will focus on Ex-Im Bank's "reasonable assurance of repayment"
mandate, i.e., assuring that the transaction, and thus the buyer, or obligor, meets certain threshold stan-
dards of commercial viability. In some cases, Ex-Im Bank will require a guarantee by the government, a
local commercial bank, or some entity more credit-worthy than the foreign buyer; in other cases, Ex-Im
Bank "takes" a security interest in a particular asset, but this has proven problematic in many instances
because of the technical difficulties of filing security interests in certain foreign countries.
43. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States met foreign buyers' demands for export
credits with long repayment terms and relatively low down payments and, true to U.S. free market bent,
did not believe in interest rate subsidies. See id. at 180 (discussing the U.S. reluctance to use interest rate
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subsidy costs), precluded meaningful international cooperation in export
finance. 44 In the 1970s, however, the industrialized countries found them-
selves in an accelerating, self-propagating export credit war. On the macro-
economic side, the 1973 oil shock caused large trade deficits for oil import-
ing countries (most of the OECD members), which, in turn, led to an in-
crease in interest rates. 45 At the same time, the industrialized, oil-importing
world faced an unrelenting urge to promote exports as a means to reduce
trade deficits, 46 prompting a sharp increase in ECA lending. 47
With rising interest rates, official interest rate subsidies became increas-
ingly expensive; as a means to "win" exports, ECAs aggressively offered ex-
port credit packages at a significant negative spread from ECA borrowing
rates. 48 The rising costs of export subsidies placed additional weight on over-
burdened government budgets.49 Given these economic conditions-high
interest rates, large trade deficits, and limited government resources-all
OECD ECAs braced for an inevitably costly export credit race, but also rec-
ognized that their own internal budget situation might not permit unfet-
tered participation in that race. In response, finance ministers from OECD
countries conceived the Arrangement in the hallways at a World Bank/IMF
meeting in 1973.50 In its initial form, the Arrangement was referred to as
the 1976 "Consensus on Converging Export Credit Policies," '5 followed by
the first incarnation of the Arrangement in 1978.
subsidies and the European inability to offer extended repayment terms). See also Rolf Geberth, The Gene-
sis ofthe Consensus, in THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5, at 27. The European ECAs that
did not have access to capital markets that allowed refinancing of such long-term debt offered below-
market interest rates to entice buyers to purchase European goods. See Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 180.
This tension between the U.S. insistence on market-based interest rates (with long repayment terms) and
the European facility with interest rate subsidization (with shorter repayment terms) created a stalemate.
44. For a discussion of the pre-Arrangement history, see RAY, supra note 10, at 45-52. See also Moravc-
sik, supra note 10, at 180-81.
45. From 1973 to 1980, long-term interest rates in the United States steadily increased from 6% to
14%. British and French interest rates increased similarly. See Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 183-84.
46. For example, the United States enjoyed a trade surplus of U.S. $1.9 billion in 1973 that deterio-
rated to a trade deficit of U.S. $19.4 billion by 1980. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL
OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS: ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, available at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/
eop/index.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
47. See RAY, supra note 10, at 49-50 (showing that between 1972 and 1982, ECA long-term lending
(including guarantees and insurance) increased almost fivefold).
48. ECAs typically borrow from government treasuries and therefore benefit from rates offered to gov-
ernment borrowers. See EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 19, at 35 ("Ex-Im
Bank borrows from the U.S. Treasury for its cash needs for loan disbursements and claim payments that
are in excess of amounts appropriated for claim losses.").
49. Budget deficits increased significantly from 1969 to 1981. Congressional Budget Office, Revenues,
Outlays, Surpluses. Deficits, and Debt Held by the Public, 1962-2002, available at http://www.cbo.gov/
showdoc.cfmindex= 1821&sequence=0#table1 (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
50. See Geberth, supra note 43 at 27-28. See also Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 180.
51. The Consensus was not a "multilateral" agreement but rather was "implemented" through a series
of "unilateral but parallel undertakings." RAY, supra note 10, at 52.
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B. Arrangement Rules
The Arrangement regulates ECAs with the goal of "leveling the playing
field" among ECAs, 52 thereby encouraging "competition among exporters
from the OECD-exporting countries based on quality and price of goods and
services exported rather than on the most favourable officially supported
terms." 53 The Arrangement is self-designated a "Gentlemen's Agreement"
among ECA participants. 54 It is not a formal treaty-there are no signature
or ratification processes. There are no parties, only participants. While the
Arrangement's text can be found on the OECD's Web site and the Arrange-
ment borrows from the OECD's resources, the OECD serves as a mere ad-
ministrative home;55 the Arrangement is not an OECD Act.56 Participants
own the Arrangement, and the Participants group is autonomous; nonethe-
less, the Participants frequently liaison with the Export Credit Group of the
OECD Trade Directorate. 57
The Arrangement's substantive rules (or disciplines) govern officially sup-
ported export credits and tied aid. Under the Arrangement, "official sup-
port" is form neutral, meaning that it may come in the form of direct loans,
refinancing, interest rate support, export credit insurance, or loan guaran-
tees.58 The Arrangement covers the export of goods and services 59 with re-
payment terms of two or more years, usually excluding the export of small,
consumer goods and including the export of most capital equipment. 60
52. The Arrangement, supra note 4, Introduction, at 7 (stating that the Arrangement seeks to encour-
age competition among competitors on the basis of price and quality rather than attractiveness of terms).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 8 ("The Arrangement, developed within the OECD framework, came into being in April
1978 following agreement among its Participants. The Arrangement is a 'Gentlemen's Agreement' among the
Participants. The Arrangement is not an OECD Act, although it receives the administrative support of
the OECD Secretariat.").
55. See RAY, supra note 10, at 33, 42, suggesting that:
[The Arrangement] is obviously "in" the OECD, and yet it has never been officially part "of" the
OECD. Thus, although the Secretariat of the Organization provides a small staff and services and al-
though the Arrangement is widely known as the "OECD Arrangement," it does not exist officially
within the OECD .... It is not an "act of the Organization."
56. The Arrangement, supra note 4, Introduction, at 8.
57. Additional information on the Export Credit Group (otherwise known as the Export Credit Divi-
sion), can be found on the OECD Web site, available at http://www.oecd.org/department/O,2688,en_
2649_34169_1__i_1_l,00.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
58. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 2, at 9 (stating that "'[o]fficial support' can take the form
of direct credits/financing, refinancing, interest rate support, aid financing (credits and grants), export
credit insurance and guarantees"). See also id., Introduction, at 7 (Participants have not been able to agree
upon a definition, rather than a categorical description, of "official support" and have placed the issue on
the table for "future work.").
59. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 2, at 9. Special guidelines govern select industries. See Sector
Understanding on Export Credits for Ships, id. Annex I, at 47. See also Sector Understanding on Export
Credits for Nuclear Power Plants, id. Annex II, at 51; Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil
Aircraft, i. Annex III, at 54. In addition, the Participants have experimented with special rules for proj-
ect financings. See Understanding on the Application of Flexibility to the Terms and Conditions of the Ar-
rangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits in Respect of Project Finance Transactions for
a Trial Period (until Aug. 31, 2002), id. Annex VIII, at 73 [hereinafter Project Finance Understanding].
60. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 2, at 9.
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Tied aid is aid for exports, or aid conditioned on the donee using the aid
to purchase the donor's exports. An ECA will provide aid in the form of a
grant, concessional financing, 61 or a mix of a grant and officially supported
financing (which may be concessional). While the Arrangement has effec-
tively regulated many aspects of tied aid, 62 this Article will nonetheless fo-
cus on compliance as it relates to the export credit side of the Arrangement.
The Arrangement has evolved considerably over its twenty-five-year his-
tory, and Table 1: History of the Arrangement ("Table 1: History"), tracks
the milestones in this evolution. Currently, the Arrangement regulates most
facets of officially supported export credits. The Arrangement sets maximum
repayment terms on the basis of a World Bank scheme which classifies bor-
rowers as either category I, eligible for a maximum 8.5-year repayment term, or
category II, eligible for a maximum 10-year repayment term. 63 The repay-
61. Id. at 28. For the Arrangement's purposes, concessional financing occurs when governments offer
financing terms more favorable than those permitted under the Arrangement. The Arrangement defines
(and regulates) concessionality based on the difference between the nominal value of the loan and the
discounted net present value of all future debt service payments. The concessionality level is the discount
expressed in percentage terms. For example, in a grant of U.S. $1 million, the lender does not expect to
be repaid; the concession is U.S. $1 million and the concessionality level is 100%. Alternatively, if the
tied aid is given in the form of a U.S. $1 million loan at 0% interest to be repaid over 20 years, the net
present value is approximately U.S. $317,846. Thus, the concession or grant portion of the loan is U.S.
$682,153, and the concessionality level is over 68%. This calculation is based on a discount rate of
5.90% which is based on the average U.S. dollar CIRR from January 15, 2002, to January 14, 2003, of
4.75% and a margin of 1.15%. See id. art. 38, at 29.
62. In the Helsinki Package, participants restricted tied aid's ability to act as a "hidden" subsidy. Id.
art. 34, at 26-27. The Helsinki Package dictates that tied aid is only available to countries with a per
capita income less than the World Bank's benchmark. Tied aid is generally not available for projects that
are "commercially viable if financed on market or Arrangement terms." The Arrangement, supra note 4,
art. 35, at 27. A project is not commercially viable if(1) cash flow is insufficient to cover operating costs
and costs of capital; and/or (2) the project cannot be financed on market or Arrangement terms. Id. See
also OECD, Tied Aid: Ex Ante Guidance, available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/LinkTo/td-
pg(2003)13 (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). Any official commitment of tied aid must be at a concessionality
level of at least 35%, or 50% for Least Developed Countries ("LLDCs"), which are designated by the
United Nations as least developed countries. See supra note 61 for a description of concessionality. See also
2002 COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION FOR EXPORTERS AND TIED AID, available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/56/39/1946021.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (presenting a chart which separates LLDCs from
other countries that are eligible for tied aid). The underlying rationale here is that if Participants are
going to evade some of the Arrangement's disciplines through the award of tied aid, then the award must
have a strong aid component and not just be a ruse to avoid the Arrangement's export credit disciplines.
63. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 12, at 13-14; art. 10(a), at 13. The country classification
is based on a World Bank designated per capita income threshold. The 2001 "graduation" threshold,
which is the basis of the Arrangement's 2002 classification, is U.S. $5,285 per capita annual income. See
also 2002 COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION FOR EXPORTERS AND TIED AID, supra note 62. If the World Bank
does not publish per capita income information on any country, the Arrangement will defer to the World
Bank's estimates on whether the country in question has a per capita income that is less than or greater
than the threshold then used for separating category I and II countries.
The Arrangement also explicitly regulates the process of reclassification of countries from category I to
category II. The World Bank sets the per capita "graduation level" annually on the basis of country-by-
country recalculations of per capita income. If, on the basis of a revised graduation level and a revised per-
capita income for that particular country, a country moves from category II to category I, for example, the
Arrangement will not change the classification unless the revised classification remains unchanged for 2
consecutive years. At that point, all Participants will be notified of the change, which will occur two
weeks following notification. Id.
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ment clock begins ticking at the starting point of credit, which is a term of
art tied to the Berne Union's definition. 64 Borrowers must pay 15% of the
.export contract value as an up-front cash payment. 65 The export contract
value is the total price (indicated on an invoice) of the goods and services,
excluding interest, local costs included in the price, and foreign content that
is not eligible for financing but is nonetheless included in the price. 66 Bor-
rowers repay equal installments of principal and interest semi-annually,67
which are not capitalized during the repayment period.68 "Local costs" are
expenditures for "goods and services in the buyer's country, that are neces-
sary ... for executing the exporter's contract. '"69 The Arrangement permits
Participants to finance local costs to the extent of the cash payment. 70
The Arrangement has eliminated most interest-rate subsidy from official
export credit. 71 Throughout the Arrangement's history, Participants grap-
pled with ways to eliminate interest rate competition while respecting le-
gitimate variances in interest rates from market to market. After much trial
and error,7 2 Participants developed a market-based system of Commercial
Interest Reference Rates ("CIRRs"), whereby each Participant providing direct
loans or interest rate support does so at an interest rate that is, for most cur-
rencies, 100 basis points above a prescribed basket of government bonds.73
64. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 8-9, at 11-12. If the export is a piece of equipment that is
"useable" in and of itself, the starting point is the mean date (in the case of separate shipment of compo-
nents) or the actual date when the buyer takes physical possession. In the case of a piece of capital equip-
ment to be installed in a plant or factory where the supplier has no responsibility for "commissioning,"
the starting point is when the buyer takes physical possession of all the equipment, according to Article
9(b). Id. If the supplier not only provides the equipment but also runs the plant or factory that will house
the equipment, the starting point is when tests prove that the equipment and/or plant are operable. Id.
art. 9(d), at 12.
The Berne Union is similar to the Participants group, except that it focuses solely on credit insurance
products, particularly short-term credit insurance products. For more information on the Berne Union,
see http://www.berneunion.org.uk/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
65. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 7(a), at 11.
66. Many ECAs, like Ex-Im Bank, finance the export of only local goods and services. Given that
many sub-components of any piece of capital equipment may be imports from third countries, a piece of
equipment, like the GE turbine, might actually have a relatively high percentage of "foreign content."
Ex-Im Bank has elaborate rules on the calculation of foreign content and, if foreign content exceeds 15%
of the export contract value, Ex-Im Bank will only finance the U.S. content. Other ECAs are less sensitive
to foreign content issues. Nonetheless, ifa particular agency is not permitted to finance foreign content,
such foreign content should be excluded from the export contract value for the purposes of calculating
the cash payment. See id. art. 7(d), at 11.
67. Id. art. 13(a), at 14.
68. Id. art. 14 (a), at 14.
69. Id art. 25(a), at 20.
70. Id. art. 25(b), at 20.
71. Interest rates are particularly relevant when ECAs engage in direct lending. When ECAs offer a
guarantee or insurance, the banks set the interest rate, which usually is linked to LIBOR or some other
internationally accepted floating rate.
72. See infra notes 149-159 and accompanying text.
73. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 16, at 15-16. CIRRs are 100 basis points above a base rate
which is either the 5-year government bond rate for all maturities or a three-tiered system which uses the
3-year government bond rate for repayment terms up to and including 5 years; 5-year government bond
rate for repayment terms greater than 5 years and up to 8.5 years; and 7-year government bond rates for
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Borrowers pay a premium or fee for ECA loans, insurance, and guarantee
services. The Arrangement's most recent efforts at eliminating, or at least
minimizing, competition among ECAs centered on standardization of mini-
mum premium rates. The result was the Knaepen Package, which became
effective on April 1, 1999. The Knaepen Package is a technical, and rather
complicated, minimum premium benchmark system which attempts to link
minimum premiums to market risk, while simultaneously adjusting premi-
ums to compensate for disparate export credit systems and products.74 At its
core, the minimum premium benchmark system classifies countries into seven
risk categories based in great part upon an econometric model that takes
into account financial, economic, and political market indicators related to a
country's ability to service its external debt.7 5 Each category is assigned a
minimum premium benchmark, which is the pricing of sovereign risk,76
assuming a comprehensive, 77 standard product. 78 This minimum premium
benchmark may then be adjusted for several reasons, including: (1) the quality
of ECA product; 79 (2) the percentage of cover;80 (3) the claims waiting pe-
riod;8' and (4) political-risk coverage.8 2 Minimum premium benchmarks are
repayment terms longer than 8.5 years. Rates are adjusted on a monthly basis.
74. See id. arts. 20-24, at 17-20. See also The Knaepen Package: Guiding Principles for Setting Premia Fees
Under the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/59/4/1910218.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (on file with the Harvard International LawJournal).
75. This model measures country credit risk, which includes whether the country has issued a general
moratorium on repayments, whether there are any circumstances that would make it difficult to transfer
money to pay the debt (e.g., currency controls), local legal provisions that require repayment in local
currency, and the history of force majeure events. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 20(c), at 17. The
econometric model, the Country Risk Assessment Model ("CRAM"), takes into account the financial
indicators (in terms of liquidity and financial solvency) and the major macroeconomic indicators for each
country/market ECA payment experience. The Knaepen Package: Guiding Principles, supra note 74, at 3.
76. "Sovereign risk" is the risk attached to debt backed by the full faith and credit of a government
usually through its Ministry of Finance or corresponding governmental entity. See The Arrangement,
supra note 4, art. 22(e), at 18. See also The Knaepen Package: Guiding Principles, supra note 74, at 4.
77. A "comprehensive product" is a guarantee or insurance product that covers both political and
commercial risks.
78. "Standard products" are direct loans or "conditional" insurance products (products that pay a
claim only after the insured party satisfies several conditions) with a coverage rate of 95% including
interest payments during the claims waiting period. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 23(b), at 19.
79. If the product is above standard, meaning that it is an unconditional guarantee, then the Partici-
pant should assess a premium surcharge; if the product is below standard, meaning that it is a condi-
tional insurance product that does not cover interest during the claims waiting period, then the Partici-
pant should assess a discount. Id. art. 23(b), at 19.
80. Some ECA products incorporate some degree of risk-sharing (i.e., upon claim, the ECA pays out
at a rate of 90% of the covered (disbursed) principal), with the underlying principle being that risk-
sharing entices the insured or guaranteed party to mitigate the chances of default. The Knaepen Package
links minimum premium benchmarks (standard product) to 5% risk-sharing (or 95% cover). If the in-
sured/guaranteed party bears more than 5% risk, the Participant shall discount the minimum premium
benchmark. Accordingly, if the insured/guaranteed party bears less than 5% risk, the Participant shall
surcharge the minimum premium benchmark. Id. art. 23(d), at 19.
81. The "claims waiting period" is the "period between the due date of payment by the buyer/borrower and
the date that the insurer/guarantor is liable to reimburse the exporter/financial institution." See id. art.
23(a), at 19.
82. If a Participant offers a "political risk only" product (as opposed to a comprehensive product), the
Participant shall use the country credit risk benchmark, which is 10% lower than the minimum pre-
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also sensitive to the length of the drawdown period, 83 repayment terms, and
the timing of the premium payment. 84 In addition, in certain circumstances
where the parties structure a transaction to externalize or mitigate country
credit risk during the term of the loan, Participants may discount minimum
premium benchmarks.85
In the hypothetical GE example, Ex-Im Bank would likely follow the Ar-
rangement and offer GE the following terms:
Export Contract Value U.S. $10 million
(assuming 100% U.S. content)
Interest Rate 4.75% (CIRR)86
Down Payment 15% or U.S. $1,500,000
Principal 85% or U.S. $8,500,000
Repayment Terms Maximum of 10 years87
Installments Semi-annual, equal principal, and
interest
Starting Point Brazilian buyer taking possession of
turbine
mium benchmark for sovereign risk. See id. art. 22(f), at 18.
83. See The Knaepen Package: Guiding Principles, supra note 74, at 28-29. See also Ex-Im Bank Exposure
Fee Advice Table, available at http://www.exim.gov/tools/exposure/fee-advice tables.html (last visited
Dec. 2, 2003).
84. See The Knaepen Package: Guiding Principles, supra note 74, at 4-7.
85. The "permitted exceptions" include: third-country unconditional guarantees, multilateral or re-
gional institutions' intervention, offshore escrow account to "catch" future cash flow streams, offshore
security (hard or asset-based), in-country asset-secured or asset-based financing, third-country insurance
or guarantee, local currency financing, debtor representing better risk than sovereign, and co-financing
with international financial institution. See id. at 8-9.
86. ECAs charge interest only when they are loaning money directly; therefore, the CIRR is only rele-
vant to the direct loan activities of ECAs. The CIRR quoted in the text is based on a repayment term of
10 years; a shorter repayment term would result in a lower CIRR. See generally Export-Import Bank of the
United States, About CIRR Rates, available at http://www.exim.gov/tools/cirrabout.hrml (last visited
Dec. 2, 2003).
87. Brazil is a category II country and thus qualifies for a repayment term of up to 10 years. However,
if the applicant wanted to bring this application as a medium-term credit (credit application U.S.
$10 million and under), and thus avert a more lengthy Board process, the maximum repayment term
would have to be consistent with Ex-Im Bank's medium-term program (generally maximum repayment
of 5 years). See supra note 27 for a description of Ex-Im Bank's medium-term program. See also Ex-Im
Bank's description of its medium-term programs, available at http://www.exim.gov/products/insurance/
medium term.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
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Exposure Fee 14.78% of disbursements88
Local Costs U.S. $1.5 million (down payment)
eligible for coverage
Japan Bank for International Cooperation and Hermes, the respective Japa-
nese and German ECAs, would offer the similar terms, except that the CIRR
would be linked to market rates and the contract value would likely be
quoted in local currency. In this world, the playing field is level. The Bra-
zilian buyer can focus on underlying economic fundamentals of price and
quality, and the ECAs can focus on servicing local exporters rather than
competing with foreign ECAs.
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH THE ARRANGEMENT: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
International legal scholars long avoided the subject of compliance, in part
because international lawyers assumed, given anecdotal evidence, that com-
pliance occurs "almost all of the time,"8 9 and in part because, compliance is
difficult to document and even more difficult to quantify.90 This Part and
the appendices to this Article document, primarily through empirical re-
search, sustained and pervasive compliance among Participants. This evi-
dence is compiled in three tables appended hereto, and summarized in some
bar graphs that are incorporated in the text. The first two tables-Table 2:
Participant Compliance and Table 3: Non-Participant Compliance-present a
2003 snapshot of ECA compliance with the Arrangement. The third table-
Table 4: Historical Compliance-demonstrates sustained compliance over
the life of the Arrangement.
Prior to presenting this data, this portion of the Article will describe the
methodology for compiling the data and quantifying the results. Then, it
will examine Ex-Im Bank's compliance record in some detail, not only as an
accessible ECA case study but also as a window into the type of information
that this Article gathered as a predicate to compiling the ECA-by-ECA in-
formation in the Tables. Finally, this Part will present the composite data for
88. This quote assumes a 10-year repayment term, twelve-month drawdown period, and a financed
fee, as drawn. Given the Knaepen Package rules, the longer the repayment term, the higher the premium
or exposure fee. As noted in supra note 87, the exporter would likely choose a shorter repayment term of
5 years, which would result in a more reasonable exposure fee of 8%. For a detail of loan calculations, see
Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-im Bank Exposure Fee Calculator, available at http://www.
exim.gov/tools/feecalc.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
89. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 42 (2d ed. 1979) ("[A]lmost all nations observe almost
all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.") (emphasis
omitted). For a detailed discussion of the historical evolution of compliance as a part of international law
and relations scholarship, see Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1942-62.
90. Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1963 ("Any study seeking to evaluate compliance ... faces a serious
measurement problem" not only in terms of defining "compliance" but also in terms of gathering "in-
formation on state practices.").
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all Participants, as well as some non-Participants, highlighting the breadth
and depth of compliance with the Arrangement.
A. The Methodology
1. Scope
This study documents and analyzes ECA compliance with the standard
export credit rules of the Arrangement. It does not deal with tied aid and
the complex set of tied aid rules that the Helsinki Package introduced. 91 Nor
does it analyze ECA compliance with any of the sector-specific rules, such as
the Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Ships92 and the Sector Un-
derstanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft. 93 These addenda to the
Arrangement are rich and interesting in their own right and may be worthy
of further study. However, the decision to maintain a fairly narrow focus was
a pragmatic choice driven by the type of data readily available.
The Arrangement's export finance rules are in and of themselves compli-
cated, filling over twenty-one articles. Table 2: Participant Compliance and
Table 3: Non-Participant Compliance respectively assess Participant and non-
Partici-pant compliance with four categories of export-credit-oriented rules:
(1) interest rates;94 (2) repayment terms, which includes the term of repay-
ment, 95 starting point, 96 and repayment installments;97 (3) the size of the
credit, including down payment 98 and coverage of local costs;99 and (4) the
premium rate or cost of the credit. 00 I chose these rules because, as described in
Part III, they set the fundamental parameters for all official export financing
packages. Furthermore, these rules lend themselves to objective documenta-
tion rather than subjective anecdote.
Table 2: Participant Compliance includes all Participant countries, even
those, like Ireland, that have abolished their ECAs. The research also sur-
prisingly uncovered some significant compliance among non-Participants.
Of approximately twenty-six non-Participant ECAs worldwide, many, espe-
cially in Latin America, simply do not comply with the Arrangement, and I
91. See supra notes 61-62 for a discussion of the tied aid rules that the Helsinki Package introduced in
1991. See also Table 1: History of the Arrangement for a summary of the evolution of the tied aid rules
[hereinafter Table 1).
92. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, Annex 1, at 47.
93. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, Annex III, at 54. Nor does the Arrangement assess ECA com-
pliance with the trial Project Finance Understanding. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, Annex VIII, at
73.
94. Interest rates are now linked to CIRRs. See supra note 73.
95. See the Arrangement, supra note 63 (maximum repayment term of 8.5 or 10 years depending on
country classification).
96. See the Arrangement, supra note 64 ("repayment terms" clock starts at a point consistent with
Berne Union definition of "starting point").
97. See the Arrangement, supra notes 67-68 (semi-annual, equal installments).
98. See supra text accompanying note 65 (minimum of 15%).
99. See supra text accompanying note 69 (equal to the level of the down payment).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 74-85 (Knaepen Package of minimum premium benchmarks).
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 45
have not included those countries in Table 3: Non-Participant Compli-
ance. 10 1 Table 3: Non-Participant Compliance only includes non-Participants
that are members of the OECD, non-Participants that are not members of
the OECD but are applicants for E.U. membership, and Taiwan and Hong
Kong, which are significant trading partners with OECD members.
2. Sources
There are three types of sources from which this Article could pull com-
pliance data: (1) high-level diplomatic or ministerial statements; (2) ECA
representations of their own programs; and (3) transactional data. Table 2: Par-
ticipant Compliance and Table 3: Non-Participant Compliance rely on publicly
available programmatic information from ECAs, primarily from ECA Web
sites, annual reports, and a periodic OECD publication, Export Credit Fi-
nancing Systems.' 0 2 Fortunately, plentiful ECA promotional material provides
a relatively transparent view of ECA programs and products. 10 3
While high-level diplomatic statements may be colorful and illuminat-
ing, ECA programmatic information is a more reliable and useful data source.
Diplomatic statements tend to be rather general and thus do not offer the
type of specific, rule-by-rule compliance data that the Tables seek to capture.
Furthermore, it may be necessary, for political or diplomatic reasons, for a
Minister of Finance or even the President of an ECA to represent publicly
and diplomatically that their ECA is compliant with the Arrangement. It is
quite another matter for ECAs to represent to their customers-via public
promotional material-that they are voluntarily limiting the terms and size
of export subsidies. Written materials directed at the customer base may there-
by provide a more unadulterated view of ECA compliance with the Ar-
rangement.
Due to the fact that ECAs handle confidential business information, it is
impossible to measure compliance on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Yet
even if the transactional information were available, I do not believe that the
results of this empirical survey would dramatically change. When commu-
nicating to its customers in promotional material, an ECA has little incen-
tive to represent loyalty to the Arrangement unless it is indeed true. Many
customers would prefer unfettered and unconstrained official financing in
101. For a complete list of ECAs, see Harvard Business School, supra note 24.
102. OECD, supra note 24.
103. In my experience, most ECAs operate in a quasi-commercial/quasi-public world. On the one
hand, they are government agencies, and, unlike commercial banks, they are not primarily motivated by
profit but rather by trade expansion. On the other hand, ECAs operate side-by-side with commercial
bankers, investment bankers, financial advisors, attorneys, and many ECA employees who worked in the
private sector at one point in their career. Consequently, a private sector mentality permeates ECAs to a
much greater degree than other government agencies. As part of this private sector mentality, most ECAs
"advertise" their services in promotional material, understanding that it will be difficult to fulfill the
underlying ECA mission if exporters are unaware of ECA services, or intimidated by the bureaucracy that
sometimes accompanies government programs.
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the name of promoting their exports. Furthermore, once an ECA designs pro-
grams to conform to the Arrangement, institutional momentum and inertia
help to assure transactional compliance. Finally, as will be discussed at great
length, the Arrangement's procedures make transaction-by-transaction non-
compliance very difficult, if not impossible.10 4
3. Qualitative Judgments
For each ECA, I qualitatively assessed the level of compliance with each of
the seven Arrangement rules. "Compliance" means that the ECA explicitly
claims to comply with the particular Arrangement rule. 10 5 "Probable com-
pliance" means that it is a realistic assumption that the ECA is complying
with the terms of the Arrangement. An ECA that claims generally to com-
ply with the Arrangement, in the absence of more specific information, is
deemed to be in "probable compliance." "No compliance" means that the ECA
does not appear to be complying with the terms of the Arrangement. "Not
applicable" means that the Arrangement's rules do not apply given the ECA's
particular export credit financing system. 10 6 "Unavailable" means that it is
impossible, given the limited programmatic information publicly available,
to draw any conclusion about whether a particular ECA complies with a
particular Arrangement rule.
While the assessments embedded in the Tables necessarily involve some
subjective judgment, three individuals-the author and two research assis-
tants-independently classified each ECA's compliance with each parameter
and jointly resolved any discrepancies that surfaced during the independent
reviews.
4. The Compliance Index
From this qualitative data, this Article attempts to quantify compliance
in the form of a compliance index. The compliance index not only permits
comparisons among sub-groups of Participants and between Participants
and non-Participants but also dramatizes succinctly but poignantly the ex-
tensive compliance that the documentary evidence revealed. Quantifying com-
pliance with any international regime is generally problematic and impre-
cise, and measuring compliance in the context of the Arrangement is no ex-
104. See infra notes 212-226 for a discussion of institutionalized derogations.
105. When an ECA claims that "credit terms" or "terms and conditions" are consistent with the Ar-
rangement, I consider this to encompass starting point, repayment term, and repayment installment,
which are the three components that are integral to standardizing the length and tenor of repayment.
106. For example, if an ECA does not give direct loans, then the CIRR would not apply (guarantees
are given to commercial banks that would likely link interest rates to LIBOR or some other internation-
ally accepted floating rate). Also, Ireland has exited the official export credit business and thus, although
a Participant through its membership in the European Union, the Arrangement has no applicability. See
OECD, Ireland, in EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS, supra note 24, at 1.
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ception. Nonetheless, I believe the compliance index to be adequately realis-
tic for comparative purposes.
In calculating the compliance index, I first assigned a numeric value to
each Arrangement rule, weighing each of the four categories of Arrangement
rules-interest rates, repayment terms, size of credit, and premium-equally.
For example, in examining whether Participants complied with the interest
rate provisions of the Arrangement, I measured Participant compliance with
the CIRR. Yet in determining whether Participants complied with the re-
payment terms, I looked at the term of repayment, starting point, and re-
payment installments. To equalize the weight that the compliance index
gives to interest rates and repayment terms, the CIRR is given a weight of
one, while each component of "repayment terms" (term of repayment, starting
point, and repayment installments) is given a weight of 1/3. Using similar
analysis, the "minimum premium" rule has been assigned a weight of one,
while cash payment and local costs, the two variables that determine the size
of the credit, are each assigned a weight of 1/2. The compliance index, there-
fore, is a scale of 0 to 4, with interest rates, minimum premiums, repayment
terms, and size of credit each accounting for one point.
I next assigned a relative weight to each qualitative compliance assess-
ment for each Arrangement rule: "compliance" at 100%; "probable compli-
ance" at 75% compliance; 0 7 "unavailable" at 25%;108 and "no compliance" at
0%.
Calculation of the compliance index involves multiplying the point value
assigned to each Arrangement rule by the weight assigned to each compli-
ance assessment and then aggregating the points for each country. For exam-
ple, Table 2: Participant Compliance reveals that the United States complies
with each element of the Arrangement and therefore its compliance index is
4. New Zealand's compliance index calculation is more complex:
107. For Austria, the probability was 50% upon an explicit statement that Austria would only use
CIRRs for transactions in foreign currency, which we estimated would occur in about 50% of the transac-
tions. See Table 2: Participant Compliance with the Arrangement's Export Credit Provisions [hereinafter
Table 2].
108. If we simply excluded the "not available" information from the calculus, then the calculations
become skewed in favor of those countries that do not disclose information. One has to at least consider
that the ECA does not disclose information because it is trying to "hide" non-compliance, so a probabil-
ity of less than 50% is in order. However, an ECA that simply does not provide a transparent view into
its operations is more likely to be in compliance than an ECA that explicitly states that it does not com-
ply with the Arrangement. Therefore, we decided on 25% for unavailable information.
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Maximum Compliance Weight Points toward
Point value assessment compliance
index
Interest rates 1.00 Unavailable 25% .25
Starting .33 Unavailable 25% .08
point
Repayment .33 Compliance 100% .33
Term
Repayment .33 Compliance 100% .33
Installment
Cash Pay- .50 Unavailable 25% .13
ment
Local Costs .50 Compliance 100% .50




Those rules that were "not applicable" to any country's compliance profile
did not impact the compliance index. 10 9 Figures 2, 3, and 4 average compli-
ance indices for Participants, non-Participants, or significant subgroups of
Participants or non-Participants.
5. Historical Data
Table 4: Historical Compliance spreads data incrementally over a 20-year
period, applying the same basic methodology described above with a few
exceptions. First, Table 4: Historical Compliance, unlike Table 2: Partici-
pant Compliance, analyzes only those Participants that were also members of
the G-7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. The narrower scope of review should not decisively alter
the portrait of compliance because these Participants have historically ac-
counted for over 85% of all official export credit activityiO Second, because
109. For example, in Greece, the ECA does not provide direct loans, so the CIRR does not apply.
Therefore, the "interest rate" rule falls out of the analysis and Greece's compliance index is effectively on a
three-point scale. However, to maintain the compliance index as a meaningful comparative tool, Greece's
three-point index is appropriately converted to the four-point scale. See Table 2.
110. See OECD, Medium- and Long-Term Export Credits by Reporting Country, available at http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/13/44/7084900.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (G-7 Participants account for 88% of
official export credits in 1998 and 85% in each year from 1999 to 2001).
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Participants did not attempt to harmonize minimum premiums via the
Knaepen Package until April 1999, Table 4: Historical Compliance meas-
ures compliance with only three categories of Arrangement rules: interest
rates, repayment terms (starting point, term of repayment, and repayment
installments), and size of credit (cash payments and local costs). Thus, in
nominal terms, the compliance index for the historical data is a three-point
index, but, for purposes of comparison with Table 2: Participant Compli-
ance, I have scaled the historic indices to correspond to the four-point index
used in Tables 2 and 3.111 Third, the Arrangement rules evolved over time,
and Table 4: Historical Compliance measures compliance with the rules that
existed at each particular historical moment. Fourth, while Table 2: Partici-
pant Compliance and Table 3: Non-Participant Compliance rely on multiple
sources-OECD publications, ECA Web sites and annual reports-Table 4:
Historical Compliance relies only on the OECD publication, Export Credit
Financing Systems. 112 Otherwise, the methodology behind the compliance
indices in Table 4: Historical Compliance is identical to that of the method-
ology behind the indices compiled from Tables 2 and 3.
B. Ex-Im Bank Compliance
An in-depth examination of Ex-Im Bank's implementation of the Ar-
rangement provides a clear window into how this Article assesses compli-
ance for each ECA. Ex-Im Bank implements the Arrangement's rules with
precision, care, and tenacity. Ex-Im Bank board members have consistently
praised the Arrangement as the significant regulatory framework for export
credits. 13 In practice, the Arrangement is a core, constituent document that
111. The "2003" column in Table 4 takes the compliance indices directly from Table 2, which in-
cludes minimum premiums (the Knaepen Package). Thus, the indices in the "2003" column are based
nominally on four potential points and are not converted from a three-point to a four-point scale, as Table
4 does in all other columns. See infra Table 4: G7 Compliance with the Arrangement's Export Credit
Provisions (1982-2003) [hereinafter Table 4].
112. See OECD, EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS (5th ed. 1995) [hereinafter EXPORT CREDIT
FINANCING SYSTEMS 1995). See also OECD, EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS (4th ed. 1990) [here-
inafter EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS 1990]; OECD, EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS (3d
ed. 1987) [hereinafter EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS 1987]; OECD, EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING
SYSTEMS (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS 1982].
113. Rita M. Rodriguez, Ex-Im Bank: Overview, Challenges, and Policy Options, in THE Ex-IM BANK IN
THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 5, at 10 (The Arrangement "succeeded in leveling the playing field for
'officially supported' export credits .... The age of blatant export credit subsidy competition among
governments appears to be over."). The president and chairman of Ex-Im Bank, during periodic re-
authorization hearings, explicitly and implicitly represented to Congress, on the public record, that Ex-
Im Bank is "bound" by the Arrangement. See Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Statement by
Chairman Robson (June 19, 2001) Hearing Before House Committee on Banking (pushing for further
OECD negotiations to bring "market window" and "untied aid" financing under the Arrangement's
auspices, and exhibiting confidence in the Arrangement and implying that the Arrangement's rules are
being improperly (maybe even illegally) evaded by use of "market windows" and "untied aid"). See also
Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Statement by John B. Taylor, Undersecretary, Department of
Treasury (June 19, 2001) ("[B]ecause ExIm exists, the United States has a seat at the international table
that sets rules for how official export financing operates."); Reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank of the
United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. of the S. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm.,
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is agency law, just as domestic laws that restrict exports to "bad actor" coun-
tries' 14 or prohibit exports of certain products such as arms or drugs.' 15
Specifically, Ex-Im Bank requires a 15% cash payment, as the Arrange-
ment demands.1 16 Ex-Im Bank's repayment terms are explicitly linked to the
Arrangement and, in no case, longer than 10 years,11 7 from a "starting
point" that is consistent with the Arrangement's definition."18 Ex-Im Bank
demands repayment in equal, semi-annual installments.1 9 For direct loans,
Ex-Im Bank uses a three-tier CIRR as its interest rate. 120 Ex-Im Bank will
105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Mr. James A. Harmon, President and Chairman, Export-Import Bank
of the United States) (stating that "[we] attempt to mitigate competition and achieve budget savings
through multilateral negotiations in the OECD .... Today, as a result of ten years of hard bargaining
and consistent Congressional support for Ex-Im Bank, there are no losses as a result of the interest rates
charged on our loans."); Ex-Im Bank Reauthorization: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Int'l. Trade, Investment
and Mon. Policy ofthe House Comm. On Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 8 (1983) (statement
of Chairman Draper) ("Our interest rates have been reduced to the minimums allowed under the OECD
International Arrangement .... The vast majority of cases are getting approved, have been approved all
through 1982, and all of those cases, practically speaking, are currently at the OECD minimums.").
114. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(2) (West 2001). See also supra note 37.
115. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(6)(C)(ii) (West 2001). See also § 635(b)(6)(A)-(B),supra note 38.
116. See Export-Import Bank of the United States, Loan Guarantee: Competitive Financing for Interna-
tional Buyers, available at http://www.exim.gov/products/loanguar.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
117. Under the Arrangement, the maximum repayment term is 10 years, 8.5 years for countries on
the World Bank graduation list. For Ex-Im Bank's medium-term program, the maximum repayment
term is 5 years (capital equipment under U.S. $10 million); for Ex-Im Bank's long-term program, the
maximum repayment term is 10 years (transactions over U.S. $10 million, excluding project finance
transactions). See id. This excludes project financings, which are treated uniquely by the Arrangement and
by Ex-Im Bank. See generally Project Finance Understanding, supra note 59, at 73. See also Export-Import
Bank of the United States, Standard Repayment Terns, available at http://www.exim.gov/pub/pdf/ebd-m-
26.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (on file with the Harvard International Law Journal).
118. See Loan Guarantee: Competitive Financing for International Buyers, supra note 116. See also Standard
Repayment Terms, supra note 117. ("The most common starting point is the date of shipment by the ex-
porter or supplier.").
119. See Loan Guarantee: Competitive Financing for International Buyers, supra note 116. See also Standard
Repayment Terms, supra note 117. ("Repayment begins approximately six months after the starting point,
and payments of principal and accrued interest generally must be made semiannually.").
120. Ex-Im Bank sets CIRRs on the 15th of every month based on U.S. Treasury rates for the pre-
ceding month, as published by the Federal Reserve on the Monday following the last day of the previous
month. See About CIRR Rates, supra note 86. Consistent with the terms of the Arrangement, Ex-Im Bank
calculates CIRRs by adding 100 basis points to the 3-year U.S. Treasury rates for repayment terms less
than or equal to five years, the 5-year U.S. Treasury rates for repayment terms greater than 5 years and
less than or equal to 8.5 years, and the 7-year U.S. Treasury rates for repayment terms greater than 8.5
years. See also The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 16, at 15; OECD, Commercial Interest Reference Rates: The
Official Lending Rates of Export Credit Agencies, available at http://www.exim.gov/tools/cirrrates.html (last
visited Dec. 2, 2003).
On November 21, 2003, Ex-Im Bank's published CIRR rates, effective through December 14, 2003,
were: 3.26% for repayment terms less than or equal to five years; 4.19% for repayment terms less than or
equal to 8.5 years; and 4.75% for repayment terms longer than 8.5 years. The OECD's published CIRRs
were identical. See The Arrangement, supra note 4. Sometimes, an exporter will approach Ex-Im Bank for
some type of preliminary commitment that it can use in bidding for a sale. Since CIRRs change every
month, the CIRR on the preliminary commitment may be different than the CIRR at the time of the
official application to Ex-Im Bank. Upon request and payment of a premium, Ex-Im Bank will "lock in"
the CIRR for a maximum of 120 days for a charge of an additional twenty basis points. See also About
CIRR Rates, supra note 86. This policy is consistent with the Arrangement, which permits fixing CIRRs
for 120 days (as opposed to monthly or every 30 days) for a charge of twenty basis points. See The Ar-
rangement, supra note 4, art. 17(a), at 16.
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cover local costs up to 15% of the contract value, coinciding with the 15%
cash payment.12 1 As discussed above, the Knaepen Package introduced a
minimum premium benchmark system, effective April 1, 1999.122 Even
though Ex-Im Bank's premiums had been calculated using an inter-agency
rating system, 123 Ex-Im Bank migrated to the Knaepen system by the April
1, 1999, deadline and, since that time, Ex-Im Bank's fee structure has
tracked, with specificity, the intricacies of the minimum premium bench-
mark system.124 As a powerful counterexample to many U.S. policymakers
that proclaim the futility of international agreements, the Arrangement's
rules define Ex-Im Bank's rote, everyday programs.1 25
C. Foreign ECAs
Foreign ECAs also take their Arrangement obligations seriously and com-
ply significantly with the export credit provisions of the Arrangement. In
public statements, high-level trade officials and ECA administrators applaud
the Arrangement as engendering widespread compliance and effectively
managing officially supported export finance within an expanding and in-
creasingly connected international economy.1 26 In addition, many ECAs, in
121. See Export-import Bank of the United States, Local Cost Policy, available at http://www.exim.gov/
products/policies/local_cost.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
122. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, arts. 20-25, at 17-20 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 32 for a description of the ICRAS country risking rating system.
124. While staff initially resisted the premium rate shift, Ex-Im Bank's management, determined to
comply with OECD commitments, advocated the institutionalization of the new fee structure, and man-
dated OECD fee training sessions for all Ex-Im Bank employees. Today, the Knaepen system is an em-
bedded, organic part of Ex-Im Bank.
Ex-Im Bank introduced the new fee system to its users with the following: "One of the last major un-
covered aspects of official export finance support was the fees charged by ECAs for the risk that a transac-
tion would not be repaid. We changed our exposure fee system in concert with all major ECAs to charge
no less than the OECD minimum risk fees for every market." See Export-Import Bank of the United
States, Exposure Fee Advice, available at http://www.exim.gov/tools/exposure/fee-advice.html (last visited
Dec. 2, 2003). Ex-Im Bank calculates minimum premium benchmarks consistent with the Arrangement.
Compare Ex-Im Bank's policies, at Exposure Fee Advice and Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-
posure Fee Calculator, available at http://www.exim.gov/tools/feecalc.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003), with
The Arrangement, supra note 4, arts. 20-25, at 17-20, and The Knaepen Package: Guiding Principles, supra note
74.
Given that the Knaepen Package minimum premium benchmarks are based on public sector risk, Ex-
Im Bank then adds a transaction risk increment for private sector transactions to measure the risk specific
to the transaction and the parties. The transaction risk increment is linked to the ICRAS that, prior to
the Knaepen Package, was the sole determinant of Ex-Im Bank's fees. See also Ex-Im Bank Exposure Fee
Calculator, supra note 124. The Arrangement is concerned about premiums as "hidden subsidies" and
thus does not prohibit Participants from charging above the minimum premium benchmarks. See also the
Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 20(e), at 17.
125. Throughout my tenure at Ex-Im Bank, I attended hundreds of credit committee meetings and
dozens of Board of Director sessions, and I do not recall a standard export credit transaction (as opposed
to a project finance transaction) that fell outside the bounds of the Arrangement.
126. See A. Ian Gillespie, A New World for the Export Credit Agencies, in THE EXPORT CREDIT AR-
RANGEMENT, supra note 5, at 111 (arguing that the Arrangement has "proven useful" in "avoiding a
destructive and expensive export-credit race"). See also Funio Hoshi, A Japanese Perspective, in THE Ex-IM
BANK IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 5, at 237 (contending that the Arrangement has almost suc-
cessfully "level[ed] the playing field" and squeezed most "subsidy elements" from official export finance);
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their customer-oriented publications, make broad claims of allegiance to the
Arrangement. 1
2 7
Yet the proof of compliance is not in these general statements but rather
in how ECAs structure daily interactions with exporters. Table 2: Partici-
pant Compliance uniquely analyzes and compiles this public information for
such indicia of compliance. A quick glance at Table 2: Participant Compli-
ance reveals consistent, widespread Participant compliance with the Ar-
rangement. As Figure 2 illustrates, the average Participant compliance index
is currently 3.4 on a four-point scale. The compliance indices for a majority
of Participants are 3.8 or higher, with most over 3.0; a few outlying Partici-
pants, namely Greece, New Zealand, and Spain place a drag on the average
compliance index, not because they are blatantly non-compliant but because
their programs are not transparent enough to make qualitative compliance
assessments possible. 128
Hidehiro Konno, From Simple to Sophisticated, in THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5, at
95, 95 (noting that the Arrangement has served the purposes of "global prosperity" through "promoting
trade" while managing the export credits which are the "fuel that power(s]" international trade); Michael
Kruse & Eckhardt Moltrecht, A National Perspective: The View from Germany, in THE EXPORT CREDIT
ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5, at 99, 99-101 (arguing that the Arrangement has been a success and that
future success depends on further evolution and modernization); Hans W Reich, A German Perspective, in
THE Ex-IM BANK IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 5, at 222 (acknowledging that, with the conclusion
of the Knaepen Package and the harmonization of minimum premium levels for sovereign risk, officially
supported export credits "have indeed been fairly uniform"); Soledad Abad Rico et al., The Arrangement
from a Spanish Perspective, in THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5, at 39, 43 ("The Ar-
rangement has been a successful example of international co-ordination in a difficult area where the incli-
nation is to beat competing countries through an uncontrolled credit race.").
127. As this Article already suggested, these representations may actually be more indicative of reality
than those of high-level policymakers. See, e.g., EFIC, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, 19 (2002) ("We [Austra-
lia] provide these [medium term) facilities under the 'Consensus Arrangement.'"); Oesterreichische Kon-
trollbank Aktiengesellschaft (OeKB), Export Financing Scheme, available at http://www.oekb.at/english/l/
03/10300000.shtml (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) ("Credits according to Kontrollbank's export financing
scheme are provided in conformity with the rules of the OECD Arrangement on Guidelines ... '.");
Export Development Canada, EDC, How We Work, International Agreements, available at http://www.edc.ca/
corpinfo/whoweare/how we work_e.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) ("Canada Account financing is struc-
tured following OECD guidelines .... ); Eksport Kredit Fonden (EKF), available at http://www.ekf.dk/
(under "International" link, then the "Agreements" link) (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) ("The basis for the
use of officially supported exported credits is the 'Arrangement. ... '); Finnvera, OECD, at http://www.
finnvera.fi/index2.cfm?to=612 (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) ("[AJll credits guaranteed by Finnvera must
adhere to rules, laid down in the OECD Consensus."); Export Risk Guarantee Agency (ERG), Basis of
ERG, available at http://www.swiss-erg.com/portrait/international/e/index.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003)
("Primarily the aim is to implement reasonable principles for credit terms in international trade and to
avoid competitive distortion due to official support. The most important organisations to this effect are
OECD and Berne Union."); Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD), Products & Services, available
at http://www.ecgd.gov.uk/print/home/pshome/creditterms/credittermsmi.htm (last visited Dec. 2,
2003) ("[W]e are bound by the OECD Consensus on government support for export credits and tied aid
finance, which has been incorporated into EC law.").
128. See "Compliance Index" column in Table 2.
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Participants
Source: Table 2: Participant Compliance with the Arrangement's Export Credit
Provisions.
Also significant, several non-Participant countries also comply with the
Arrangement. Many of these ECAs profess their adherence to the Arrange-
ment.129 As Figure 3 illustrates, the average compliance index for non-Partici-
pants is 3.0, and as high as 3.4 for those seeking admission to the European
Union. 130
129. See, e.g., Hungary's ECA claims that "the terms and conditions of the loans with maturity over
two years are in line with the rules of the Arrangement." OECD, Hungary, in EXPORT CREDIT FINANC-
ING SYSTEMS, supra note 24, at 8; Poland's ECA proclaims, "For credits over one year, the rules on the
Arrangement on credit terms and down payment apply." OECD, Poland, in EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING
SYSTEMS, supra note 24, at 5; Romania's ECA states, "The Arrangement is always applied as a bench-
mark." OECD, Romania, in EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS, supra note 24, at 8; and Turkey's ECA
proclaims, "In the implementation of the [medium- and long-term export credits] programme, the Bank
fully complies with the Arrangement." OECD, Turkey, in EXPORT CREDIT FINANCING SYSTEMS, supra
note 24, at 10.
130. It is important to recognize that this figure does not represent compliance among all non-
Participants. See discussion of scope in text accompanying supra note 101.
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Source: Table 3: Non-Participant Compliance with the Arrangement's Export
Credit Provisions.
While this Article calculates average compliance indices of 3.4 for Par-
ticipants and 3.0 for non-Participants, these indices are less important in a
nominal sense but very -significant in (1) their relative proximity to perfect
compliance; and (2) that some non-Participants comply with the Arrange-
ment to almost the same extent as the Participants themselves.
Figures 2 and 3 offer a 2003 snapshot of compliance. Figure 4, below,
based on the data from Table 4: Average Compliance, illustrates compliance
over the life of the Arrangement. Compliance indices for the G-7 Partici-
pants hovered in a narrow range from 3.4 to 3.8.










2003 1999/1995 1990 1987 1982
Source: Table 4: G-7 Compliance with the Arrangement's Export Credit
Provisions (1982-2003).
Notably, Figure 4 illustrates that compliance with the Arrangement is
not epiphenomenal but rather has been high, sustained, and steady through-
out the Arrangement's life.
V. WHY COMPLIANCE?
In the Sections that follow, this Article explores reasons why Participants
and non-Participants alike have embraced the Arrangement, incorporating
its spirit and its specific, at times tedious, rules into export credit programs.
While it is often impossible to know precisely why a state chooses to comply
with a particular international rule, the following Sections offer enlightened
hypotheses, some substantiated with hard data and others with softer conjec-
tures, as to why Participants, and select non-Participants, became enthusias-
tic adherents to the Arrangement's rules.
The following sections look at state interests, the Arrangement itself, and
the broader international legal context to construct a compliance story. Sec-
tion A begins where much international compliance scholarship begins-
with the simple proposition that states will comply with international rules
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th the simple proposition that states will comply with international rules
when it is in their interest. This realist, and subsequently rationalist, state-
centered view may explain the Arrangement's initial combustive moment
but is not robust enough to explain the profound and sustained compliance
that the data reveal. Section B then peers into the Arrangement's history,
evolution, processes, and form for an understanding of compliance. While
turning to the international rules that are the subject of the compliance in-
quiry may seem like an obvious analytic step, much realist and rationalist
compliance work neglects any piercing, detailed analysis of legal rules, ex-
plaining, in part, why such theories are limited in their explanatory and
predictive value. Section C looks to the broader, systemic context in which
trade finance regulation is enmeshed. Through vertical linkages between the
Arrangement and domestic law and horizontal linkages between related ar-
eas of economic regulation, a web of interlocking law has emerged which,
while not decisive in explaining compliance throughout the Arrangement's
history, clearly fortifies the Arrangement and helps assure that compliance
will continue into the future. This Part concludes with a weighing of the
compliance factors, arguing, that while state interests and systemic linkages
play some role in explaining sustained compliance, it is the Arrangement
itself-its dynamic processes, measured evolution, and loose form-that is
the key engine of compliance.
A. State Interests and the Initial Commitment
The realists have hijacked international legal scholarship, particularly the
compliance question. 131 The underlying realist contention is that, in an an-
archical world, states act in self-interest, typically derivative of power poli-
tics, and that compliance with international law is not compliance at all but
rather naked coincidence of state interests and international "rules."' 32 Clas-
sic realists argue that a powerful state will have the luxury of acting unilat-
131. See Simmons, supra note 12, at 328 (arguing that the estrangement of "law" and "international
relations" theory is largely a function of the dominance of realist thinking and further arguing that "he-
gemony in realist thinking" discouraged "inquiries into the role that international law might play in
explaining international outcomes."). See also Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and Inter-
national Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (1993) ("[Tlhe theoretical scholar-
ship in both international law and international relations can be understood as either a response to or a
refinement of [the realist] challenge [to international law].").
132. For a sampling of the realist critique, see generally FRANCIS BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (1985); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1978); Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance ofInternational Law: The Schism Be-
tween International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980); Stanley Hoffman, The
Role ofInternational Organizations: Limits and Possibilities, 10 INT'L ORG. 357, 364 (1956).
In more refined versions of the realist critique, state interests are not subsumed solely by sheer power
but are rather derivative of the structure of the international system. See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). For a modern review of the realist critique, see Jonathan
D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1789 (2003) (arguing that the realist critique
remains a potent force in international law and international relations and exhorting international legal
scholars to take the realist critique seriously).
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erally in its own interests; less powerful states must define their own self-
interests in relation to their more powerful brethren.' 33 International law,
therefore, is not law at all but a shrewd and ephemeral reflection of state
power, interests, and preferences. The realists thereby leave little room for
legal institutions and fundamentally challenge the relevance of international
law. 134
In deconstructing the notion of "state interest," rationalists seek to dis-
prove the simplistic, anachronistic, and empirically problematic contention
that power-driven self-interest is the sole determinant of state behavior. Ra-
tionalists, most notably regime theorists, 35 assume that states are unitary,
rational actors that will pursue their self-interests. Unlike realists though,
rationalists recognize that state interest is not always coincident with imme-
diate self-interest and power. Using game theory and other familiar tools of
economic analysis, rationalists view "self-interest" as embracing notions of
the "collective good," "systemic utility maximization," "long- versus short-
term gains," or "zero sum vs. positive sum gains."1 36 Rationalists use these
tools to explain why states often coalesce in cooperative, self-restraint to form
regimes with core unifying norms. Distinct from the realists, regime theo-
rists find a role for law and legal institutions, preserving states' systemic
long-term interests in the face of immediate and competing short-term in-
terests. Typically, however, rationalists view international law as a passive
backdrop against which state interests evolve and play out.
133. MORGENTHAU, supra note 132, at 5 ("We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of inter-
est defined as power.").
134. See Boyle, supra note 132, at 198 (arguing that "International law is devoid of any intrinsic
significance within the calculus of international political decisionmaking."). See also Hoffman, supra note
132, at 370 (arguing that power politics, particularly cold war politics, limit and paralyze international
institutions).
135. "Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L
ORG. 185, 186 (1982). See Oran R. Young, International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation, 32 WORLD
POL. 331, 332-42 (describing regimes in terms of a substantive component, a procedural component,
and implementation).
For prominent examples of regime theory, see THE ANATOMIES OF INTERDEPENDENCE (John Gerard
Ruggie ed., 1983); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); ROBERT 0. KEO-
HANE, AFTER HEGEMONY (1984); ORAN R. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY: A THEORY
WITH INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS (1979); Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 357 (1982)
(describing conditions in which security regimes, or cooperative security arrangements, will come into
existence); Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982); Stephen
D. Krasner, Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 497 (1982);
Charles Lipson, The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change, 36 INT'L ORG. 417
(1982); Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36 INT'L ORG. 299
(1982). See also Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories ofInternational Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491
(1987); Oran R. Young, Book Review, International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions, 39
WORLD POL. 104 (1986).
136. See, e.g., Young, supra note 135, at 109 ("[Alctors frequently experience powerful incentives to
accept the behavioral constraints associated with institutional arrangements in order to maximize their
own long-term gains.").
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The rationalists identify historical moments such as the 1973 oil shock
that immediately preceded the Arrangement, when states' interest may shift
and realign, as propitious for international cooperation and regime-
building.' 37 Using game theory, the rationalist form of analysis, consider the
following highly simplified model of pre-Arrangement export credit dy-
namics:138
Country Y No Subsidy Country Y Subsidy
Country X -$500 (50% chance of -$750 (75% chance of
No Subsidy losing $1,000 export), losing $1,000 export),
-$500 (50% chance of -$350 ($100 subsidy cost
losing $1,000 export) + 25% chance of losing
$1,000 export)
Country X -$350 ($100 subsidy cost -$600 ($100 subsidy cost
Subsidy + 25% chance of losing + 50% chance of losing
$1,000 export), -$750 $1,000 export), -$600
(75% chance of losing ($100 subsidy cost + 50%
$1,000 export) chance of losing $1,000
export)
X,Y = cost to Country X, cost to Country Y
While a classic prisoner's dilemma game predicts that both countries will
opt to subsidize exports, 139 that outcome does not further either country's goal
137. See generally KEOHANE, supra note 135; RUGGIE, supra note 135; Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 362-68
(1989).
138. Assume that, before the oil shock, unfettered by any regulation, Country X and Country Y com-
peted for exports under the following circumstances: the cost of export subsidies is $100; the value of the
export in question is $1,000; the chance of winning the export for its nationals is 50% if both Country X
and Country Y subsidize at a level of $100 or if both do not subsidize; if Country X provides an export
credit subsidy while Country Y does not, the chance that the foreign buyer will "buy from Country X"
rises to 75%, and vice versa.
These games are based on the treatment of prisoner's dilemma games in DOUGLAs G. BAIRD ET AL.,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 31-35 (1994) (describing collective action problems in terms of the pris-
oner's dilemma game).
139. Assume that each country fully understands the costs and benefits not only of its decision to pro-
vide an export credit subsidy but also of the other country's decisions and further assume that neither
country knows whether or not the other country will provide an export credit subsidy. Id. at 10 (referred
to as "complete but imperfect information"). Consider Country X's options. If Country X subsidizes, its
costs are $350 if Country Y does not subsidize and $600 if Country Y subsidizes; if Country X does not
subsidize, its costs are $500 if Country Y does not subsidize and $750 if Country Y subsidizes. Notwith-
standing Country Y's decision (to subsidize or not to subsidize), Country X is always better off if it sub-
sidizes. In this sense, Country X has a "strictly dominant" strategy of providing export credit subsidies.
Id. at 11. Now consider Country Y's options. If it subsidizes, its costs are $350 if Country X does not
subsidize and $600 if Country X subsidizes; if Country Y does not subsidize, its costs are $500 if Coun-
try X does not subsidize and $750 if Country X subsidizes. Notwithstanding Country X's decision (to
subsidize or not to subsidize), Country Y is always better off if it subsidizes. Country Y's strictly domi-
nant strategy is also to subsidize. If game theory's assumption that players are rational is correct, then
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of promoting exports because equivalent subsidies effectively cancel each
other. Yet because it is worse for each country to unilaterally eliminate sub-
sidies, neither country will want to make the first move. Country X/Country
Y cooperation could resolve this collective action problem, but cooperation
presents a costly hurdle, especially because bilateral elimination of subsidies
requires simultaneous reduction in subsidies to identical levels at an identi-
cal pace. Otherwise, differentials remain in the system that permit subsidies
to remain a manipulative economic force and potentially ignite a powerful
subsidy war.
In 1973, some of the underlying economics changed. 40 The cost of export
subsidies nearly doubled from 1972 to 1973.141 Given the same assumptions
as the previous game, but this time with doubled subsidy costs, Country X
and Country Y viewed their respective subsidy tradeoffs as:
Country Y No Subsidy Country Y Subsidy
Country X -$500,-$500 -$750,-$450
No Subsidy
Country X Subsidy -$450, -$750 -$700, -$700
X,Y = cost to Country X, cost to Country Y
Even with increased subsidy costs, each will independently gravitate toward
the "subsidy" position. However, the sharply rising cost of the strategy,
which still does not produce any competitive advantage, is all the more poign-
ant at a moment of tight government budgets that feel the strain of rising
both the United States and United Kingdom will subsidize exports and each country will assume a cost
of $600. Id.
140. See supra notes 45-49 for a discussion of the macroeconomic impact of the 1973 oil shock.
141. As the subsidy level rises, for example as the spread between domestic interest rates (the rates at
which ECAs borrow funds) and ECA lending rates (which would decrease in an export-credit war as a
competitive way to gain exports) increases, the hard cost of these subsidies increases. Historical interest
rate data reveal that the interest rate spread at a minimum doubled in Japan, France, West Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States from 1972 to 1973. See Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 183.
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
France 2% 1.50% 1% 3% 2% 1.50% 2% 1% 1.50%
Fed. Rep. 2% 2% 2% 3.50% 2% 0.50% -1.50% -2% 0%
Germany
Japan 1% 1% 1% 2.50% 1.5% 0% 0% -1% 0%
U.K. 3% 2.50% 2.50% 8% 8% 7.50% 6% 6% 6%
U.S. 1% 0% 0% 0.50% 0.50% 000% 0% 0.50% 1%
Source: Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 183 (relying on IMF statistics and John Ray, The "OECD Consensus"
on Export Credits, THE WORLD ECONOMY 9 (1986) to compile a chart of interest rates in the G-5, as well
as the ECA benchmark lending rates).
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subsidy costs. 142 This economic moment may provide Country X and Coun-
try Y with the incentive to cooperate. Rationalists argue that hard coopera-
tion will occur if the costs of reaching a credible agreement that breeds
confidence in the stability of the "no subsidy" position are less than the costs
of bilateral subsidies. 143 The 1973 oil shock, which coincides with the initial
cooperative discussions on the periphery of IMF/World Bank and G-5 meet-
ings, apparently altered the cost/benefit tradeoffs of officially supported ex-
port finance. States' interests in maintaining fiscal discipline outweighed
states' interests in preserving wide latitude over export promotion policies,
and this change effectively united states in an urge to cooperate to control
the skyrocketing costs of export subsidies.
At first glance, the rationalists tell a compelling story of why ECAs from
the industrialized world committed in 1973 to controlling export subsidies.
Of course, the simplifying assumptions of the game mask the complex, mul-
tidimensional dynamics of the official export subsidy race. A more nuanced
view, rooted deeper in historical and empirical data, reveals weaknesses in
the rationalists' arguments, as well as constraining limitations in the model's
use.
In reality, during the 1970-73 period, the period immediately preceding
the initial cooperative discussions, the cost of subsidies in the United States
remained virtually unchanged, and the cost of subsidies in the United
Kingdom, for example, almost tripled. 144 The game now looks like this:
U.K. No Subsidy U.K. Subsidy
U.S. -$500 (50% chance of -$750 (75% chance of
No Subsidy losing $1,000 export), losing $1,000 export),
-$500 (50% chance of -$550 ($300 subsidy
losing $1,000 export) + 25% chance of losing
$1,000 export)
U.S. -$350 ($100 subsidy - $600 ($100 subsidy
Subsidy + 25% chance of losing + 50% chance of losing
$1,000 export), -$750 $1,000 export), -$800
(75% chance of losing ($300 subsidy + 50%
$1,000 export) chance of losing $1,000
export)
X,Y = cost to the U.S., cost to the U.K.
In this scenario, the United States will continue to subsidize. The United
Kingdom will choose to eliminate subsidies. The United States has no in-
142. See Congressional Budget Office, supra note 49.
143. See BAIRD, supra note 138, at 34. See also Abbott, supra note 137, at 364 (discussing the impor-
tance of the relative size of payoffs).
144. See Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 183.
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centive to cooperate because the United Kingdom will unilaterally eliminate
subsidies no matter what the United States does. The cooperative urge should
not emerge here-if anything, it should harden the United States' resolve to
maintain autonomy over subsidy decisions. Yet we know that 1973 marked
the beginning of a concerted cooperative effort. Of course, with different
pairings of different countries the model would likely produce distinct out-
comes, simply highlighting the multidimensional complexity of official ex-
port credits and the limitations of the rationalists' flat, static modeling.
Furthermore, if the rationalists are right and if the rise in the cost of sub-
sidies indeed tips states' interests toward cooperation, then the data suggest
that rationalist predictive precision is incorrect. Granted, in 1973 the cost of
subsidies rose significantly for the G-5 countries, explaining the initial co-
operative discussions. 145 Yet from 1973 to 1977 the cost of subsidies for all
countries except the United Kingdom actually fell to pre-1973 levels, or
lower, resulting in a steady post-1973 reduction in the cost of subsidies to
1970 levels. 146 If the rationalists are correct in the theory that international
cooperation is all about states acting in their rational self-interest in main-
taining fiscal discipline, then the cooperative moment should have self-
combusted from 1973 to 1978, as the cost of subsidies once again decreased.
Instead, cooperation deepened with the advent of the 1976 Consensus and
the 1978 Arrangement.
Even if the rationalist model correctly pinpoints states' initial commit-
ment to the Arrangement, it is insufficient to explain sustained commit-
ment to the Arrangement despite subsequent fluctuations and divergences in
the cost of subsidies and, concomitantly, states' interests in maintaining
autonomy over subsidies. Nor does it make predictions or provide guidance
as to what form cooperation should take. In fact, the rationalists would
likely find the use of an informal, non-binding arrangement a paradoxical
way to ensure the credibility necessary to maintain states' no subsidy posi-
tion. Official export credit dynamics are much more complex than any
unitemporal prisoner's dilemma game could reasonably depict. In peripher-
alizing legal institutions and rules, rationalist theory, rooted in state inter-
est, divests itself of a powerful explanatory tool that could add robust pre-
dictive flavor to its otherwise flat approach.
B. Sustained Compliance: Arrangement-Centered Explanations
This Section turns to the Arrangement in search for an explanation for
sustained compliance. In conducting a probing review of the Arrangement,
this Section examines the Arrangement's negotiating history, technical proc-
esses, and soft form and identifies specific Arrangement features that con-
tributed to ECA compliance. In the end, this Section paints a picture of an
145. See supra note 141.
146. See Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 183. See also supra note 141.
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Arrangement that astutely packages several features, coddling-or gently
directing-Participants toward a path of compliance.
1. Negotiating History
a. Incrementalism and Consensus
Before the Arrangement became the Arrangement, it was called the "Con-
sensus." This name may have more appropriately captured the Arrange-
ment's essence. Scholars generally argue that consensus decision-making
enhances states' compliance with an international norm. 47 Indeed, absolute
consensus, as opposed to a majority, supports all of the Arrangement's rules.
So, at each moment in the Arrangement's history, the Arrangement repre-
sents a negotiated consensus-a type of equilibrium-centered on certain
specific issues. When consensus becomes impossible to garner, the Arrange-
ment simply "reserves" that particular issue for later discussion and consen-
sus building. As a result, there are still several prominent areas that the Par-
ticipants have identified as ripe for regulation but for which no consensus
has congealed, and the Participants have placed these items on a "future
work" list that is incorporated into the Arrangement itself. 48
The Arrangement's consensus-driven decision-making enabled, if not ne-
cessitated, incrementalism. As Table 1: History highlights, the Arrangement
evolved to its current place slowly, with each subsequent innovation build-
ing upon the previously laid foundation. An in-depth examination of efforts
to eliminate interest rate subsidies, as well as the establishment of minimum
premium benchmarks, illustrates the compliance benefits of the Arrange-
ment's gradual unfolding.
While the elimination of interest rate subsidies was the primary impetus
behind the Arrangement, it nonetheless spanned sixteen years, involving
much experimentation.1 49 The 1978 Arrangement set an interest rate floor
of 7.5-8%, favoring high interest rate countries by preserving their subsidy
(the spread between the market rates and the floor) and disadvantaging low-
interest-rate countries (by not only eliminating their subsidy but by requir-
ing these countries to charge a premium). 150 The minimum rates, or the
"uniform matrix," were nominal, meaning they did not differentiate be-
147. See, e.g., Edith Brown Weiss, Conclusions: Understanding Compliance with Soft Law, in COMMIT-
MENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BONDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
535 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) ("Generally the research confirmed that consensus about the norm posi-
tively affected compliance.").
148. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, arts. 85-88, at 46. In addition, the Participants have reserved
certain industries such as ships, aircraft, and nuclear power plants for special Sector Understandings, see
supra text accompanying notes 92-93, pragmatically recognizing that the generic regulations in the
Arrangement's main body would not address particular industry needs with appropriate specificity with-
out placing a rather strong drag on the consensus-driven process.
149. For a summary of the gradual elimination of interest rate subsidies, see Table 1.
150. Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 181.
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tween interest rate conditions in various countries. 51 In 1983, after interest
rates soared in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Participants raised mini-
mum matrix rates to 10-12% for high-interest Participants 152 and created a
rudimentary automatic adjustment mechanism to approximate market con-
ditions for low-interest Participants. 153 By 1987, Participants agreed to a
differentiated, market-based CIRR formula for Participants with interest
rates below the minimum matrix. 154 CIRRs, linked to baskets of govern-
ment bonds in each market, are market rates that effectively preclude below-
market interest rate subsidization. 155 In 1991, the Participants applied the
CIRR formula to all Participants, except credits to the poorest countries,
thereby eliminating almost all interest rate subsidies. 156 The 1994 Schaerer
Package institutionalized CIRRs as the universal interest rate system for
high- and low-interest Participants, and for loans to all countries, including
the very poorest countries.1 57 With this development, the Arrangement had
succeeded in virtually eliminating all interest rate subsidies. Notably, at
each historic juncture, as Table 4: Historical Compliance illustrates, Partici-
pants complied with the prevailing interest rate rules.
From 1978 (or even 1976 with the Consensus), the Participants ap-
proached the issue of interest rate subsidies in a controlled, incremental way.
In doing so, however, the Participants successfully eliminated subsidies and
innovated the CIRR. The CIRR importantly introduces the concept of
automatic adjustment mechanisms into the Arrangement; Participants do
not have to reconvene to set and reset CIRRs because the CIRR formula self-
corrects to reflect market conditions. The CIRR also embodies a market-
specific view of Arrangement rules, recognizing that the Arrangement's suc-
cess depends on its ability to tailor itself to individual Participants' market
conditions. The Participants could not have achieved all of this-virtual
elimination of interest rate subsidies, automatic adjustment, market differen-
tiation-spontaneously at the Arrangement's inception without placing a
strong drag on the process and/or breaking a commitment to consensus deci-
sion-making at critical junctures. Without the use of incremental steps,
along with a certain degree of economic "serendipity" (i.e., a large spike in
interest rates that convinced even high-interest-rate Participants that subsi-
dies needed to end), 158 the Participants would not have arrived at today's
unambiguously successful CIRR, which embodies innovative concepts, such
as automaticity, that now run through other areas of the Arrangement. 5 9
151. Id.
152. Id. at 188.
153. Id. at 186.
154. RAY, supra note 10, at 57-58.
155. See supra notes 71-73 for detailed discussion ofCIRRs.
156. RAY, supra note 10, at 98.
157. OECD, The Arrangement: What It is All About, in THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, Supra
note 5, at 17, 20.
158. See supra note 141 (table).
159. See, e.g., infra notes 227-231 for a discussion of automartic reclassification.
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The 1997 Knaepen Package of minimum premium benchmarks is the Ar-
rangement's newest innovation.1 60 In 1994, responding to an OECD Group
on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees study on ECA premium rates and
cash flow, the Participants placed "premium harmonization" on the Arrange-
ment's official list of future work. 161 The Participants then designated a working
group of technical experts to develop a proposal ("Working Group"). 162 In
1997, the Participants accepted the Knaepen Package, or the Guiding Prin-
ciples for Setting Premia and Related Conditions, 163 which proposes stan-
dardization of premiums through application of general principles and a
seven-tiered country classification scheme.' 64 The Knaepen Package, while
incorporated into the Arrangement in 1997,165 was not implemented until
1999, allowing ECAs to amend their internal rules, train staff, and change
processes.1 66 Participants understood the Knaepen Package as a mere "start-
ing point" that "is subject, over time, to improvement and enhancement in
light both of experience and developments in international trade and in the
ECA's working and political environment."' 167 Through an elaborate Elec-
tronic Exchange of Information system, Participants share financial and ex-
periential information on the guiding principles, and the Working Group
assesses this information in a forward-looking, potentially revisionary vein.' 68
The Working Group has used this information to compile and publish specific
guidance on each permitted exception to the minimum benchmarks, as well
as to provide additional transparency into the country classification scheme
and the econometric formulas for the calculation of the benchmarks. 169 The
Knaepen Package's measured conception, staggered implementation, and
forward-looking revisionism is another example of the Arrangement's pro-
ductive evolutionary process.
Consensus-driven incrementalism may have some drawbacks. It may delay
important ends, as evidenced by the sixteen-year delay in eliminating all
160. For a description of the mechanics of the minimum premium benchmark system, see supra text
accompanying notes 75-85.
161. Pierre Knaepen, The "Knaepen Package": Toward Convergence in Pricing Risk, in THE EXPORT
CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5, at 75, 76 ("In their Declaration of Principle of September 1994,
the Participants recognized that premium and guarantee fees are an important and priority issue and
agreed to investigate guiding principles with a view to producing convergence among premia.").
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 78. See also supra text accompanying notes 75-76 for an explanation of the guiding princi-
ples, country classification scheme, and permitted exceptions from the country classification scheme.
165. The Arrangement, supra note 4, arts. 20-24, at 17-20.
166. During this transition period, Participants used "best efforts" not to reduce premiums below the
basic benchmarks. Id. art. 22, at 18, n.3. Participants granted Korea, a 1997 newcomer to the Arrange-
ment, a more gradual dispensation, requiring that Korea charge 40% of minimums by April 1, 1999,
60% of minimums by April 1, 2000, 80% of minimums by April 1, 2001, and 100% of minimum
benchmarks by April 1, 2002. Id.
167. Knaepen, supra note 161, at 79.
168. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 24, at 19-20. See also The Knaepen Package: Guiding Prin-
ciples, supra note 74, at 9.
169. The Knaepen Package: Guiding Principles, supra note 74.
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interest rate subsidies. In addition, it has circumscribed the Arrangement's
reach. Agricultural products explicitly fall outside of the Arrangement's
scope, and Participants have not yet reached consensus on regulation of the
agricultural sector. 170 Participants have, for the most part, treated project
financings, 17 1 typically the larger infrastructure projects, as outside the Ar-
rangement's scope.' 72 Many important issues remain on the Arrangement's
"future work" list, such as a definition of "official support"'173 and "market
window operations." 174 These examples are not intended to detract from the
Arrangement's achievements, which are monumental and deserving of cele-
bration. Instead, they are intended to provide some perspective on what the
Arrangement has accomplished and what it still may strive to achieve. The
Arrangement will undoubtedly grapple with some of these "scope" issues in
the same measured, incremental manner that has guided it through its first
twenty-five years. Consensus-driven incrementalism will insure that when
the Arrangement does indeed tackle some or all of these issues, the ensuing
rules will work in a way that is acceptable to Participants and thereby breed
a level of compliance that is consistent with the Arrangement's record.
170. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 87(a), at 46.
171. Scott Hoffman suggests that:
Project finance is a "financing structure in which debt, equity, and credit enhancement are com-
bined for the construction and operation, or the refinancing, of a particular facility in a capital-
intensive industry, in which lenders base credit appraisals on the projected revenues from the opera-
tion of the facility, rather than the general assets or the credit of the sponsor of the facility."
SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE 4-5 (1998).
172. While the Participants have tried to bring project finance into the Arrangement's ambit through
a set of guidelines with a trial period, these guidelines have not yet settled into the Arrangement. See
Project Finance Understanding, spra note 59, at 73.
173. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 88, at 46. ("It has not proved possible to reach total
agreement on the definition of official support in light of differences between long-established national
export credit systems .... Until agreement is reached, the current wording in the Arrangement does not
prejudice present interpretations.").
174. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 86, at 46. ("The Participants undertake to investigate
further ... the definition of market window operations in order to prevent distortion of competition.").
The definitions of "market windows" and "official support" have been of particular concern recently.
Market windows are "private" financial institutions that enjoy significant government backing and thus
are able to offer financing at below-market rates. Market windows, particularly in Canada and Germany,
have been providing export trade finance on terms that are more flexible, and often more attractive from a
domestic exporter's vantage point, than the Arrangement permits. See Allan I. Mendelowitz, The New
World of Government-Supported International Finance, in THE Ex-IM BANK IN THE 21ST CENTURY at 170-
80 (describing market windows in Germany and Canada); Rodriguez, supra note 113, at 10-14
(describing market windows in Canada and Germany and expressing concern on behalf of U.S. exporters).
Because the market windows are not official ECAs and because the Arrangement regulates only officially
supported export credits, the countries who support market windows, principally Canada and Germany,
argue that they fall outside the Arrangement. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 2, at 9 ("The Ar-
rangement shall apply to all official support for exports of goods and/or services .... ") (emphasis added).
Obviously, unchecked market windows could infuse subsidized export credits and undermine the Ar-
rangement. See also William Daley, Maintaining Ex-Im Bank as a Major Force, in THE Ex-IM BANK IN THE
21ST CENTURY, supra note 5, at 246-47 (arguing that Ex-Im Banks should consider competing with
market windows); Mendelowitz, supra note 174, at 180-84 (arguing that market windows are having a
negative effect on U.S. exporters). Of course, this loophole could be closed upon a more precise definition
of "official support," but to date no consensus has emerged.
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b. Specificity
Notably, the Arrangement is specific and technical. Where the Arrange-
ment could state that Participants will offer financing based on market-
oriented rates, it instead defines a CIRR as having a specific relationship to a
specific government bond of a specific maturity, leaving little room for Par-
ticipants to claim "this was my best estimate of an interest rate reflecting
market conditions." 175 Likewise, the Arrangement could have stated that the
maximum repayment term would be 10 years. Instead the Arrangement pre-
cisely linked repayment term to the starting point of credit, a term that the
Arrangement precisely defines, as well as an elaborate World Bank country
classification scheme. 176 These are just a few of many possible examples of
precise, specific Arrangement regulation.
An international agreement will garner compliance if its terms are easily
complied with-if the regulated do not have to guess what terms mean,
struggle with implementation, or argue about ambiguities. 177 In its specificity,
the Arrangement stands in contrast with many international legal agree-
ments that echo general aspirational platitudes without any type of specific
compliance roadmap. In human rights treaties, for example, general prom-
ises not to subject anyone to "torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment"'17 are laudable aspirations, but the prohibition raises
unanswered questions: What is torture? What is other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading punishment? The states negotiating a treaty may all agree that tor-
ture is undesirable, but they may disagree on whether sleep deprivation, for
example, constitutes torture. 17 9 In failing to include a detailed list of those
practices that are clearly torture and those practices that are acceptable uses
of police power, the treaty itself may become a roadblock to compliance.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 7 1-73 for an explanation of CIRRs.
176. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 9, at 11-12.
177. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823,
1857, 1863 (2002) (arguing that "vague statements" lead to a relatively low level of compliance because
"reputational consequences" are not high when the obligations are ambiguous). See also ABRAM CHAYES &
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULA-
TORY AGREEMENTS 11 (1995) ("The broader and more general the language, the wider the ambit of
permissible interpretations to which it gives rise.").
178. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (no one shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment). See also
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. While the drafters added a little more specificity
to the definition, it does not come close to including any kind of laundry list of the types of treatment
that may be considered torture; furthermore, the exclusion of "pain or suffering arising only from, inher-
ent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions" does not do much to clarify the precise meaning of the prohibi-
tion.
179. This was an issue in the wake of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the detention of
members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban by U.S. forces. See Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries
Abuse But Defends Interrogations: 'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas
Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al. See also Alan Cooperman, CIA Interrogation Under Fire:
Human Rights Groups Say Techniques Could be Torture, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2002, at A9.
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In the case of ambiguous treaty mandates, some countries' non-compliance
may be benign in that state actors reasonably, but mistakenly, believe that
their conduct does not constitute torture or other cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading punishment. 180 In this case, clarity and precision in drafting might
enhance compliance. In other cases, state actors have no pretense of compli-
ance, but they use ambiguities as a convenient guise for their behavior and
justify their actions in terms of these ambiguities rather than admitting
their breach of international obligations. In this case, clarity and specificity
in drafting would not necessarily improve compliance but would deprive
these state actors of an excuse disguising their malignant behavior.' 8'
Of course, specificity in drafting raises problems as well. State actors may
abide by the clear, specific "black letter" of the international legal obliga-
tion, but, at the same time, take actions that are inconsistent with their
overarching goals. Some ECAs, for example, are allegedly skirting the Ar-
rangement by rerouting transactions through unregulated "market win-
dows"' s2 and "untied aid" programs, 183 prompting concern in Congress about
the continued efficacy of the Arrangement. 184 While an in-depth review of
these practices is beyond the scope of this Article, yet deserving of further
study, it is worth noting here that specificity has costs, as well as benefits.
Specificity, clarity in that which is legal and that which is illegal, may assist
and expedite Participants' search for loopholes. Importantly, in the case of
the Arrangement, Congress seeks to close the loopholes not by de-
legitimizing the Arrangement for permitting the loopholes to develop, but
rather by seeking to envelop the loopholes within an emboldened Arrange-
ment. 
185
180. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 188 n.43 (1993)
(arguing that interpretations of ambiguities in treaties are typically "invoked in good faith" but none-
theless evade the purposes of the treaty).
181. Id. (citing ORAN YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY: A THEORY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL APPLICATIONS 106-08 (1979), which argues that interpretation of ambiguous provisions may be
"deliberate attempts at 'evasion' of obligation").
182. See supra note 174 for discussion of market windows.
183. Untied aid is aid that is not explicitly linked to the donee's purchase of the donor's exports.
Nonetheless, much of this aid comes with implicit understandings, supported by the threat of "turning
off the spigot," which effectively accomplish the same end as tied aid. The Arrangement only purports to
regulate tied aid, and thus, many countries argue that untied aid practices remain outside of the Ar-
rangement's reach. For a description of untied aid, see Reauthorization of Ex-Im Bank: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Monetary Policy and Trade of the HR Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 152 (state-
ment by C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for Int'l Econ.).
184. See, e.g., Reauthorization of Ex-Im Bank: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Monetary Policy and
Trade of the HR Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 75-76 (Hon. Doug Bereuter discussing untied
aid and adding that it is sometimes a guise for tied aid). See also Rodriguez, supra note 113, at 10-19. See
generally Mendelowitz, supra note 174, at 169-89 (discussing the growing problem of market windows);
Pub. L. No. 107-189, 116 Star. 698, § 15(b) (2002) (authorizing Ex-Im Bank to deviate from the Ar-
rangement to match financing provided by "market windows"); id. § 9(a) (authorizing use of the Tied
Aid Fund in accordance with the Arrangement, except that use of the Tied Aid Fund need not be in
accordance with the Arrangement in response to a breach by a foreign ECA).
185. Id. § 10(a)(1) (ordering the Secretary of the Treasury to negotiate an untied aid agreement that
would have the effect of subjecting untied aid to the Arrangement's rules); Id. § 15(b) (authorizing Ex-Im
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c. Participants
In some ways, states are problematic objects of international regulation
because individuals within states make compliance decisions, and the legal
facade of the state often shelters individual decision-makers at the expense of
accountability and compliance. The Participants group, as result of its size
and composition, is a counterweight to this type of problem. First, the group of
Participants is, and has been, relatively small and circumscribed. By defini-
tion, the Arrangement only regulates officially supported export finance, usually
distributed through ECAs. At last count, only forty-nine countries officially
supported export credit; the Participant club includes twenty-three coun-
tries, 47% of those countries with ECAs. 186 Some scholars correlate compli-
ance with the size of the regulated group; arguably, smaller groups are easier
to coordinate.1 87 Other scholars argue that to the extent that reputation
drives, or partially drives, a state's compliance,' 88 a small group that pre-
cludes anonymity necessarily raises the reputational impact of compliance
decisions. The Arrangement ostensibly supports these theories.
The Arrangement's Participant group indeed exhibits a camaraderie that
is conducive to the consensus-driven incrementalism already discussed as
significant to the Arrangement's compliance pull. A recent book collecting
"reflections" on the Arrangement from former chairmen and vice chairmen
of the Participants Group, as well as ECA/Participant negotiators, captures
the collegiality of the Participant group. 189 The reflections exude great loy-
alty, admiration (and maybe even awe) toward the Arrangement as an insti-
tution that has a distinct and seductive identity independent of the con-
stituent Participants. 190 This camaraderie is enhanced because Participants
repeatedly interact in varied fora, such as the OECD, the G-8,191 or in indi-
Bank to deviate from the Arrangement in the face of aggressive use of foreign market windows to cir-
cumvent the Arrangement if such matching "advances the negotiations for multilateral disciplines and
transparency within the OECD Export Credit Arrangement.").
186. See Harvard Business School, supra note 24. This number will increase when the first wave of
Central and Eastern European countries joins the European Union. See infra text accompanying notes
282-284.
187. Weiss, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 147, at 547 ("The fewer the number of
actors involved, the easier to regulate, and the more positive the effect on the benefit-cost ratio of com-
plying.").
188. See infra text accompanying notes 307-312, presenting theories regarding the link between
reputation and compliance.
189. See generally THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5.
190. This sense is reinforced by the fact that Participants frequently move professionally through a
type of revolving door, from representing a Participant, to chairing the Participants group and serving as
a liason to the OECD's export credit group, to actually doing a detail in the OECD's export credit group.
See FIDE LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2001, available at http://www.fide.fi/english/Annual%20Report/
Annual%20Report% 202001.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
191. The G-8 is a group of industrialized countries that periodically discusses economic, political, and
social issues that have a global impact. The G-8 countries are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States. The European Union also attends G-8 meetings. For
background information on the G-8, see generally SOMMET EVIAN SUMMIT 2003, The G-8: Background,
available at http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/theg8/background to the._g8.html (last visited
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vidual co-financing relationships. 192 Consequently, the Participants group
assumes a club-like demeanor, punctuated by the rhetorical use of the term
gentlemen's agreement, which accentuates the reputational impact of non-
compliant behavior. 193
In addition, the state representatives that negotiated the Arrangement,
typically ECAs, sometimes in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance, are,
for the most part, subjects of Arrangement regulation. 194 Some hypothesize
that the higher the correlation between the group of regulators and the
group regulated, the more likely there will be compliance. 95 The Arrange-
ment is not an instance of government regulators creating a set of legal rules
for the public or private industry.196 Nor is this an instance of one executive
agency negotiating a treaty designed to regulate a multitude of federal and
state actors.1 97 In the case of the Arrangement, the industrialized ECAs who
Dec. 2, 2003).
192. See infra text accompanying notes 273-278 for a discussion of co-financing.
193. Over the years, those who have negotiated the Arrangement have described the process in decid-
edly "club-like" language. See Eero Timonen, The Birth of the 'Helsinki Package,' in THE EXPORT CREDIT
ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5, at 51, 51-52 who observed:
Those present-Anthony Burger (Canada), Geb Ledeboer (the Netherlands), Kurt Schaerer (Swit-
zerland), John Ray (the Secretariat) and myself-worked out the first proposal, the so-called "Hel-
sinki Package." We were able to agree on the text in one day. Geb Ledeboer volunteered to serve as
typist as we constructed the sentences. I remember him sitting at my PC, a large cigar in his mouth
dropping ashes on the keyboard as he wrote. The work was done in genuine harmony and so swiftly
that we had time to enjoy a sauna, dinner and drinks that evening.
194. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sometimes negotiates alongside Ex-Im Bank. Recently, this
has been a source of some intragovernmental tension. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank of
the United States: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Int'l Trade and Finance of the S. Cmte. On Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 18 (June 19, 2001) (Hon. John B. Taylor, Undersecretary of the Treasury
for International Affairs, discussing tension between Ex-Im Bank and the Department of Treasury re-
garding a particular transaction (Valmont)); Reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank of the United States:
Hearing before the Subcomm. On Int'l Monetary Policy and Trade of the HR Cmte. on Financial Services, 107th
Cong. 7, 28 (May 2, 2001) (Testimony of Elaine Stangland, deputy general counsel of Ex-Im Bank, dis-
cussing the proper role of the Department of Treasury vis-a-vis Ex-Im Bank tied aid decisions).
195. This is the conclusion drawn in the case of compliance with voluntary technical standards, par-
ticularly environmental management standards, drafted by the International Standardization Organiza-
tion. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "Soft Law" in a "Hybrid" Organization: The International Organization for
Standardization, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 147, at 263, 279 ("By far the strongest
factor leading to success in terms of the actors involved in creating the standard was the participation of
targets of the norm in the standard-setting and implementation processes.").
196. See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Governance in a Global Economy, 93 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 105, 108 (1999) (arguing, specifically with reference to the Basle Accords, that "regulatory con-
vergence type of governance mechanisms," whereby states agree to a common form of regulation for
private/public industry, as opposed to the "statutory/adjudicatory model," has limitations). For an exam-
ple of a legal instrument designed to regulate private industry, see OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, Dec. 17, 1997,
37 I.L.M. 1. See also WORKING PARTY ON EXPORT CREDITS AND CREDIT GUARANTEES, ACTION STATE-
MENT ON BRIBERY AND OFFICIALLY SUPPORTED EXPORT CREDITS, Feb. 20, 2003, TD/ECG(2000)15.
197. In the case of human rights treaties, for example, the State Department typically takes the lead
in negotiating the treaty, possibly with the select federal agencies, but many of the rights are enforced
through local law enforcement agencies that are many steps removed from the negotiators. See, e.g., IN-
TERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 178, art. 9 (setting forth rights
of those who are arrested or detained, including the right to be "informed" of charges, the right to be
brought "promptly" before a judge); id. art. 10 (giving all detainees the right to "be subject to separate
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negotiated the document are the parties regulated by the agreement. This
congruence between negotiating parties and regulated parties enhances the
match between the Arrangement as a text and the Arrangement's practical
application. ECAs, as active participants in the creation of the Arrange-
ment's rules, likely know best what types of rules and regulations are most
workable given their position as a government agency that forays
significantly into the private commercial world. The term "Participant" is
not whimsical drafting. Given that the ECAs participate fully in the design,
maintenance, and integrity of the legal regime, the term Participant could
not be more appropriate.
2. Procedure
a. Notice, Review, and Reporting
The more transparent an institutional arrangement, the more mutual
trust the parties will have in the system and in others' compliance, and the
more likely all parties will comply with the agreement. 198 In the name of
transparency, Arrangement Participants exchange information, notify other
Participants about decisions (particularly those decisions that do not con-
form, or may not conform, to the Arrangement), and engage in probing re-
views of the Arrangement's functions.
Transparency is a delicate balance for the Arrangement. On the one hand,
continued compliance with the Arrangement rests on mutual trust among
Participants; transparency provides a window into Participants' legitimate
and illegitimate actions and therefore buoys this trust. On the other hand,
Participants analyze, evaluate, and structure their financing packages based
on proprietary information from private sector exporters. 199 A Participant's
ability to gather reliable and useful information from domestic private sector
exporters depends in great part on these exporters trusting that this infor-
mation will not, through the Arrangement's mandated information ex-
changes, fall into the hands of competitors. The Arrangement strikes this
balance.
At the heart of the Arrangement is an elaborate notification process. As a
general rule, Participants do not notify other Participants of an export credit
treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons" and the right to be in a penitentiary system
that is geared toward "reformation and social rehabilitation").
198. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 177, at 135-36 (citing rational choice theorists, such as Ken-
neth Abbott, James Boyle, Stephen Krasner, and John Gerard Ruggie, who argue that transparency "fa-
cilitates coordination," "provides reassurance," and "exercises deterrence" and thereby facilitates contin-
ued cooperation or compliance).
199. On an Ex-Im Bank application for a loan guarantee, for example, the exporter must provide in-
formation regarding the value of the export supply contract, the shipment dates, the covered goods and
services, the project, the buyer (and the buyer's contact information), the lender (and the lender's contact
information), credit ratings, and financial statements (even for privately held companies). See Export-
Import Bank, Preliminary Commitment and Final Commitment Application, available at http://www.exim.gov/
pub/pdf/95- 10ap.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
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package that complies with the terms of the Arrangement; a derogation or a
"permitted exception" triggers the notification process.200 The Arrangement
contains other notice-triggering events, such as the setting of a CIRR2 10 or a
change in the base rate which forms the foundation of a CIRR 202 or the
signing of any type of aid agreement or credit line. 20 3 In addition to defining
notification events, the Arrangement specifies, in great detail, the form that
such notifications should take.
20 4
The Arrangement also institutionalizes information exchange. The Ar-
rangement mandates the periodic exchange of information on specific topics,
such as minimum premium benchmarks. 05 Participants may initiate formal
or informal exchanges of information regarding third countries, particular
transactions, and derogations from the Arrangement through the "enquiry"
20 6
and "face-to-face consultation" process.20 7 Participants also agree to review
the effectiveness of the Arrangement's rules and procedures. 20 8 The Ar-
rangement provides for annual review of the basic export credit and tied aid
programs, 20 9 as well as periodic review of CIRRs210 and minimum premium
benchmarks.
211
200. For export credits, Participants must give 10 days "prior notification" for derogations and "per-
mitted exceptions," which include premium rates below benchmarks due to externalization of country
risk, repayment terms for low risk countries that exceed limits, repayment of principal and/or interest
less frequently than semi-annual equal installments, and an application of a discount to the premium for
political risk coverage. The Arrangement, supra note 4, arts. 47-48, at 33. For derogations and lower
premiums due to externalization of risk, notice triggers a right to discussion and an extension of the 10-
day period, during which Participants may discuss and object to the derogations or permitted exceptions,
as notified.
201. Id. art. 78, 80, at 43.
202. Id. art. 16(e), at 15.
203. Id. art. 56, at 36.
204. Id. Annexes IV, V, at 66-69 (These forms specify the items that must be included in the
notification, as well as a standard presentation for the notification).
205. For example, minimum premiums must be high enough to assure that ECAs will cover their
long-term operating costs, as well as commercial losses. Id. art. 24, at 19-20. The Arrangement requires
that Participants report periodically on premium feedback tools to assure that premiums enable Partici-
pants to meet their long-term operating goals. Id. In an effort to monitor and assess the viability of the
entire minimum premium structure, which is the newest layer to the Arrangement's regulatory structure,
Participants must exchange premium-related information on a variety of topics including country risk
classification, sample premium calculations, permitted exceptions, and matching procedures. Id. art. 81,
at 44. The OECD Export Credit Division also compiles the cash flow statistics as they pertain to mini-
mum premium benchmarks at OECD, Cash Flow Report, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/
18/2493679.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
206. See The Arrangement, supra note 4, arts. 67-68, at 39-40 (the Participants must respond to in-
quiries within 7 days). See also id. arts. 68-69, at 40 (noting that face-to-face consultations, upon requrest
of a Participant, may occur at a mutually agreeable time and place; OECD secretariat will distribute to
all Participants the outcome of the consultations).
207. Id. art. 69, at 40.
208. Id. art. 4, at 10 ("The Participants shall review, at least annually, the functioning of the Ar-
rangement.").
209. Id. art. 82(a), at 44 (The review will include, among other things, notification procedures, dero-
gations, calculation of concessionality, tied aid procedures, and matching.).
210. Id. art. 83, at 44.
211. Id. art. 84, at 44.
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Participants do not assume that all works perfectly. On the contrary, the
underlying assumption is that imperfection exists, will be illuminated through
information exchanges, and should be corrected through the evolution of the
Arrangement. Participants recognize that an Arrangement that functions well
today may not function smoothly as economic and political conditions change.
Through institutionalizing notification, information exchange, and review,
Participants have institutionalized a type of dialogue, assuring that the Ar-
rangement remains a living and evolving piece of work.
b. Institutionalized Derogations
The Arrangement importantly conceives of compliance dynamically, in-
corporating a significant tolerance for technical non-compliance. While the
Arrangement includes a non-derogation engagement, 212 it pragmatically recog-
nizes that Participants will not always abide by the Arrangement's rules.
Perhaps the most unique of the Arrangement's features is its institutionali-
zation of derogations, or legitimate ways in which Participants may cheat or
defect from the Arrangement. The Arrangement thereby codifies a flexible,
realistic view of compliance that disposes of a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude
that may breed the type of disenchantment that may otherwise cause states
to withdraw from the Arrangement all together.
The Arrangement contains two types of institutionalized derogations: the
notice-and-match process that is usually unilateral, and the common-line
process that is consultative. The notice-and-match process is unique.213 It
begins with one Participant making a unilateral decision to derogate from
the Arrangement's disciplines, perhaps by offering an interest rate that is
below the appropriate CIRR. The derogating Participant must then notify
other Participants of the derogation, 21 4 in some circumstances, give other
Participants a chance to respond to and discuss the derogation, 21 5 in any case
212. Id. art. 27, at 21-22 (export credit), art. 40, at 30-31 (tied aid).
213. This author has not found another international or regional agreement that deals with derogation
in a similar manner. While some international agreements permit centralized bodies to approve devia-
tions from legal norms, see Simmons, supra note 12, at 339 (stating that the IMF executive committee
has the power to "exempt" exchange control behavior and thus may bring a derogation into the ambit of
the IMF agreement), and others use "escape clauses" whereby parties can appeal to some entity for an "opt
out" or "pass" on certain rules, see Thomas A. Behney, Jr., Escape Clause Relief in the EEC and the United
States: Different Approaches to the Dilemma ofAdjustment to a New World Trading Environment, 15 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (1990) (discussing escape clauses in General Agreement on Trade Tariffs), the
Arrangement is unique in allowing Participants, as opposed to some centralized authority, to drive the
derogations unilaterally. As will be discussed, a Participant may unilaterally decide to deviate from the
Arrangement as long as it provides notice; it does not have to justify its action. As long as the Participant
complies with the Arrangement's procedures, its action falls within the Arrangement's bounds.
214. For export credits, the derogating Participant must give other participants at least 10 days no-
tice. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 47(a), at 33. A Participant must notify other Participants of
tied aid offers, giving at least 30 days prior notice for tied and untied aid offers. Id. art. 55, at 36.
215. For export credits, a Participant may, within the 10-day notification period, request a discussion
among Participants regarding the derogation. Id. art. 4 7(a), at 33. For tied aid, which has a 30-day
notification window, there is an implicit understanding that discussions among Participants should and
will happen. These discussions may become formalized face-to-face consultations, in which case a dero-
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providing other Participants an opportunity to match the non-conforming
provision.216 The decision to match, like the decision to derogate, is a uni-
lateral decision. If the match is identical,217 the matching Participant shall
give all other Participants prompt notice of its intent to match. 218 If the
match is not identical, then the matching Participant must give other Par-
ticipants prior notice of its intent to match and provide an opportunity to
match its non-conforming offer in turn.21 9 As long as Participants follow the
notice-and-match process, it is difficult, almost impossible, for a Participant
not to be in compliance with the export credit rules of the Arrangement.
A "common line" is a consensual understanding among Participants to
offer, usually on a transaction-by-transaction basis, terms that are more or
less favorable than those permitted under the Arrangement. 2 0 Sometimes,
an exchange of information, either through enquiries or face-to-face consul-
tations, will lead to a common line. Other times, Participants, either indi-
vidually or as a group, look to the common line process to resolve ambigui-
ties that are not solved in the four corners of the document. 22' Participants
must follow an elaborate process in arriving at common lines. 222 However,
gating Participant must give additional notice within 60 days of consultation if it decides to derogate in
the face of unsupportive consultations. Id. arts. 62, 63, 65(a), at 38-39.
216. Id art. 50, at 34 (export credits), art. 60, at 37 (tied aid).
217. Id. arts. 51, 52(c), at 34-35 (for tied aid, a match that leads to the same concessionality level and
for export credits, a match that has the identical derogating element).
218. Id. art, 50, at 34 and art. 60, at 37.
219. This 5-day period may not elapse prior to the end of the derogating Participant's initial 10-day
notification (for export credits) or 30-day notification (for tied aid). Id
220. Id. art. 71, at 41. A common line is somewhat like an amendment to a contract in that if the
parties to a contract later realize that they did not include a provision to cover a particular contingency or
if they have a "change in heart" about a provision as originally negotiated, they may agree upon an
amendment to the original contract as long as they follow any particular amendment procedures in the
original contract. Thus, the Participants agree to bend or manipulate the Arrangement for a particular
issue or transaction through acceptance of common line proposals.
221. For example, if a sales contract involves more than one destination, a country in category I
(which allows 8.5-year repayment terms) and a country in category II (which allows 10-year repayment
terms), Participants may use the common line procedures to determine the appropriate repayment term.
Id. art. 10, at 13. If a Participant wants to provide financing in a currency of a non-Participant (and
therefore there is no CIRR), the Participants may use the common line process to determine the appro-
priate CIRR. Id. art. 16, at 15-16.
222. See generally id. arts. 70-77, at 40-43. A Participant sends a proposal for a common line to the
OECD Secretariat; the proposal must include a reference number, the name of the importing country and
buyer, description of project, terms and conditions (as proposed by initiating Participant), the nationality
and names of competing bidders, bid closing date, common line proposal, and any supporting analysis for
the common line proposal. Id. art. 71, at 41. The common line proposals are then posted on the OECD's
electronic bulletin board. Id. Participants must respond within 20 days with a request for more informa-
tion, an acceptance, a. rejection, or a proposal for common line modification. Id. art. 72, at 41. A Partici-
pant with no position on a common line is deemed to have accepted the common line. Id. After the lapse
of the 20-day period, if not all Participants have accepted the common line (but none have rejected the
common line) the proposal shall be left open for 8 more days. Id. art. 73, at 42. Any Participant that has
not explicitly rejected the common line proposal during this additional 8-day period is deemed to have
accepted the common line, unless any Participant conditions acceptance on explicit acceptance by one or
more Participants. Id. art. 73(b), at 42. A Participant may reject one or more elements of a common line,
and other Participants, including the initiating Participant, may then decide whether to accept the
common line as modified. Id. art. 73(c), at 42. Once Participants agree on a common line, or, when the
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once Participants accept a common line, it becomes an organic part of the
Arrangement, usually for a specific transaction or to illuminate an Arrange-
ment issue more generally. Participants may deviate from common lines with
appropriate notice; 223 however, other Participants reserve the right to match
derogations from common lines. 224 The OECD's Secretariat maintains for
Participants a current electronic listing of the status of all common lines.
225
The institutionalized derogation and common line processes functionally
deconstruct the notion of compliance, transforming it from an "all or noth-
ing" proposition to one that is decidedly less rigid. It is virtually impossible
not to comply with the Arrangement's substance because the notify-and-
match process and common line processes define deviations as compliant
provided that Participants follow procedural requisites. As long as Partici-
pants provide notice of derogations from the Arrangement (and the oppor-
tunity for others to match), or properly propose a common line, they will be
in compliance with the terms of the Agreement. The Arrangement's trans-
parency building blocks, namely notice, information exchange, and review,
lend integrity to this derogation process, enabling the Arrangement to main-
tain a climate of compliance despite small deviant decisions and actions.
In the end, it is this institutionalization of derogations, redefining deviant
behavior in terms of compliance, that is one of the Arrangement's most signifi-
cant contributions to institutional design. While many international schol-
ars and policymakers accept as an inevitable reality that international com-
pliance will not be absolute and complete, 226 they frequently view this non-
compliant behavior as necessary and inevitable deviance as opposed to ac-
ceptable, or even desired, behavior that comports with, maybe even en-
hances, institutional architecture. The Arrangement embodies a nuanced,
sophisticated notion of compliance, recognizing that compliance occurs in
shades of gray. The Arrangement sets compliance priorities in that compli-
20-day and 8-day periods have run and it becomes clear that Participants will not be able to agree on a
common line, the period can be exteded by mutual consent. The OECD Secretariat will notify partici-
pants of the status of the common line proposal. Id. arts. 74-75, at 42. Accepted common lines will
become effective 3 days after such notification. Id.
223. Id. art. 77, at 40 (notice must be given 60 days before committing to any deviation).
224. Id. art. 77(e), at 43.
225. Id. art. 76, at 42.
226. See Simmons, supra note 12, at 333 (arguing that the compliance question rarely presents itself as
a "transparent, binary choice" and further contending that a cogent definition of "compliant behavior"
must precede any analysis of the "compliance" question). See also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 177, at
17 (arguing that an "acceptable level of compliance" depends on the type of agreement and may also be
complicated because "compliance questions are often contestable and call for complex, subtle and fre-
quently subjective evaluation."); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 180, at 176 ("[T]he treaty regime as a
whole need not and should not be held to a standard of strict compliance but to a level of overall compli-
ance that is 'acceptable' in light of the interests and concerns that the treaty is designed to safeguard.");
Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES:
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 4-5 (Harold K.
Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss eds., 1998) (positing that compliance has several dimensions, including
substantive obligations, procedural obligations, and the "spirit" of the agreement; and further arguing
that "substantial compliance is what is sought by those who advocate treaties and agreements").
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ance with legal process is an absolute necessity, while compliance with the
substantive legal rules is merely a desired outcome. And, through reporting
and review procedures, the Arrangement contemplates non-compliance with
any particular substantive provision as a signal of a problem in the rules them-
selves rather than deviant or malicious behavior on the part of Participants.
This dynamic view of compliance uniquely fortifies the Arrangement.
c. Self-Modulating Law: Automaticity
The Arrangement remains vibrant, in part, through recourse to targeted
automatic adjustment mechanisms. While the Arrangement mandates dis-
course among Participants, it also recognizes those areas where it can self-
correct without unnecessarily cumbersome and technical Participant ex-
changes. As already noted, CIRRs automatically adjust on a monthly basis,
reflecting changes in domestic government bond rates.2 27 The Arrangement
delineates procedures for the automatic reclassification of countries from
category I (World Bank high-income countries) to category II (World Bank
low-income countries), or vice versa, which is significant for defining the
maximum repayment term. 228 The Knaepen Package on minimum premium
benchmarks contemplates automatic reclassification of countries into the
seven risk categories on the basis of revised data from international organiza-
tions or major events that change the perceived country risk. 229 Although
not explored here in depth, a Participant may offer tied aid only under lim-
ited circumstances, including minimum concessionality. 230 The level of con-
cessionality for any tied aid offer is linked to a discount rate that, in turn, is
linked to an annual CIRR average, which, as we have seen, self-adjusts in
reaction to the market. 231 The Arrangement adjusts, particularly to market
forces, without having to engage the Participants, or a sub-group of Partici-
pants, in the adjustment process, thus maintaining the vitality and instru-
mental focus of prescribed Participant exchanges.
3. The Form: Gentlemen's Agreement
During the first week of class, almost all international law professors teach
that international law comes in two principal forms: a formal international
agreement/treaty or customary international law.2 32 The Arrangement is
227. See supra note 73.
228. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of classification and re-
classification of countries by the World Bank.
229. The Knaepen Package: Guiding Principles, supra note 74, at 14 (delineating procedures for periodi-
cally updating country-specific data).
230. See supra note 61 and accompanying text for discussion ofconcessionality.
23 1. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 38(a), at 29. See also supra note 227 and accompanying text.
232. See THIRD RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987). See also BARRY E. CARTER
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-7, 93-135 (4th ed. 2003); LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 56-133 (2001); MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND
COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 20-121 (2001); BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
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neither. The Arrangement is not a treaty.233 Nor is it customary international
law, as custom follows a pattern and practice stemming from a legal obliga-
tion,2 34 and the Arrangement is not a mere codification of existing ECA
practice but rather meant to condition such practice. 235
The Arrangement is a gentlemen's agreement. Perhaps the handshake that
often cements a gentlemen's agreement is the proper image, for handshakes
are powerful in a reputational, peer-pressure vein and not, at least under U.S.
law, in a legal sense.236 Participants do not ratify the Arrangement. Further,
they do not formally join the Arrangement, and they may leave at will (with
the niceties of notification that one would expect from any gentlemen's un-
derstanding).2 37 There are no formal voting or amendment procedures, and
Participants effectively amend the Arrangement by reaching consensus on
particular issues. There is no Arrangement dispute resolution process, nor
are there formal sanctions for deviant behavior. From an institutional stand-
point, the Arrangement officially stands alone.
Many scholars label this gentlemen's agreement as soft law. While the soft
law means that the Arrangement is not a binding legal instrument, it does
not affirmatively illuminate the Arrangement's legal, normative, or substan-
tive standing. Soft law is not a precise legal term. It categorically includes
myriad international instruments or, more inclusively, communications ranging
from informal understandings or conversations to more formalized memo-
randums of understanding, diplomatic letters, protocols, codes of conduct,
or even arrangements such as the one at question here.2 38 As international
LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 74-132 (1997).
233. Although the Arrangement, in its specificity, "feels" like a treaty, the Participants clearly state in
the introduction that "[tihe Arrangement is a 'Gentlemen's Agreement' among the Participants. The
Arrangement is not an OECD Act, although it receives the administrative support of the OECD Secre-
tariat." The Arrangement, supra note 4, Introduction, at 8. See also The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1969) art. 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 ("The consent of a
State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a
treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed."). The Arrange-
ment does not satisfy any of the Vienna Convention's requirements.
234. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987) ("Customary interna-
tional law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."). While there are some parts of the Arrangement that arguably may codify custom, most of
the specific, technical provisions do not. Interest rates, for example, did not converge until the Arrange-
ment's rules paved the way. ECAs did not harmonize premiums until the Knaepen Package was a fai
accompli.
235. It is possible that, after ECAs follow each layer of Arrangement regulation for some time, par-
ticular rules, those requiring ECAs to finance a maximum of 85% of the contract value, will harden into
customary norms. Yet, for anyone familiar with customary international law, it seems awkward, at best,
to label norms custom that are as specific and technical as those in the Arrangement. Professor Guzman
attempts to deal with some of this awkwardness in his theory of international law. See Guzman, supra note
177, at 1874-78. See also infra notes 307-314, 342-344 for a discussion of Guzman's theory of interna-
tional law.
236. In U.S. law, under the Statute of Frauds, oral contracts are generally not enforceable unless the
contract is less than U.S. $500. See generally UCC § 2-201 (1994).
237. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 7, at 11 (Arrangement is of "indefinite duration," but a
party may withdraw with 60 days notice.).
238. See Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, in COMMITMENT
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rules proliferate in response to economic globalization and the ensuing envi-
ronmental, health, and human rights issues, the line between soft interna-
tional law and hard international law is becoming blurred. Hard legal in-
struments, such as treaties, may include soft legal promises, such as promises
to use "best efforts" or "appropriate means" to accomplish stated ends. 239
Soft legal documents, such as the Arrangement, may include hard commit-
ments, such as the technical rules regarding the calculation of CIRRs and
minimum premium benchmarks, notice-and-match procedures, and the
painstaking categorization of high- and low-income countries.240 While trans-
national actors increasingly use soft law forms,2' 4 scholars have been slow to
embrace their import, probably because of their elusive nature.24
2
Paradoxically, the use of a soft legal instrument in the case of the Ar-
rangement may help explain Participants' initial commitment and subse-
quent compliance. Some who have been intimately involved with the Ar-
rangement believe that the sense of legal ambiguity in whether the Arrange-
ment is law or not played a significant role in the Participants' initial com-
mitment to the Arrangement. 243 This view echoes some international legal
scholars who argue that soft law lowers the commitment hurdle because the
AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 147, 21, 25-30 (discussing different soft law forms, including commu-
niques, minutes, "soft commitments" embedded in formal treaties, declarations, and agendas and pro-
poses a classification scheme for soft law instruments). See also Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction to INTER-
NATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) (discussing non-
binding norms); Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Agreements, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 443 (1983).
239. See Dinah Shelton, Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of "Soft Law," in COMMITMENT
AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 147, 1, 10-13 (arguing that the "line between law and not-law may appear
blurred").
240. Id. See also Chinkin, supra note 238, at 31-34 (discussing the "hardening" of "soft law" instru-
ments through use of specific normative mandates and transformative procedures).
241. See generally Wolfgang H. Reinicke & Jan Martin Witte, Interdependence, Globalization and Sover-
eignty: The Role of Non-Binding International Legal Accords, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note
147, at 75 (arguing that globalization has pushed private actors into the forefront of international norm
formation and, by definition, private actors may only resort to soft law; we are thus witnessing an explo-
sion in soft law norms).
242. But see generally COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 147 (collection of articles examin-
ing the use of, and instances of compliance with, soft international law, with particular emphasis on the
environment, trade and finance, human rights, and arms control). Scholars have long discussed the im-
portance of informal norms in domestic law. For an excellent account of how informal norms influence
the behavior of neighbors in Shasta County, Cal., see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:
How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
243. John Ray, The Arrangement from the Inside, in THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5,
at 33, 33 ("[I]ts very title-the 'Arrangement'-was carefully chosen to avoid any implication of a formal
agreement, to say nothing of a treaty. No one really seems to be sure exactly what 'arrangement' signifies
in international jurisprudence. The Participants in the Arrangement have been careful to keep it that
way.").
This is the position taken by the U.S. Treasury Department. See Geithner, supra note 5, at 87 who
commented:
Perhaps most impressive of all, the Arrangement's successes have been achieved while operating as a
"Gentlemen's Agreement" among like-minded governments, without the force of international law.
The Arrangement is an example of the more enlightened approach to resolving multilateral eco-
nomic issues through discussion, negotiation and collaboration on which we must all increasingly
rely in the new global economy.
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soft law form circumscribes the legal/reputational costs of subsequent defec-
tions. 244
If the slow, steady broadening and deepening of the Arrangement's sub-
stantive scope explains, in part, why ECAs accepted and abided by the Ar-
rangement's increasingly intrusive restrictions on export finance, the flexibility
of soft law explains, procedurally, how Participants effectively achieved such
incrementalism. 245 Participants could tackle one or several issues at a time,
reserving others without consensus support for subsequent consideration, in
part because they did not face cumbersome amendment and ratification pro-
cedures at each substantive juncture.2 46 In contrast, formal international
treaties often contain elaborate, cumbersome, and legally complicated amend-
ment procedures that require acceptance by a majority of state parties prior
to taking effect and may result in a web of asymmetrical legal obligations.2 47
In most countries, domestic legislatures must approve or ratify formal legal
treaties,2 48 adding not only procedural complexity to the commitment proc-
ess but also domestic constituencies (e.g., Congress) that negotiators must
placate prior to making legal commitments. The soft law structure, loosen-
ing the strictures of textual formality, enabled Participants to move steadily,
sometimes slowly, but almost always in a progressive direction, toward a
comprehensive, viable, and self-modulating regulatory regime.
In easing the ability to reverse or alter course and reducing the legal and
reputational costs of subsequent deviance, soft law provides states freedom
to innovate.2 49 In the Arrangement's case, some of this imaginative effort
244. See infra notes 307-314 and accompanying text (describing Professor Guzman's neo-institutionalism).
245. See Kurt Schaerer, Flexibility in a Changing World, in THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra
note 5, at 13, 14 (arguing that the combination of "as little rigidity as necessary" with "as much
flexibility as possible" will safeguard the Arrangement's integrity).
246. Scholars note that soft law's flexible amendment procedures are particularly conducive to the
type of evolutionary development that furthers compliance. See David A. Wirth, Compliance with Non-
Binding Norms of Trade and Finance, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 147, at 330, 331
(describing a piece in the same volume by Professor Beth Simmons and noting the importance of flexible
amendment procedures).
247. See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 233, arts. 39-41 (discussing
amendment procedures for multilateral agreements and contemplating that some parties to a multilateral
treaty may have asymmetric obligations toward other parties). See, e.g., AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, art. 10, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 155, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (setting
forth elaborate amendment procedures, including procedures that require acceptance by two-thirds of the
Members or three-fourths of the Ministerial Conference). See also INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 178, art. 51 (requiring for amendment: (1) proposal of an amend-
ment; (2) vote by at least one-third of state parties to call a U.N.-sponsored conference on the amend-
ment; and (3) approval at the conference by a majority of those in attendance).
248. See Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2066-71 (2003). See also Reinicke &
Witte, supra note 241, at 88 (arguing that cooperation via treaties "is usually delayed because of the
requirement of ratification").
249. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLI-
ANCE, supra note 147, at 100, 110 (describing how soft law forms may facilitate legal experimentation in
areas such as the internet). See, e.g., Beth Simmons, International Efforts Against Money Laundering, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, Supra note 147, at 244, 245-63 (arguing that the non-binding nature
of the Financial Action Task Force's rules on international money laundering are a necessary first step in
catalyzing international harmonization of rules and implying that state parties were able to take this
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yielded better, smarter solutions that, not surprisingly, endured to generate
widespread compliance. Presumably, Participants, particularly high interest
rate Participants, may have been reluctant to migrate to the CIRR and re-
linquish their interest rate subsidy if they had felt permanently locked in by
the formality of a treaty.2 50 It is equally unclear whether Participants would
have agreed to minimum premium benchmarks if they had felt that the
Knaepen Package was hard legal fiat rather than a soft experiment. 251 Yet
these two innovations are critical to the Arrangement's goals of eliminating
competition on the basis of "the most favourable officially supported terms."
252
With no formal entry or exit requirements, the Arrangement's soft-law
form may actually have enticed some non-Participants to comply with the
Arrangement by dangling membership as an attainable, compliance-sensitive
carrot. The Arrangement explicitly invites non-Participants to join through
compliance rather than through a lengthy, formal legal process of member-
ship involving invitation, signature, and/or ratification. 253 For non-Participants,
compliance with the Arrangement is one, if not the, route to Arrangement
membership as it signals to the Participant industrialized giants that their
exporters can and will play on a level playing field.2 54 In encapsulating this
membership-through-compliance process, the Arrangement's soft form ac-
commodates non-Participants' desires to become members of a prestigious
group, be it the Participant group or even the European Union, without
creating a formidable and often discouraging hurdle.
C. International Systemic Explanations: Interlocking Legal Relationships
International law is like a loosely woven garment. No piece of law exists
in isolation but instead is interwoven with myriad legal regimes, rules, and
institutions. The loosening or unhinging of one thread at best weakens all,
but may even result in the collapse of the entire interlocking system. From
the perspective of any state actor, compliance with any one legal instrument
implicates many other pieces of law. A state's decision to disregard one in-
experimental step, in part, because of the soft law form). See also Wirth, supra note 246, at 330 ("A non-
binding 'soft' instrument can allow [states] to gain experience with more ambitious, aspirational goals in
a less risky milieu.").
250. See supra notes 71-73 for a discussion of the evolution of the creation of the CIRR and supra
notes 149-157 for discussion of the evolution of the CIRR.
251. See supra notes 74-85 and 162-169 and accompanying text for discussion of Knaepen Package
on minimum premium benchmarks.
252. The Arrangement, supra note 4, Introduction, at 7.
253. Id. at 9 ("Other countries willing to apply these Guidelines may become Participants following
prior invitation of the existing Participants.").
254. This sentiment is echoed strongly by Turkey:
Turkey has applied to be an observer member to the Participants Group, regarding the Arrange-
ment On Guidelines For Officially Supported Export Credits (OECD Consensus). Turk Eximbank
gives importance to international relations and to act in line with norms and arrangements of inter-
national organizations such as the WTO, E.U., Berne Union and OECD.
Export Credit Bank of Turkey, Annual Report 2001, available at http://www.eximbank.gov.tr/eng/
engindex.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
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ternational rule may, in reality, be a decision to disregard many interrelated
international rules. This, in turn, may raise the stakes of complying with the
original rule and sustain compliance.
The Arrangement's weave is both horizontal and vertical. On a horizontal
level, the Arrangement is linked to several different international instru-
ments and institutions, such as the WTO, the World Bank, and the United
Nations. These links lend credibility to the Arrangement because a rebuke
of the Arrangement is tantamount to a fractional rebuke of these companion
institutions. 255 On a more micro-transactional level, countries often jointly
offer financing packages, catalyzing, especially in the case of non-Participant
countries, migration toward Arrangement principles. The Arrangement is
vertically linked to other regional and domestic legal systems, making a vio-
lation of the Arrangement synonymous with a violation of regional or local
law. In the view of the regulated parties, in this case the ECAs, these link-
ages transform the compliance question from one of compliance with a non-
binding gentlemen's agreement to one of compliance with E.U. or U.S. law.
1. Horizontal Linkages
The horizontal weave was evident from the very inception of the Ar-
rangement, which took place on the periphery of IMF, G-5, and OECD
meetings.2 56 Some linkages are evident on the face of the Arrangement. The
Arrangement borrows from the United Nations and the World Bank to clas-
sify countries for purposes of calculating repayment term 257 and determining
eligibility for tied aid.2 58 Participants incorporate the Berne Union's definition
of starting point into the Arrangement.2 59 The IMF's calculation of special
drawing rights is integral to tied aid concessionality calculations, 260 and the
United Nations' "least developed countries" are entitled to a minimum con-
cessionality of 50%.261 While these might appear as mere definitional cross-
references, they tie together the legitimacy of multiple institutions. For ex-
ample, World Bank statistics are valuable only if used as meaningful meas-
ures throughout the international community; if Participants eschew the
255. See Peter M. Haas, Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative Poli-
tics, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 147, at 43, 56 who suggests:
Linkages among institutions involved in an issue area may contribute to compliance. Dense net-
works of institutional factors, including such factors as numbers of international institutions in-
volved in negotiations, and frequency of interactions could contribute to stronger levels of compli-
ance by encouraging states to build up their reputation to anticipate reciprocity in other areas of po-
tential importance.
256. See Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 180.
257. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the link between repayment term and
World Bank country classification scheme.
258. See 2002 COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION FOR EXPORTERS AND TIED AID, supra note 62.
259. Seesupra note 64 for a definition of a "starting point" and its relationship to the Berne Union.
260. The Arrangement disciplines do not apply to any tied aid package that is less than U.S.
$2 million SDR or has a concessionality rate of 80% or more. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 36, at
27-28.
261. See supra notes 61-62 for a description of the tied aid rules on concessionality.
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World Bank classifications, they in essence detract from its critical informa-
tion-gathering function. If the Arrangement develops a new "starting point"
definition where a Berne Union technical definition already exists, then the
Berne Union is relegated to the fringe.
Probably the strongest horizontal linkage, a linkage with the WTO is not
immediately apparent on the face of the Arrangement. One of the WTO's
constituent documents is the Subsidies Agreement and Countervailing Meas-
ures ("Subsidies Agreement"), which effectively bans government subsidies
or financial contributions conditioned on export performance, including di-
rect expenditures such as loans and contingent expenditures such as loan
guarantees.2 62 Any violation of this prohibition triggers WTO dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms.2 63 Official export credit, as an explicit export promotion
tool in the form of a direct loan or guarantee, ostensibly violates the WTO's
Subsidies Agreement. However, the WTO explicitly grants a type of safe
harbor status to export credits in accordance with the Arrangement.
264
The Subsidies Agreement prohibits official export credits unless (1) pre-
miums are real in the sense that they are adequate to cover the "long-term
operating costs and losses of the programmes"; 265 and (2) there is no interest
rate subsidy (i.e., governments are extending credit at or above their cost of
funds). 266 ECA compliance with the Arrangement ensures that ECAs satisfy
both of these conditions and thereby ensures that official export credit does
not offend the Subsidies Agreement.2 67 First, the Knaepen Package on mini-
mum premium benchmarks is predicated on premium rates being adequate
to "cover long term operating costs and losses." 268 Second, the Subsidies Agree-
ment prohibits export credits (official export loans) at rates "below those
which [an ECA] would have to pay for funds." 269 If ECAs are Participants,
262. AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 155, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT).
263. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
264. The WTO granted a similar presumption or "safe harbor" in the Agreement on Technical Barri-
ers to Trade to the standards emanating from the International Organization for Standardization. See
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "Soft Law" in a "Hybrid" Organization: The International Organization for Standardiza-
tion, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 147, at 263, 271.
265. SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT, supra note 262, Annex (j).
266. Id. at Annex I(k).
267. GERHARD ABEL, The Multilateral Trading System, the Export Credit Arrangement and the WTO, in
THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT, supra note 5, at 15.
268. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 24(a), at 19-20. In negotiating the minimum premium
benchmark package, Participants recognized that the WTO required premium rates that covered long-
term operating costs and losses, and they designed a package with this specific admonition in mind. See
Knaepen, supra note 161, at 77. In fact, the Knaepen Package includes "premium feedback tools" explic-
itly designed to gather information over time to assure that minimum premium benchmarks are high
enough that ECAs maintain long-term self-sufficiency. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 24, at 19-20.
If, in gathering this information, the Participants discover that minimum premium benchmarks are
"inadequate to cover long term operating costs and losses," the minimum premium benchmarks, and the
method embodied in the Arrangement to calculate minimum premium benchmarks, will be reviewed
and adjusted appropriately. See id. See also The Knaepen Package: Guiding Principles, supra note 74, arts. 1(4),
VIII.
269. SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT, supra note 262, Annex (k).
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or parties to any successor agreement, such ECAs are deemed to be provid-
ing export credits at CIRRs, which, by definition, are above "those which
[ECAs] actually have to pay for the funds so employed."2 70 In upholding the
Arrangement's disciplines, Participants also ensure that their export credit
programs are consistent with their undertakings in the Subsidies Agree-
ment. 2
71
In horizontally linking the Arrangement to the WTO, the Participants
also import a sanction mechanism. Gross violations of the Arrangement may
place a Participant's export credit program in conflict with the Subsidies
Agreement and expose the Participant to WTO sanctions, which include
referral to a quasi-judicial dispute settlement process. 272 The cross-fertilization
of international agreements thereby enables the Arrangement simultane-
ously to maintain its soft law exterior for negotiating flexibility and malle-
ability and to import a de facto sanction regime typical of hard law instru-
ments.
Other horizontal linkages occur on the level of individual transactions.
ECAs frequently work together through co-financing arrangements, 273 and
these arrangements exert a significant compliance pull, particularly in the
case of non-Participant co-financing with Participant ECAs. Co-financing is
a response to ECA local content rules on the one hand and the economic
reality of foreign sourcing of capital equipment subcomponents on the other
hand. 27 4 A piece of equipment, such as the GE turbine, may contain 50%
U.S. content and 50% Mexican content. Ex-Im Bank will only finance the
U.S. portion, and thus, GE might bear the financing costs of the other half.
270. CIRRs are 100 basis points above a prescribed basket of government bonds. See supra note 73.
The Subsidies Agreement explicitly states:
[I]f a Member is a party to an international undertaking on official export credits to which at least
twelve original Members to this Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor under-
taking which has been adopted by those original Members), or if in practice a Member applies the
interest rate provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity
with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement.
SUBSIDIES AGREEMENT, supra note 262, Annex I(k).
271. All Arrangement Participants are also Members of the WTO and, as such, are bound by the Sub-
sidies Agreement. See supra note 247, art. 11(2) (all WTO Members are bound by the "Multilateral Trade
Agreements," including the Subsidies Agreement).
272. Ifa WTO Member is not a Participant, or is a Participant but does not follow the Arrangement
rules, then subsidized export credit may be a violation of the Subsidies Agreement and may expose that
member to WTO dispute resolution procedures. The procedures in broad outline include: consultations,
hearings before a panel established by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, and appellate review. See
WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/ursum-e.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). See Andrew Guzman & Beth A.
Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis ofLitigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organi-
zation, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 205, 206-08 (2002) (summarizing the WTO dispute resolution process from
consultation to panel investigation to appeal to decision).
273. For a general discussion of co-financing and its growing importance in trade finance, see Hiroo
Fukui, Export Credit Agencies and the World Bank: A Partnership, in THE EXPORT CREDIT ARRANGEMENT,
supra note 5, at 123.
274. Most ECAs will only finance "domestic" content. In the case of the United States, for example,
there are elaborate U.S. content rules. See supra note 36 for a discussion of the U.S. content rules. With
the application of these rules, a portion of a transaction may not be eligible for financing.
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However, through a series of co-financing agreements, Ex-Im Bank and other
ECAs pledge to work cooperatively to offer financing for their respective
"shares" of the equipment. 7 5 In the current example, a joint reinsurance
agreement between Ex-Im Bank and the Mexican ECA, Bancomext, permits
GE to apply to Ex-Im Bank for coverage (up to 85%, per the Arrangement),
and Bancomext agrees to "reinsure" Ex-Im Bank for the non-U.S. portion.
2 76
Through this reinsurance, or indirect coverage, Bancomext effectively ac-
cepts the same terms and conditions that Ex-Im Bank offers, which, of
course, are consistent with the Arrangement. 277 By virtue of one ECA being
bound by the Arrangement, the financing terms of the integrated package
typically conform to the Arrangement's terms and conditions. Co-financing
arrangements, in addition to facilitating finance for export transactions sour-
ced from more than one country, raise the regulatory standards to the "great-
est common denominator. ' 278 Non-Participant compliance thus is a de facto
by-product of pragmatic co-financing relationships.
2. Vertical Linkages
The Arrangement is also intertwined vertically with E.U. and U.S. law.
Beginning in 1978, the European Community incorporated the entirety of
the Arrangement into law and, through a European Council decision (as
opposed to a directive)279 has made the Arrangement directly binding and
applicable to all member states.2 80 By virtue of incorporation into E.U. law,
275. See. e.g., Ex-Im Bank, Cooperative Agreements with Foreign Export Credit Agencies, available at http://
www.exim.gov/pub/ins/pdf/eib99-11.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (describing Ex-Im Bank's co-finan-
cing agreements).
276. Id.
277. In the case of other non-Participant ECAs, the co-financing agreement is not a reinsurance
agreement, whereby one ECA.fronts for another, but rather contains promises to coordinate financing of
respective domestic content in an integrated financing package.
278. Similarly, the Basle Accords harmonized standards for banking regulation. Banks in non-member
states comply in great part if they "wish to do business with Basle member countries." See Lawrence L. C.
Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 5
(1998).
279. For a discussion of the legal standing of a Council of Ministers decision, see DAVID MEDHURST,
A BRIEF AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO E.U. LAW 31 (2001). See also KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE
ABCs OF COMMUNITY LAW 69 (1999).
280. Council Decision 2001/76/EC 2000 O.J. (L 32/1) (replacing the Decision of April 4, 1978 on
the application of certain guidelines in the field of officially supported export credits). As a Council deci-
sion, the European Community commands ECAs (or the local equivalent) to comply with the Arrange-
ment on behalf of member states. See BORCHARDT, supra note 279, at 69.
In addition, in a recent directive, Directive on Harmonisation of the Main Provisions Concerning Ex-
port Credit Insurance for Transactions with Medium- and Long-Term Cover, the Council mandates
member states to amend laws, regulations, and administrative processes related to medium- and long-
term export credit insurance to comport generally with the Knaepen Package. Council Directive
98/29/EC 1998 O.J. (L 148/22). Interestingly, this directive uses the Arrangement as a "spring board,"
borrowing overarching principles from the Arrangement regarding the distorting effect of competition
among export credit insurance, but actually transcends the scope of the Arrangement by, in effect, man-
dating harmonization of individual insurance policies. While the Arrangement, which has been incorpo-
rated into local law, addresses larger issues, such as premiums, the permissible term of the credit (in-
cluding the starting point), the interest rate (in the case of a direct loan), and coverage of local costs, the
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the Arrangement is no longer some type of quasi-law/quasi-gentlemen's
agreement, but rather a hard piece of domestic law. As Figure 2 demon-
strates, the compliance rate among E.U. Participants is currently very high,
although on an essential par with the Participant group as a whole. 281
While the European Union's hard incorporation of the Arrangement does
not seem to have a dramatic impact in terms of Participant compliance, 282 it
has profoundly impacted the propensity of non-Participants to comply. As
Figure 3 illustrates, those non-Participant countries that have applied for
E.U. membership appear to have strong incentives to comply. 283 Indeed,
prior to becoming an E.U. member state, applicant countries must demon-
strate that they are readily able to "adopt the common rules, standards and
policies that make up the body of E.U. law.' '284 Because E.U. law incorporates
the Arrangement, demonstrated compliance with the Arrangement is an ex-
plicit precursor to E.U. membership. Consequently, non-Participant appli-
cants for E.U. membership comply with the Arrangement.
Although the United States has not, like the European Union, incorpo-
rated the Arrangement in its entirety into local law, Congress has incorpo-
rated in Ex-Im Bank-related legislation much of the Arrangement's sub-
stance and even more of its spirit. The Export-Import Bank Act 28 5 codifies
some of the Arrangement, either by borrowing direct language or by refer-
encing part of the Arrangement. For example, Ex-Im Bank may only insure
or guarantee 85% of the total contract value of a medium-term export. 28 6
The 85% is, of course, an Arrangement-imposed limit.287 Ex-Im Bank must
grant tied aid "consistent with the procedures established by the Arrange-
directive addresses some of the minutiae that must be clarified in any insurance policy, including an
export credit insurance policy. Some of these issues include: the scope of cover (i.e., what types of risk will
the insurance policy cover?), the permitted percentage of cover (i.e., will the exporter hold onto any
risk?), whether the exporter may "participate out" of the uninsured percentage (and thereby not hold
onto any risk), the types of losses for which the insurer is liable, claims processes and waiting periods, and
country cover policy (i.e., the policy by which member states determine the buyer countries to which to
extend cover or insurance).
281. See Figure 2. The compliance index for all Participants, E.U. and non-E.U., is 3.4, while the
compliance index for E.U. Participants is 3.3.
282. In fact, the compliance index for non-E.U. Participants is 3.6, while that of E.U. Participants is
3.3. See supra Figure 2.
283. See Figure 3, indicating that the compliance index for non-Participants seeking E.U. member-
ship is 3.4, while the compliance index for other non-Participants is 2.3.
The following countries have applied for E.U. membership: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey.
284. See Europa, Enlargement, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/print-enlargement.
hrm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). In particular, applicant states must create "conditions for its integration
through the adjustment of its administrative structures, so that European Community legislation trans-
posed into national legislations implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial
structures." Europa, E.U. Enlargement: A Historic Opportunity, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enlargement/intro/print-criteria.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
285. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635 (West Supp. 2003) (including the 2002 Amendments).
286. Id.
287. The Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 7, at 11.
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ment."288 In addition, Ex-Im Bank will only offer direct loans at interest
rates that are "consistent with international agreements. " 289 Interestingly, in
the recent Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act, Congress explicitly
permitted Ex-Im Bank to deviate from the Arrangement in the face of for-
eign deviant behavior,290 suggesting that Congress understands that Ex-Im
Bank is otherwise bound by the Arrangement's terms.
On a more general level, Congress clearly embraces the Arrangement as inte-
gral to Ex-Im Bank's existence. Congress exhorts Ex-Im Bank to participate
actively in negotiations to "minimize competition" and "reduce government
subsidized export financing. "291 Furthermore, Congress consistently requires
Ex-Im Bank to negotiate expansions of the Arrangement to enhance cover-
age of export credit activity.292 Legislative history accompanying several Ex-
Im Bank reauthorizations reveals that Congress intends for Ex-Im Bank to
be bound by a strong, all-encompassing Arrangement. 293 While the Arrange-
288. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635i-3(d) (West 2001). However, Congress explicitly allows Ex-Im Bank to devi-
ate from the Arrangement in the face of a foreign ECA breach. Export-Import Bank Reathorization Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-189, 116 Stat. 698. This "exception" may, in and of itself, be consistent with
the Arrangement because the Arrangement allows ECAs to match non-conforming tied aid offers. The
Arrangement, supra note 4, art. 41, at 31.
289. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(l)(B) (West Supp. 2003). While the Act does not explicitly reference the
Arrangement here, the fact that Congress added it to the Act in 1978, the same year that the Arrange-
ment came into effect, strongly suggests that the phrase "international agreements" refers to the Ar-
rangement.
290. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635i-9 (West Supp. 2003) which indicates that:
The Bank may provide financing on terms and conditions that are inconsistent with those permitted
under the OECD Export Credit Arrangement to match financing terms and conditions that are be-
ing offered by market windows on terms that are inconsistent with those permitted under the
OECD Export Credit Arrangement.
291. 12 U.S.C.A. § 635(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2003) (requiring that Ex-Im Bank draft an annual re-
port on competitiveness with foreign ECAs).
292. Id. (asking Ex-Im Bank to negotiate an extension of the Arrangement to encompass market win-
dow activity); and 12 U.S.C. § 635(a) (requiring the United States to negotiate an expansion of the Ar-
rangement to bring untied aid-or aid that is not "tied" to exports-into the confines of the Arrange-
ment). See also supra note 183 and accompanying text.
293. See Ensuring that Ex-Im Bank has the Resources to Enable it to Fulfill its Statutory Mandate for U.S.
Exporters Both Small and Large to Provide Financing Terms and Conditions Competitive with those Offered by
Foreign Export Credit Agencies: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th
Cong. 406 (2001) (statement of Sen. Hagel) ("All export credit agencies are obliged to obligate the Bank
to follow the arrangement negotiated in the ... OECD, when offering financing through government
entities."). See also 148 CONG. REC. S1954 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (arguing that the Arrangement
governs market windows, just as it governs the traditional ECA lending activities, and criticizing foreign
ECAs for using market windows to circumvent the Arrangement, implying that the Arrangement gov-
erns all ECA and ECA-like lending activities); The Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of2001: Report
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 52 (criticizing foreign govern-
ments for evading the Arrangement through untied aid and market windows, and implicating embracing
the Arrangement as the set of rules governing ECAs); Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2001:
Conference Report, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-487 (noting that the final, consolidated bill includes a provi-
sion to encourage Ex-Im Bank and the U.S. Department of the Treasury to further Arrangement negotia-
tions so as to include market windows within the rubric of the Arrangement); The Export-Import Bank
Amendments of 1983: Report of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. REP. No. 98-111
(1983) which indicated:
As a result of the latest round of talks on export credits within the OECD, along with the steady de-
cline in commercial interest rates, the subsidy element in official export financing has been virtually
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ment, in its entirety, is not explicit law within the United States, Congress
clearly intends for it to cast a "legal shadow" over Ex-Im Bank's activities.
3. Compliance as a Function of Hardening of the Arrangement?
The Arrangement does not exist in isolation. By borrowing definitions and
country classifications, the Arrangement intersects other international insti-
tutions. The WTO, in particular, lends weight to the Arrangement by
transforming it into a safe harbor for purposes of the Subsidies Agreement.
Vertically, the Arrangement has direct legal effect in all European Commu-
nity member states, and the U.S. Congress has incorporated some Arrange-
ment rules into U.S. law. In particular, the linkages with the WTO, as well
as E.U. and U.S. law, create a de facto sanctions regime that increases the
cost of non-compliant behavior.
This discussion inevitably leads to the question of whether the hardening
of the Arrangement into law via these horizontal and vertical linkages ac-
counts for the current snapshot of compliance, as set forth in Table 2: Par-
ticipant Compliance and Table 3: Non-Participant Compliance. If, in fact,
the hardening of the Arrangement is significantly linked to compliance, then
many of this Article's previous conclusions regarding positive correlation be-
tween compliance and soft law would be problematic. However, the data com-
piled in Table 4: Historical Compliance suggest that there is no discernable
correlation between compliance and the Arrangement's hardening into law.
If hardening of Arrangement rules through the WTO's Subsidies Agree-
ment were significant, then Table 4: Historical Compliance should reveal an
increase in compliance rates after 1994, the year in which member states
concluded the Subsidies Agreement. In fact, compliance rates remained rela-
tively constant and did not increase significantly with the safe-harbor-like
linkage between the WTO and the Arrangement. 294
eliminated for all of the major OECD countries, with the exception of France .... A continually
competitive Eximbank, with continued strong support from the Congress, is essential for further
success in the credit talks, until the goal of permanently eliminating official export credit as a factor
in international sales competition is achieved.
EximBank Reauthorization: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade, Investment and Mon. Policy of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 4, 32 (1983) (statement of Chairman Draper)
suggesting that:
Our interest rates have been reduced to the minimums allowed under the OECD international ar-
rangement .... Under the revised guidelines of the OECD's international arrangement, the mini-
mum interest rates which were 7.5 percent to 8.75 percent when I joined are now 10 percent to
12.4 percent. On January 18 of this year, we reduced Eximbank's rates to the arrangement mini-
mums, removing the last differential between our competitors' rates and our rates.
294. The aggregate compliance indices demonstrate that compliance remained remarkably steady from
1990 through 2003. The compliance index stayed constant through 1999. See supra Figure 4. The com-
pliance indices for individual countries show that some countries became more compliant after 1994
(Italy's index, for example, increased from 3.3 to 3.8) while other countries actually became less compli-
ant in the years following the WTO Agreement (such as Canada's index decreasing from 3.7 to 3.3). See
infra Table 4. Nonetheless, all of these are marginal differences. Participants complied with the Ar-
rangement prior to the Subsidies Agreement, and its advent did not have a dramatic impact on compli-
ance levels.
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Similarly, if the hardening of the Arrangement via E.U. law were a
significant compliance factor, we would expect compliance to increase from
the moment of incorporation into E.U. law. The European Community in-
corporated the Arrangement in 1978, immediately upon the Arrangement's
inception.2 95 Surprisingly, the data show that compliance among non-E.U. Par-
ticipants is actually higher today than compliance among E.U. Partici-
pants. 296 Likewise, the historical data in Table 4: Historical Compliance do
not reveal any dramatic discrepancies in compliance between E.U. and non-
E.U. Participants through the life of the Arrangement. 29
7
In the United States, Congress codified certain Arrangement rules, such as
the Arrangement's requirement of a 15% cash down payment. 298 If the hardness
of law were a decisive compliance factor, then Ex-Im Bank might comply
with the hard rules at a higher rate than the soft rules. However, Ex-Im Bank is
currently in full compliance with all the Arrangement export credit rules,
whether hard or soft,2 99 and has been at perfect, or close to perfect, compli-
ance throughout the Arrangement's history.300
How, then, are the international systemic linkages relevant to this Arti-
cle's exploration of compliance? First, the systemic linkages, in particular
the hardening of the Arrangement through the E.U. and the intermingling
through co-financing agreements, do have a profound and likely decisive
impact on compliance among non-Participants. Second, while the systemic
linkages or interlocking law may not have been the pivotal factor in historic
compliance, these linkages inevitably fortify the Arrangement and help per-
petuate Participants' compliance in the future. The Arrangement exists at
the center of a three-dimensional web of law, norms, and legal institutions,
which may unravel and disintegrate, some dimensions more than others, if
the Participants eschew the Arrangement. This web of interlocking relation-
ships adds a systemic, multidimensional quality to the Arrangement, trans-
forming it from an isolated gentlemen's agreement into a robust set of rules
that sometimes carries hard consequences. The Arrangement's systemic di-
mension certainly has not detracted from compliance and will likely bolster
and propel compliance in the future.
295. See Council of Ministers Decision of 4 April 1978, as amended by Decision 93/112/EEC. See also
supra note 280 for current decision.
296. See infra Table 2. The compliance index for E.U. Participants is 3.3, whereas the compliance in-
dex for non-E.U. Participants is 3.6.
297. See infra Table 4.
298. See supra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of certain Arrangement
rules into U.S. law).
299. See infra Table 2, showing that the United States complies with each of the Arrangement rules.
See also supra Part IV.B for discussion of Ex-Im Bank's compliance profile.
300. The compliance indices for the U.S. are: 4.0 (2003); 4.0 (1995); 4.0 (1990); 3.7 (1987); and 3.7
(1982). See infra Table 4.
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D. Why Compliance?: The Dynamics of the Arrangement
This Article is designed as a robust case study of an instance of overwhelm-
ing compliance with a piece of international regulation. In-depth analysis of
the Arrangement reveals a hodgepodge of possible explanations for Partici-
pants' compliance, broadly grouped as: state-interest-centered explanations,
Arrangement-centered explanations, and international systemic explana-
tions. The state-centered explanation that states comply because it is in their
interest to do so explains why states may have initially joined the Arrange-
ment but does not necessarily account for its sustenance, as well as its grad-
ual deepening and broadening. While vertical and horizontal linkages be-
tween the Arrangement and other law and legal institutions fortify compli-
ance, the historic data does not show these factors to be decisive.
So we are left with the Arrangement itself as the critical engine of com-
pliance. The Arrangement synergistically bundles multiple features that
entice Participants to comply. Consensus decision-making requires agreement
among Participants prior to codification and necessitates the type of incre-
mental evolution that results in the discovery of innovative and effective
rules; the soft-law housing is accommodating to this measured unfolding
and is non-intimidating to Participants when they dare to innovate (and
may later want to amend and change course). The Arrangement's commit-
ment to specificity enhances compliance by clarifying the standards to which
Participants should conform. A Participants group that is relatively small
and homogeneous not only makes it practical to proceed by consensus, but
also breeds the type of camaraderie where the label of "deviant" tars not
merely ECA, but also personal reputation. While the transparency-related
procedures enhance trust among Participants and confidence in the regime,
they also prompt the type of discussion and information exchange that prods
evolution that is responsive to Participants' Arrangement needs. Institution-
alized derogations pragmatically redefine compliance, inviting Participants
who occasionally must defect from the Arrangement to remain within the
Arrangement's sphere rather than alienating them as "deviant" within the
closely knit Participants' group. Perhaps the Arrangement's soft form, which
undoubtedly lowered the legal stakes of Participants' initial commitment
decisions, provides the flexibility and malleability necessary to maintain, in
some sort of delicate balance, the foregoing compliance factors within a co-
herent, yet evolving, Arrangement.
Indeed, much of the Arrangement's compliance power stems from a graceful
dynamism-a delicate embrace of innovation and change that prevents law
from becoming brittle and stale and open to disregard as irrelevant or anach-
ronistic. Of course, the Arrangement could not effectively cause change if
the Participants were not open to such change. Fortunately, an integral and
productive attitude of humility and imperfection permeates the Arrange-
ment. Prescribed reporting and assessment requirements are not mere in-
formation gathering but rather self-reflective moments designed to identify
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weaknesses, inconsistencies, and potentially undermining fissures. The Ar-
rangement's processes demand that each Participant be vigilant regarding
the Arrangement's continuing viability and efficacy.
Unfettered dynamism could potentially disintegrate the core or essence of
an international agreement. The Arrangement's juxtaposition of micro- and
macro-dynamism protects against this risk. On the macro level, the Partici-
pants exchange information and experiences to assure that the Arrangement
itself remains on an evolutionary, self-correcting, and self-bettering path. On
the micro-level, the Arrangement's notice-and-match and common line pro-
cesses enable Participants to ask for dispensation for a particular transaction
without requesting a cure at the Arrangement-level. This micro-dynamism
assures that law appropriately bends but simultaneously enables Participants
to distinguish between necessary dynamism of the moment and dynamism
necessary to forge a productive future.
Before concluding this Part, it bears mention that the Arrangement's im-
pact beyond the core group of Participants also opens a fresh window into
the process by which international rules become standard-setting interna-
tional norms. Interestingly, several non-Participants, including significant play-
ers in the international trading community, comply with most of the terms
of the Arrangement. In this case, some states follow the Arrangement as a
practical answer to co-financing relationships. Other states have ambitions
to be a member of a certain club, such as the E.U., and voluntarily comply
to satisfy membership requirements; the easy, attainable membership re-
quirements of the Arrangement appear to accommodate these ambitions. Yet
other states may comply to fall into the safe harbor of the WTO Subsidies
Agreement. When a legal regime bestows benefits, whether reputational or
otherwise, non-parties may voluntarily comply to share in such rewards.
Under ripe conditions, international rules self-propagate.
VI. COMPLIANCE THEORY AND THE ARRANGEMENT
This Article does not purport to draw a new, grandiose theory of compli-
ance from this single, though rich, case study. By design, this Article is an
empirical portrait of compliance that links compliance to the Arrangement's
rules, form, and history; it consciously stands in contrast to the broad theo-
retical work that this Part will examine. However, the example of the Ar-
rangement touches upon some of the most current, and heated, debates in
international compliance theory. As such, this Article would not be com-
plete without at least raising some of the theoretical issues that the Ar-
rangement and its record of compliance implicate. This Part briefly exam-
ines how the Arrangement fits into existing compliance theory, but com-
cludes that none of these theories are sufficiently robust to explain the Ar-
rangement's entire compliance story. Therefore, this Part also uses the Ar-
rangement as a vehicle to raise some of the questions that must be asked,
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and answered, in contemplation of a newer, more inclusive theory of compli-
ance.
A. Neo-Institutionalism and Managerialism
As discussed at the outset of Part V, the dominant compliance theory (re-
alism and rationalism) is decisively state interest-centered. 30 1 In its most
basic form, states comply with international law when it is in their self-
interest to do so; otherwise, states will defect. Yet state interests, while use-
ful in explaining Participants' initial commitment to the Arrangement, were
insufficient in accounting for sustained compliance. In composing the Ar-
rangement's compliance story, the international regulations themselves
played a starring role. Two newer compliance theories, neo-institutionalism
and managerialism, consciously elevate international rules and institutions.
Neo-institutionalism is an outgrowth of institutionalism. Institutional-
ists, like some rationalists, employ tools of economic analysis and game the-
ory and assume that states are unitary, rational actors that unapologetically
pursue their self-interest. 30 2 But, institutionalists, more than their rational-
ist cousins, 30 3 believe that law and legal institutions independently mold
and impact state behavior. 30 4 In other words, law is not a mere landscape
upon which state interests develop. 30 5 State interests are by no means irrele-
vant to institutionalists, but these interests flow through an institutional
sieve that may reshape and refine such interests. Institutionalists thus theo-
retically resuscitate law as an integral element of compliance theory.
301. See supra notes 131-139 and accompanying text.
302. For a sampling of institutionalist literature, see generally Robert 0. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin,
The Promise of lnstitutionalist Theory, 20 INT'L SEC. 39 (1995) ("Like realism, institutionalist theory is
utilitarian and rationalistic."); Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A
State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986); Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and
International Institutions, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 121 (1996) [hereinafter Political Economy]; Duncan
Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985) [hereinafter Game Theory]. In
addition, many of the "regime theorists," see supra note 26 and accompanying text, evolved into institu-
tionalists or have been deemed institutionalists from time to time. See Hathaway, supra note 12, at 1949
(arguing that modern literature uses the terms "regime" and "institution" interchangeably). In this Arti-
cle, "institutionalists" refer to the subclass of rationalists that believe law independently impacts state behavior.
303. Insitutionalists contend that regime theorists are quick to label any cooperative arrangement a
regime and thereby diminish and dilute the notion of law so that it recedes passively into the backdrop of
analysis. See Snidal, Political Economy, supra note 302, at 124 (stating that "[a]n ironic by-product of this
[regime theory's] broadened understanding of international institutions, however, is that the role of 1Os,
and of international law, came to be largely neglected in the ensuing regime literature"). See also Abbott,
supra note 137, at 345 (stating that regimes are often defined so broadly that they encompass much more
than formal, treaty-based international institutions). Yet institutionalists and regime theorists do not
merely disagree over semantics-regime (broad concept) vs. institution (narrower, concrete concept). For
regime theorists, international regimes come into existence in a moment of cooperative combustion and,
after their constitutive moment, become a backdrop--true window dressing-for the interaction of self-
interested state actors that found it in their self-interest to create a regime. As such, the international
regime-or international institution-"feels" exogenous to the continual compliance calculus.
304. See Snidal, Political Economy, supra note 302 (arguing that institutions are both exogenous and en-
dogenous variables in compliance decisions and thus exert an independent pull on state decisions).
305. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
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In practice, institutionalists tend to focus on formalized enforcement and
sanction mechanisms found in hard treaty law and tend to neglect the other
micro-operational rules that importantly contribute to the dynamics of law.
Since most soft law does not offer any formal sanction or enforcement
mechanisms, soft law is a virtual casualty of institutionalist analysis.30 6 Con-
sequently, classic institutionalist analysis tends to be narrow and would not
necessarily offer insights apropos to the Arrangement.
A recent group of neo-institutionalists, for lack of a more appropriate la-
bel, looks more closely at the structure of law and legal institutions through
the lens of a state's reputational capital.30 Neo-institutionalists, particularly
Professor Andrew Guzman, contend that once a state commits to an interna-
tional rule, the state will have placed some of its reputation at stake and that
the state's interest in following or violating the rule will be informed by the
costs of compliance, which include not only the hard costs of formal sanc-
tions,30 8 if any, but also the reputational costs of non-compliance.30 9 The
306. The institutionalist penchant for using game theory and other tools of economic analysis seems
to limit the depth and breadth at which they look at international rules. When games are constructed in
terms of "payoffs," formal sanction mechanisms are relatively easy to analyze because they are
quantifiable. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 302, at 40-44 discussing the role of payoffs in interna-
tional games. In addition, with use of games like the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Cold-War, national secu-
rity context, and brinkmanship situations (e.g., the Cuban Missle Crisis) become an institutionalist fa-
vorite. While formal treaties (with sanction mechanisms) and diplomatic crises are quite interesting,
these types of examples neglect not only soft law but also the non-sanction-oriented (non-payoff oriented)
rules in hard law as well. See Snidal, Political Economy, supra note 302, at 124 (examining the question of
"Why do so manyformal institutions exist?" (emphasis added)). See also, e.g., Jacobson & Weiss, supra note
226 (impressively exploring international environmental accords, but illustrating the institutionalist
penchant to look at formal treaties, which carry formal implementation and sanctions). See generally John
K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release
and Remediation in the Law ofTreaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REv. 1 (1997) (looking
at the formal mechanisms via which states can be "released" from treaty obligations).
Some institutionalists impressively dissect institutional arrangements into salient features and, using
rationalist game theory and rational choice frameworks, predict when states will choose certain institu-
tional configurations. See generally Barbara Koremenos, et al., The Rational Design of International Institu-
tions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761 (2001). This work is important in that it pierces the black box of international
institutions. This work is, however, self-admittedly not concerned with the compliance calculus but
rather the calculus of institutional design. While the two inquiries may overlap at times, this neo-
institutionalist work explicitly asks, "why are institutions designed as they are?" rather than, "do par-
ticular institutional designs enhance compliance?"
307. See Guzman, supra note 177, at 1823. See also Hathaway, supra note 12 (arguing that treaty
ratification is an effective signaling device that can enhance a state's reputation and diffuse international
pressure to ratify treaties); Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG.
495, 533 (1991) (arguing that formal and informal agreements are means through which states signal
different commitment levels and thereby place at risk different levels of reputational capital); Beth A.
Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Af-
fairs, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 819 (2000); Simmons, supra note 12, at 323 (arguing that states will com-
mit to international norms prohibiting currency restrictions on current account transactions to signal
commitment to free market practices which in turn signals a hospitable environment for foreign invest-
ment and trade).
308. Of course, formal sanction mechanisms such as trade sanctions, dispute resolution mechanisms,
or other types of retaliatory sanctions increase the potential costs of disregarding a rule (once a state has
committed to the rule). See Guzman, supra note 177, at 1865-72 (discussing the costs of direct sanctions
and the types of direct sanctions that effectively calibrate costs in the name of compliance).
309. Id. at 1849 ("Because a country's reputation has value and provides that country with benefits, a
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structure of law impacts these costs. 310 For example, the specificity of a legal
commitment calibrates the reputational impact of deviant behavior. A state's
eschewing of a clear, unambiguous mandate is more costly than a state's ig-
noring an ambiguous platitude for which there is no clear-cut compliance
route. 311 Likewise, a state's reputation will not suffer if other state parties are
unaware that it has violated an international rule. Reporting and other trans-
parency-enhancing mechanisms that might illuminate violations of interna-
tional law will derivatively increase the reputational impact of deviation. 312
In determining reputational costs, neo-institutionalists peer into legal struc-
tures more deeply than their institutionalist counterparts. Via reputation,
law and legal structures regain stature.
Importantly for the purposes of this Article's examination of a soft gen-
tlemen's agreement, Guzman conceives of law in functional terms. Law and
legal structures function to calibrate the costs of compliance and deviance.
While many international legal theories awkwardly deal with soft law as an
afterthought, or merely ignore soft law all together, neo-institutionalists create
analytically meaningful space for soft law as a zone on a long law continuum
that determines, in part, how much reputation a state will risk to commit to
a legal rule. 313 States may deem a soft legal instrument as less of a commit-
ment, thereby making the initial commitment decision less consequential
and lightening the reputational stakes of future deviance; with soft law, a
state may more readily commit but more easily deviate. Conversely, a hard
legal instrument, most prominently a treaty, heightens the reputational stakes,
raising the initial commitment hurdle but deterring or making costly future
deviations.314
country will hesitate before compromising that reputation."). Simmons, supra note 12, at 334, 361 com-
menting that:
[T~he making of legal commitments is one way in which actors signal their intentions to an interna-
tional community of states, internationally active economic agents, and domestic civil society....
[T]he results presented here suggest that governments are keenly aware of the impact that non-
compliance will have on their reputation, affecting their appeal as a venue for conducting interna-
tional transactions within a reasonably stable legal framework that protects property rights.
310. See Guzman, supra note 177, at 1861-65 (calibrating reputational costs with the severity of the
violation of international law, the reason for the violation, the clarity of the obligation (and violation),
and any implicit understandings).
311. Id. at 1857, 1863 (arguing that the clearer the commitment, the more obvious a violation and
the more likely that a country's reputation will be affected).
312. Guzman does not discuss transparency or other reporting mechanisms. In fact, his lack of atten-
tion to these types of details is a shortcoming of his theory. However, this example of transparency-
enhancing mechanisms follows logically from his analysis.
313. See id. at 1882-83, suggesting that:
The new theory recognizes that the discrete categories of treaties, CIL, and soft law, though perhaps
useful, do not themselves define international law or represent the only possible levels of commit-
ment. Rather, they are attempts to describe the spectrum of commitment from which states choose
the level that suits their purposes at any given time.
314. Id. at 1880 (Soft law agreements "are made with an understanding that they represent a level of
commitment that falls below that of a treaty. The violation of such an agreement, therefore, carries a less
severe reputational penalty than does violation of a treaty."). See also id. at 1856 ("Having the ability
either to commit or not commit is valuable, then, but the ability to choose from a range of commitment
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A second strand of scholarship treats compliance as a management issue
and identifies the legal institutions and processes that are integral to main-
taining compliance. In The New Sovereignty,315 Abram and Antonia Chayes
("Chayes and Chayes") develop an analytically seductive managerial model
to explain why states maintain their international legal commitments. Their
theory is rooted in a normative view of law, and they argue that the law has
an inherent compliance pull that stems from the normative weight of "pacta
sunt servanda-treaties are to be obeyed." 31 6 As such, Chayes and Chayes ex-
amine compliance only within the rubric of formal law, which, in the case of
international law, most often involves a formal treaty.317 Their theory is also
dialogic, in that the discursive process of legal definition, interpretation, and
application reinforces law's normative force. 318
On top of this initial normative compliance pull, compliance must be
managed through well-crafted legal rules. Legal rules that enhance transpar-
ency within treaty regimes not only reassure those states with an urge to
comply that others who are similarly situated will comply but also deter
those with an urge to deviate by exposure of the deviant behavior.319 Precise
legal drafting, coupled with appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms that
can clarify ambiguity, illuminates the content of legal rules and assures that
states understand the norms against which compliance will be measured. 320
Through flexible amendment, protocol, rulemaking, and review processes,
treaties importantly remain "adaptable to inevitable changes in technology,
shifts in substantive problems, and economic, social, and political develop-
levels is even more valuable. By varying the form of its promise, a state can choose its level of commit-
ment and signal that commitment to other states.").
315. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 177. See also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 180, at 187.
316. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 177, at 8 (arguing that the "fundamental norm" of international
law is "pacta sunt servanda-treaties are to be obeyed."). See also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 180, at 187
("ISIrares, like other subjects of legal rules, operate under a sense of obligation to conform their conduct
to governing norms.").
317. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 177, at 8.
318. See id. at 113-34, 143. In this sense, Chayes and Chayes are members, perhaps founders, of the
legal process school. Scholars in the legal process school, or, more recently the transnational legal process
school, recognize that the state's act of committing to an international norm, even a weak commitment,
may catalyze a domestic process whereby state interests evolve in favor of compliance or even obedience.
The domestic and international process of defining an international rule, refining the international rule,
incorporating international rules into domestic legal systems, and enforcing international rules as domes-
tic laws, engages a multitude of transnational actors that repeatedly interact in various forums, coalesce
into a type of epistemic community, and ultimately reconstitute state interests in support of the interna-
tional rule. See also Koh, supra note 11, at 2646; Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptional-
ism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law En-
forced?, 74 IND. L. J. 1397 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L.
REv. 181 (1996). However, Chayes and Chayes, unlike some who embrace transnational legal process, do
not lose sight of the micro-dynamics of legal rules in the name of examining the process by which these
rules transform state interests and become embedded in the domestic psyche.
319. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 177, at 22-24 (arguing that reporting, notification, data collec-
tion, verification, and monitoring are the engines of transparency and that the more effective these proc-
esses, the greater the free-flow of information and the higher degree of compliance).
320. See id. at 10-13.
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ments.' 321 Chayes and Chayes advocate a pragmatic tolerance for non-compli-
ance, recognizing not only that states might comply with most, but not all,
of their obligations over time,32 2 but also that deviance may indeed signal a
law's weaknesses. 323 They examine rules at a nuanced, micro-level, appreci-
ating that law, in its flexible, dynamic, and self-reflective state, will help mold
state interests and ultimately minimize deviant behavior. 324 Law does not
merely function as a "switching system, facilitating the independent interac-
tions of independent states," 325 but instead participates in compliance. With
their dynamic view of legal rules, Chayes and Chayes build possibly the most
robust theory of compliance available in the extant literature.
B. The Arrangement, Managerialism, and Neo-Institutionalism
1. The Arrangement, Neo-Institutionalism, and Reputation
Through the lens of the Arrangement, Guzman's reputation-infused neo-
institutionalism and the Chayeses' normative-based managerialism are os-
tensibly quite insightful. Guzman argues that legal structures, by virtue of
their impact on reputation, significantly inform compliance. 326 In particular,
Guzman finds a significant place for soft law as an organic zone on a law con-
tinuum where the reputational costs of deviance tend to be lower than those
321. Id. at 225 (citing ORAN 0. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVI-
RONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 76-77 (1994)). See also id. at 234 (discussing the importance of
International Labor Organization review procedures of state parties in promoting compliant behavior). See
generally id. at 243 (discussing OECD review procedures to monitor compliance with Codes of Liberaliza-
tion of Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions).
322. Id. at 120 (arguing that in spite of Brazil's imperfect compliance with IMF conditions in letters
of intent, the overall compliance record is "not bad"); see Chayes & Chayes, supra note 180, at 197-98
(discussing an "acceptable level of compliance" and, concomitantly, contemplating an acceptable level of
non-compliance).
323. As parties to a treaty share information, discuss the meaning of treaty provisions, and make indi-
vidual decisions on whether to deviate from treaty terms, they may, in reality, be identifying treaty weak-
nesses-weaknesses that can and should be corrected-in the legal regime. CHAYES & CHAYES, Supra
note 177, at 230 ("The reasons advanced to excuse noncompliant conduct point to avenues for improve-
ment and correction.").
324. See supra text accompanying note 177. The way that Chayes and Chayes structure The New Sover-
eignty demonstrates this well. They first discuss sanctions, given that much of international relations and
legal scholarship focus on sanctions, see supra note 177 and accompanying text, concluding that sanctions
regimes do not, alone, explain compliance and further suggesting that scholarly attention on sanctions
has been misguided. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 177, at 29-108. Chayes and Chayes then begin to
dissect treaty regimes with in-depth examinations, ripe with current examples of transparency mecha-
nisms, id. at 135-53, reporting and data collection, id. at 154-73, verification and monitoring, id. at
174-96, capacity building and technical assistance, id. at 197-201, dispute settlement mechanisms, id.
at 201-25, amendment and protocol procedures, id. at 225-27, and institutionalized review and assess-
ment of the regime and parties' behavior under the regime, id. at 229-49.
325. Id. at 229 arguing that:
(What is left out of th[e] institutionalist account is the active role of the regime in modifying pref-
erences, generating new options, persuading the parties to move toward increasing compliance with
regime norms, and guiding the evolution of the normative structure in the direction of the overall
objectives of the regime.
326. See supra notes 310-312 and accompanying text. See also Jacobson & Weiss, Assessing the Record
and Designing Strategies to Engage Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 226, at 541-42.
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associated with formal treaty frameworks. 327 Indeed, in the case of the Ar-
rangement, reputation (or more precisely a state's desire to maintain a cer-
tain reputation) appears to impact Participants' compliance decisions.
The Arrangement's soft law casing lowered the initial commitment hurdle
in part because it limited the reputational costs of subsequent deviation.3 28 Af-
ter the initial commitment, Participants steered a compliance course in part
as means to preserve their reputational stature. The Participants group is
small, maybe even insular, with a great sense of camaraderie. Within the
Participants group, states become synonymous with individual personalities,
as opposed to anonymous collections of individuals, and the urge to protect
and preserve reputations flourishes. Interlocking legal relationships effec-
tively transform the Participant group from one that is focused solely on the
Arrangement to a broader, trade finance community of individual policy
makers. With multiple interactions in a host of international trade and
finance-related forums, Participants' reputations for being compliers or devi-
ants will follow from one forum to another. The interconnectedness of law
thus maintains reputation's prominence in compliance decisions by com-
pounding the impact of non-compliance in a domino-like fashion and thereby
raising the actual and perceived reputational costs of deviance.
Reputation is most important in explaining documented compliance by
non-Participants. With non-Participants, the compliance and commitment
decisions are one in the same; because they have not made any type of com-
mitment to the Arrangement, non-Participants do not incur reputational
costs if they fail to comply with the Arrangement, but they gain reputa-
tional standing if they nonetheless comply. For some countries, particularly
those waiting to become members of the E.U., achieving this reputational
stature is an explicit precursor to membership. For others who want to play
a major role in international transactions, either through co-financing ar-
rangements or otherwise, voluntary adherence to the Arrangement's best
practices enhances their economic and business standing. The reputational
glow of the Arrangement is indisputably the driving force behind non-
Participant compliance.
2. The Arrangement and Managerialism
The New Sovereignty argues fundamentally that legal rules should actively
manage compliance and that certain types of legal rules-those that main-
tain transparency, appropriate specificity, elasticity, and a pragmaticism (es-
pecially with respect to compliance itself--will coddle and manipulate states
toward compliance.3 29 In short, Chayes and Chayes argue that dynamic law
327. See supra notes 313-314 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (observing that Participants noted that the soft form
was instrumental in the commitment decision).
329. See supra notes 319-338 and accompanying text for the Chayeses' description of the types of legal
rules that will enhance compliance. See also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 180, at 184 ("Treaties that last
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breeds compliance. The Arrangement is dynamic. The Arranagment's rules-
which Part V argues are integral to the Arrangement's compliance story-no-
tably showcase the management techniques that Chayes and Chayes advo-
cate. Just to recount a few, the Arrangement is replete with transparency-
related procedures, from mandated reviews to information exchange to
notification and reporting requirements, not only assuring that other Par-
ticipants are complying but also providing a window into those parts of the
Arrangement that work and those that do not. The Arrangement is notably
specific, pausing for consensus and evolving incrementally before incorpo-
rating general rules that may befuddle questions of compliance with ques-
tions about the meaning of norms. Through the notice-and-match and
common line procedures, the Arrangement embodies an elastic understand-
ing of compliance that supports Participants' desires to be less than perfectly
compliant. Automatic adjustment mechanisms ensure that the Arrangement
remains current, especially in its linkage to variable macroeconomic indica-
tors such as interest rates. The Arrangement's soft form loosens amendment
procedures, encouraging Participants to experiment yet making it easy for
them to make necessary corrections. This list is certainly not exhaustive but
merely intended to illustrate that the Arrangement indeed bundles precisely
the type of management techniques identified in The New Sovereignty as criti-
cal to the maintenance of compliance.
Chayes and Chayes are profound advocates of the simple proposition that
"law matters." Likewise, Part V of this Article concludes by arguing that the
Arrangement, as a dynamic package of such management techniques, is the
ultimate driver of compliance. This Article, like managerialism, examines
legal rules, not just for formal sanctioning mechanisms, but rather to under-
stand the micro procedures that govern the international instrument's day-
to-day, rote interaction with constituent states. As such, this Article's mode
of analysis neatly coincides with the Chayeses' view of law as actively inter-
playing with state interests in favor of compliance. The Arrangement osten-
sibly offers a robust case study to support managerialism.
3. The Arrangement: Harmonizing Neo-Institutionalism and Managerialism
While the Arrangement might appear as a perfect billboard advertisement
for each neo-institutionalism and managerialism, the Arrangement also
highlights their weaknesses. Guzman's neo-institutionalism makes impor-
tant analytic space for soft law, but it conceives of soft law rather narrowly in
terms of reputational capital and does not comprehend the true force of soft
law as it relates to compliance. 330 Guzman insightfully argues that a soft law
casing like the Arrangement might help Participants make a quick com-
must be able to adapt to inevitable changes in the economic, technological, social and political setting.").
330. Guzman, supra note 177, at 1880 (discussing the important role that soft law plays in interna-
tional legal relations, but attributing this role to the reputational costs of eschewing soft law obliga-
tions).
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mitment at a critical historic moment. Yet the predictive strength of his analy-
sis diminishes in examining the Arrangement over time. Guzman predicts
that the soft law form should not be as sticky in terms of continued compli-
ance because the reputational costs of withdrawing from commitments may
not be as great as those associated with hard law. 33' Instead, Participants
consistently deepened and extended their commitment to the Arrangement
over its life; as the empirical data offered herein shows, compliance rates
have been consistently high and do not show any of the slippage that Guz-
man might expect.
The Arrangement demonstrates that the soft law form, or any form that
permits law to evolve dynamically, is functional in its own right without
passing through a reputational filter. In focusing on the reputational impact
of soft law, Guzman simply does not explore the technical procedures that
contribute to compliance and thus does not fully appreciate law's dynamism
as an important, compliance-furthering trait.332 In fact, with reputation at
its center, Guzman's theory becomes heavily focused outward on the percep-
tions and receptions of other states at the expense of an inward focus on the
intricacies of legal rules. As such, his theory evinces some of the same short-
comings as his institutionalist forefathers: paying some minor attention to
law and legal structures but ultimately failing to consider law with any
significant attention to detail. If Guzman's theory is also to serve as an ac-
curate predictor of compliance, it must grow to further appreciate law up close.
331. See id. at 1857 ("The ability to modulate the level of obligation should not be mistaken for a sys-
tem of truly enforceable promises. By choosing one form of international agreement over another, coun-
tries are varying the reputational stake that they have in the obligation."); id. at 1880 (soft law agree-
ments "are made with an understanding that they represent a level of commitment that falls below that
of a treaty.").
332. The neo-institutionalists, while better than the classic rationalists and institutionalists, are of a
related breed and continue to analyze law, particularly soft law, at a macro, rather than a micro, level, at
times treating law in rather general terms and at other times circumscribing a detailed analysis or law
with heavy reliance on game theory and economics. At times, Guzman over-simplifies the commitment
decision and the compliance decision as two "yes or no" decision points in a simple, bilateral game and
does not focus on the technicalities or intricacies of law that continually function through the life of any
international agreement. Furthermore, Guzman's theory focuses primarily on the bilateral, rather than
multilateral, agreements; multilateral agreements may offer more complex and challenging contexts in
which to explain and analyze compliance. Guzman concedes that he embraces rational choice theory and
will use bilateral game models to develop his theory, but when he veers from pure game theory to offer
descriptive examples that lend themselves to more detailed analyses of rules, he gravitates toward exam-
ples like bilateral investment treaties or other bilateral arrangements instead of the more complex, mul-
tilateral agreements. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 177, at 1851 (discussion of bilateral investment trea-
ties). But see Simmons, Money and the Law, supra note 12, at 338 (examining the IMF rules on currency
convertibility in great detail and linking these rules to patterns of compliance).
When Guzman does focus on specific rules, his main focus (law), remains on sanction-like mecha-
nisms. See Guzman supra note 177, at 1855 for an examination of Guzman's analysis of the structure of
sanctions. See also Simmons, Money and the Law, supra note 12, at 338-40 (discussing official enforcement
mechanisms in the IMF currency convertibility rules), and other structures common to hard law instru-
ments.
In all fairness, Guzman's piece is designed to present a theory and beckons further empirical work,
which may indeed remedy this line of criticism.
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The Chayeses' theory is not without its own shortcomings. The manage-
rial model is too narrow in its view of formal international law, namely trea-
ties, as a normative predicate for compliance. 333 In the case of the Arrange-
ment, the managerial model has explanatory force in spite of or even because
of the Arrangement's soft form. The Arrangement's compliance-furthering
procedures exerted a powerful compliance pull independent of a formal
treaty. In fact, the Arrangement's soft law form was particularly conducive to
the amendment and reassessment processes that preserved the Arrangement's
dynamism. While Chayes and Chayes are self-consciously reticent to extend
their model beyond the formal treaty context, the Arrangement suggests
that this constriction may stymie their model's growth and widespread ap-
plicability.
This Article is a first step toward some synthesis of neo-institutionalism
and managerialism. The Chayeses' theory is attractive because it provides a
detailed plan for a compliance-oriented microstudy of law. How transparent
is the regime? What are the procedures for amending or changing the Ar-
rangement? How specific are the legal commitments? Is there an institu-
tionalized tolerance for reasonable non-compliance? Guzman's weakness is
his myopic approach to compliance through the lens of reputation, a lens
that focuses outward at states vis-t-vis other states rather than inward at the
role that the micro-structures of law and legal institutions may play in fur-
thering compliance. Managerialism could thus complement neo-institutional-
ism, providing a roadmap for an introspective examination of law that sup-
plements the extant reputational focus.
, Interestingly, in the case of the Arrangement, the very procedures that
Chayes and Chayes identify as crucial to management of compliance, such as
notice-and-match, reporting, the common line, and loose amendment pro-
cedures, ultimately force Participants to communicate to each other
throughout the life of the Arrangement. When Participants have to partici-
pate in the law, share (and receive) information, notify others of derogations,
and ask for advice on resolving interpretive ambiguities, they cannot recede
into anonymity but rather must worry about their respective reputations.
This institutionalized discussion, backed by effective communication proc-
esses unconstrained by the strictures of hard law, reinforces the camaraderie
of the Participants group. Thus, the compliance management techniques
that Chayes and Chayes identify derivatively reinforce the prominence of repu-
tation in compliance decisions and thereby buttress Guzman's reputation-
infused neo-institutionalism.
The Arrangement also assists in harmonizing some of the underlying as-
sumptions that ground both managerialism and neo-institutionalism. In The
New Sovereignty, Chayes and Chayes explicitly concede that some of their under-
lying assumptions are familiar institutionalist (and neo-institutionalist) as-
333. See supra notes 316-318 for a discussion of the normative role of law in the Chayeses' analysis.
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sumptions, specifically that states are self-interested, rational actors.334 They,
like Guzman, even recognize that reputation factors into a state's rational
compliance choices. 335 Yet the normative foundation of managerialism (that
management of compliance begins, and must begin, with a "legally binding"
treaty) is profoundly distinct from Guzman's conception of international law
as a continuum that embraces both formal and informal legal commitments.
The Arrangement strikes at managerialism's normative underpinnings,
demonstrating managerialism's viability in spite of its soft-law form. The
Arrangement thereby suggests that the normative pull of a formal treaty is
not a necessary predicate to managed compliance. Consequently, the Ar-
rangement permeates the foundational wall that stands between Chayes and
Chayes and Guzman and places both theories on the same plane with com-
mon, or at least not starkly divergent, assumptions.
The foregoing analysis assumes that the Arrangement does not exert a
normative pull because it is not a binding form of international law, and
therefore suggests that managerialism, which is quite useful in explaining
compliance in the Arrangement's case, may stand without its normative
base. Alternatively, we must at least consider whether the Arrangement,
despite its soft law form, nonetheless exerts a normative pull comparable to
that of a hard treaty. In so doing, we inevitably confront the utility and
functionality of the soft law/hard law categorical distinctions.
Current international norms pigeonhole international instruments into
the categories of hard, binding international law, 336 which includes formal
treaties, international agreements, and hardened customary international
norms, or soft, non-binding international law that includes "everything
else." 337 This classification scheme has been clumsy. The categorical ap-
proach is easy in the case of a formal treaty which is clearly hard law or in
the case of the Arrangement whereby the Participants explicitly state in the
preamble that the instrument is a mere gentlemen's agreement. 3 8 However,
334. Chayes and Chayes admit that much of their analysis is an expansion of the institutionalist en-
terprise. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 177, at 229. They also recognize that state interests remain
paramount in compliance decisions. Id. at 183 ("If issues of noncompliance and enforcement are endemic,
the real problem is likely to be that the original bargain did not adequately reflect the interests of those
that would be living under it."). Id. at 4-5 (arguing that treaty making is, in part, a process by which
states "weigh the benefits and burdens of commitment" and that states comply because compliance saves
"transaction costs"). See also id. at 134 (arguing that transparency mechanisms are important through use
of the arguments of "economics, game theory, and related disciplines").
335. Chayes and Chayes also recognize that reputational costs are important in compliance decisions.
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 180, at 240 (in discussing Brazil's willingness to abide by IMF arrange-
ments, they argue that "stigma" or reputation is important in Brazil's compliance decisions). Where they
deviate from most rationalists, be they institutionalists or any other breed, is in their ascribing to law an
active role in the continual process of managing compliance.
336. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
338. The Arrangement, supra note 4, Introduction at 8.
2004 / Compliance Theory and the Export Credit Arrangement
there is a host of international instruments that fall somewhere in between
and may defy comfortable categorization. 339
In part because of the imprecision in the definition of soft law and in part
because of the discomfort in using the term "law" to describe an instrument
that is non-binding, scholars and policymakers frequently use the binding/
non-binding axis as a surrogate for whether a rule actually qualifies as true
(or hard) law. If, in the face of a "binding" international legal instrument a
state disregards it, many are quick to proclaim that because the rule did not
in practice "bind," it must in fact be a "non-binding" norm, a term that is
used to describe those international rules and regulations that are something
less than true law.340 In the world of international law, this predicament
harkens the all-too-familiar "what is law" debate that questions the very
existence of international law as a result of willful non-compliance in an an-
archical world without any hard enforcement mechanisms. 341
The case of the Arrangement poses a different conceptional problem.
While the Arrangement is explicitly a non-binding gentlemen's agreement,
it nonetheless embodies the specificity and precision typical of hard law
commitments. Additionally, in practice, the Arrangement catalyzes wide-
spread compliance whereby states act as if they were bound. One inevitably
wants to label the Arrangement "law" because it looks like law and performs
as law is supposed to perform. Yet how can the Arrangement be law when it
is a self-professed non-binding instrument? The Arrangement fundamen-
tally challenges us to ask whether the law (hard law)/non-law (soft law) dis-
339. See BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (3d ed. 1999) (demonstrating
how categories of international law create "ambiguities"). See also JONATHAN L. CHARNEY, Compliance
with International Soft Law, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 147, at 115, 115 (arguing
that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a "legally binding" international agreement and a
"non-binding" international agreement).
340. See generally Lipson, supra note 307, at 508 ("In international affairs, then, the term 'binding
agreement' is a misleading hyperbole."). This predicament is anomalous because we do not arrive at
similar conclusions when individuals violate domestic law and statutes-such as local law requiring the
carrying of a driver's license
341. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 201 (1954) ("And
hence it inevitably follows, that the law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive
law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. As I have al-
ready intimated, the law obtaining between nations is law (improperly called so) set by general opin-
ion."); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988) (framing
the debate with the following question: "Why should rules, unsupported by an effective structure of
coercion comparable to a national police force, nevertheless elicit so much compliance, even against per-
ceived self-interest, on the part of sovereign states?"); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 13-27
(2d ed. 1979) (describing the critics of international law in the following terms: "In sum, to many an
observer, governments seem largely free to decide whether to agree to new law, whether to accept another
nation's view of existing law, whether to comply with agreed law. International law, then is voluntary and
only hortatory."). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, Introductory Note, Part I ("The absence of central legislative and executive institutions has led
to skepticism about the legal quality of international law. Many observers consider international law to
be only a series of precepts of morality or etiquette, of cautions and admonitions lacking in both
specificity and binding quality .... These impressions are mistaken.").
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tinctions are really about law being binding or non-binding or whether hard
law and soft law divide along some other axis.
In providing a logical, functional answer to this question, Guzman makes
a unique and substantial contribution to the compliance literature. Guzman
argues that the hard law/soft law distinctions are little more than cosmetic
labels on a unified "law" continuum. 342 The difference between soft law and
hard law is not a matter of falling inside or outside of the formal categorical
definition of international law 343-which in turn separates binding from
non-binding instruments-but rather a matter of calibrating or signaling
expected reputational costs of non-compliance. Guzman's conception thereby
eschews the awkward binding/non-binding distinction as the pivotal axis.
Soft law and hard law are equally binding or non-binding as the state's deci-
sion on whether to actually be bound to any international rule is a result of
its rational weighing of the costs and benefits of deviance. 344
Guzman's theory of international law importantly envelops instruments
like the Arrangement. Under Guzman's scheme, the Arrangement is law-
not hard law, not soft law, just law. The Arrangement's form, a soft exterior
housing specific, technical rules typical of hard instruments, modulates the
costs of subsequent non-compliance, suspended somewhere between the signifi-
cant reputational commitment attached to a formal treaty and the limited
reputational commitment of a private diplomatic handshake. In solving the
Arrangement's paradox of high compliance in spite of its non-binding cloak,
Guzman's reconception of international law is initially attractive and cer-
tainly deserving of further study.
In the end, this Article argues that the Arrangement itself-whether a
soft "non-binding" instrument or, in Guzman's scheme, mere "law"-is an
important, if not decisive, engine of profound and sustained compliance.
Whether this conclusion applies beyond the Arrangement to international
legal regulation more generally clearly demands additional comparative analy-
sis. Regardless, the Arrangement is a powerful example for those-like
Chayes and Chayes and Guzman-that embrace the import of international
rules in compliance decisions. It is a potent counterexample for others, like
342. See Guzman, supra note 177, at 1881 ("Agreements among states lie on a spectrum of commit-
ment. The same reputational issues influence such promises regardless of the form in which they are
made, but the magnitude of the reputational effect varies with the level of commitment.").
343. See id. ("This theory makes the traditional separation of treaties from soft law difficult to main-
tain because the theory recognizes no clear distinction between treaties and other promises."). See also id.
at 1882 ("The new theory recognizes that the discrete categories of treaties, CIL, and soft law, though
perhaps useful, do not themselves define international law or represent the only possible levels of com-
mitment.").
344. While Guzman's functional theory of international law uniquely makes room for soft law as law,
other scholars are importantly examining the role of soft law norms. Jacobson & Weiss, supra note 226. A
cluster of international legal scholars examine soft law in great detail, looking at types of soft instruments
and attempting to link characteristics of soft law instruments with compliance. As impressive as this
study is, however, it is, for the most part, as evidenced by its title, circumscribed by the notion that
"non-binding norm" and "soft law" are interchangeable terms. Guzman's innovative contribution is that
ofdelinking "soft law" from the "binding/non-binding" axis.
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the realists and rationalists, who tend to minimize the importance of legal
rules in explaining compliance. And maybe the Arrangement even chal-
lenges us to think critically about why we categorize only certain types of
international rules as binding, or hard, international law. The Arrangement,
and thereby this Article, cannot provide the answers to these fundamental,
almost existential, theoretical questions. But the Arrangement is indeed
provocative and may prove useful in furthering scholarly and theoretical
debate in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article concludes that the Arrangement's rules matter. Yet these rules
do not matter simply because they are packaged in a form, like a treaty, that
inherits the binding label. Indeed, much binding international law actually
binds states, but so-called non-binding rules, such as those embodied in the
Arrangement, may also in practice bind states, as dramatically illustrated by
the Arrangement's strong record of compliance documented in this Article.
The binding label is simply not the appropriate arbiter of compliance here.
International rules must work effectively to steer, maybe even manipulate,
states toward a path of steady compliance. The Arrangement works. It works
because it dynamically engages Participants within a malleable form that is
hospitable to innovation, evolution, and correction. It works because the
nitty-gritty details force Participants to dialogue and engage the document's
strengths and weaknesses. And it works because it embodies a flexible, prac-
tical understanding of compliance itself that invites rather than alienates.
Indeed, states will continue to act in self-interested ways. But even if an in-
ternational rule is in a country's self-interest, not all arrangements will effec-
tively promote compliance and not all will attract the unswerving loyalty of
state parties. At a moment when international law and international institu-
tions are mounting, the Arrangement can teach much about legal rules and
legal structures. But before we can meaningfully learn, we must consider a
world beyond the formal treaties that adorn headlines. Here, in the under-
brush, lies an agreement that lawyers do not recognize technically as law but
nonetheless, in its elegance and dynamism, functions like law and shapes the
everyday minutiae of state practice.
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